Criminal Law - People v. Knoller

● Rule ○ A finding of implied malice requires that one act with a conscious disregard to human life. ● Facts ○ Marjorie Knoller (defendant) and her husband Robert Noel were attorneys who acquired four large dogs from a client. A veterinarian who examined the dogs for Knoller warned her that the dogs lacked any training or discipline and that they would be dangerous to keep at a home. He also implied that the dogs might attack humans. Despite the warnings, Knoller and Noel picked up the dogs from their former owner. While with the former owner, two of the dogs had attacked and killed the owner’s sheep and cat, and another ate his own doghouse. The former owner expressed her concern about all the dogs and suggested that two of them be shot. On April 30, 2000, Knoller and Noel brought two of the dogs to stay at their apartment. On January 26, 2001, the dogs attacked and killed Diane Whipple, who lived on the same floor. Between the date Knoller and Noel brought the dogs home and the date of Whipple’s death, there were approximately thirty incidents in which the dogs were out of control or displayed threatening behavior. Knoller was charged with second degree murder. The jury convicted Knoller based on a theory of implied malice. Knoller moved for a new trial and the trial court granted the motion. The trial court held that implied malice required a finding that Knoller was aware of the high probability that her conduct would cause another’s death, and ruled that Knoller lacked this awareness. The Court of Appeal reversed the decision granting a new trial, holding that implied malice only requires a conscious disregard of the risk of serious bodily injury to another, not an awareness that another person would likely die. The Court of Appeal ordered the trial court to reconsider its decision on Knoller’s motion for retrial in light of its definition of implied malice. Knoller appealed the Court of Appeal’s decision. ● Issue ○ Does a finding of implied malice require one to act only with a conscious disregard for the risk of serious bodily injury to another rather than with a conscious disregard for human life? ● Holding & Reasoning ○ No. A murder conviction requires a finding of malice, which can be express or implied. A finding of implied malice requires that one act with a conscious disregard for human life. The Court of Appeal erroneously ruled that implied malice only requires a conscious disregard for the risk of serious bodily injury. It based its definition of implied malice on People v. Conley, 411 P.2d 911 (1966), in which this court said an act that is likely to cause either serious injury or death demonstrates malice. However, the ruling in Conley dealt with a defendant’s action, whereas implied malice concerns a defendant’s mental state. Therefore, Conley is not applicable to the issue of what type of mental state a defendant must possess for a finding of implied malice. This court has consistently stated in cases before and after Conley that implied malice requires an awareness of a risk to human life, not merely of serious bodily injury. Thus, the trial court properly required that the defendant act with a conscious disregard to human life. Nevertheless, the trial court still erred in defining implied malice. The proper test for implied malice is laid out in People v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353 (1966). The Phillips test requires that a defendant have awareness of engaging in conduct that endangers the life of another. Here, the trial court set the bar too high and required that a defendant have an awareness that her conduct had a high probability of resulting in death. The Court of Appeal set the bar too low and permitted a conviction of second degree murder where the defendant knew his or her conduct risked causing death or serious bodily injury. Under the proper test (that is, the Phillips test), malice is implied when a defendant acts with conscious disregard for life. Because it based its order granting a new trial on an erroneous definition of implied malice, the trial court must reconsider its order granting a new trial in accordance with this court’s opinion.