Nintendo’s Revolution Guide (Figures)

NINTENDO’S “REVOLUTION” Sangbeom Kim, Ian Lamont, Hiroshi Ogasawara, Mansoo Park, Hiroaki Takaoka Figure 1 Revolution Core Product Team Genyo Takeda Shigeru Miyamoto Kou Shiota Kenichiro Ashida Akio Ikeda Junji Takamoto General Manager, Integrated Research and Development Division General Manager, Entertainment Analysis and Development Division. Miyamoto was a legend in the industry for his software development work and design for games such as Donkey Kong and early NES titles such as Super Mario Bros. He had also worked on titles for the GameCube, including Legend of Zelda. Integrated Research and Development Division, Product Development Department, Development Group No. 2. Shiota’s specialty was semiconductor design. He, too, had worked on the GameCube. Integrated Research and Development Division, Product Development Department, Design Group. Ashida was a long-time Nintendo employee who had worked on the Super NES, Nintendo 64, and GameCube, and for the Revolution was responsible for the design of the console, controller, packaging, and logos. Integrated Research and Development Division, Product Development Department, Development Group No. 5. Ikeda had developed several games in the past that had used accelerometers and innovative interfaces. Integrated Research and Development Division, Product Development Department, Development Group No. 3. Takamoto was responsible for all hardware parts on the Revolution with the exception of the circuit board. As planning began on Nintendo’s next-generation gaming console in the months following the release of the GameCube, the team began to think about the core concepts that would underlie the project. Takeda described the typical development process for a new console: As soon as we complete one system, we start thinking about the next one. Needless to say we don’t design new components or technologies from scratch. Rather, we have to base our designs on existing technologies. In the world of technology, there are so-called Roadmaps (overviews of proposed technologies/products) that are used by each industry in order to make general forecasts about where semiconductor technology is heading, as well as the evolution of disc and wireless technologies. Engineers and developers normally refer to these Roadmaps while developing hardware.55 However, some Nintendo executives and engineers had begun to question the importance of traditional hardware preferences, such as faster processors, slick graphics, and sophisticated 55 “Using State-Of-The-Art Technology in Unprecedented Ways,” Wii.nintendo-europe.com, December 2006. Accessed from http://wii.nintendoeurope.com/455.html in December 2010. 12 NINTENDO’S “REVOLUTION” Sangbeom Kim, Ian Lamont, Hiroshi Ogasawara, Mansoo Park, Hiroaki Takaoka controllers. Even before the Revolution project, Miyamoto worked on a game called Animal Forest, which was launched for the Nintendo 64 console in 2001. He deliberately designed it to be easy to play and appeal to a wide range of people. Takeda had also considered non-traditional gamers in his earlier work on the GameCube, which had a controller with an extra large “A” button for inexperienced gamers. In 2003, Takeda proposed that the Revolution project should depart from the technological roadmap, believing that the performance arms race, which drove Sony and Microsoft’s console efforts, was ultimately futile for Nintendo: After speaking with Nintendo’s development partners, I became keenly aware of the fact that there is no end to the desire of those who just want more. Give them one, they ask for two. Give them two, and next time they will ask for five instead of three. Then they want ten, thirty, a hundred, their desire growing exponentially. Giving in to this will lead us nowhere in the end. I started to feel unsure about following that path about a year into development.56 Iwata and the team began to discuss how best to approach the challenge of developing a console that would increase the population of gamers beyond its traditional customer base. Certain elements from the GameCube, including the CPU and GPU, could be upgraded for the Revolution, but other elements would have to be completely redesigned, based on new product concepts. By 2003, the team had identified several basic concepts for the console: • • • • • The Revolution was not just a toy for children. The console had to be familiar enough to be played by all family members, right in the living room. It had to be designed in a way that it would be acceptable to mothers, as they have control over the living room in most households. This meant a small, polished design. The console should be inexpensive compared to rival products – namely, Sony PlayStation and Microsoft’s Xbox. Ideally, the price should be less than 10,000 yen (about $100). Software should be easy enough to play so that every family member can play, even for a short time. The console would need to stay on for 24 hours, consume little electricity, and make little sound.57 There were other requirements, as well. Besides appealing to mothers, Nintendo had to entice partners, particularly developers. Further, the Revolution had to be backwards compatible with older GameCube games and even games from earlier Nintendo consoles, such as the Nintendo 64. This 56 “Using State-Of-The-Art Technology in Unprecedented Ways,” Wii.nintendo-europe.com, December 2006. Accessed from http://wii.nintendo- europe.com/455.html in December 2010. 57 Ibid; “Wii Remote: Taking Control Back To The Drawing Board,” Wii.nintendo-europe.com, December 2006. Accessed from http://wii.nintendoeurope.com/164.html in December 2010; “The Big Ideas Behind Nintendo’s Wii,” BusinessWeek, November 16, 2006. Accessed from http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/nov2006/tc20061116_750580.htm in November 2010. 13 NINTENDO’S “REVOLUTION” Sangbeom Kim, Ian Lamont, Hiroshi Ogasawara, Mansoo Park, Hiroaki Takaoka would help the Revolution launch with a back catalog, and would also appeal to loyal Nintendo customers who had invested in GameCube games.58 This new approach to console design was extended to the controller. Designer Kenichiro Ashida explained the evolution of his thinking about the controller: I felt strongly that this would be a console that I, too, could enjoy. More specifically, I felt that it might be time to reconsider the entire game-play style of grasping the controller with two hands, sitting glued to the TV until morning. Of course, I’m not rejecting that intense style of play, but I did feel that taking the whole idea of grasping the controller with two hands back to the drawing board offered a glimpse of the future.59 The rest of the design team, right up to the CEO, was supportive of the new approach. Iwata, as someone who had started developing computer games on a programmable calculator when he was a teenager, appreciated evolutionary steps in game-play and hardware design, and encouraged the team to think creatively. However, there were limits to how far the team would go, as Miyamoto noted: This was good in the sense that it allowed us to consider ideas such as not using hands at all, or even putting the controller on your head. Of course, going too far in that direction would just lead to something that is different just for the sake of being different. An eccentric design like that might work well for some games, but could never be used as a standard, making it a difficult choice for a console’s primary controller. So we wanted to come up with a bold and daring design that would be within the bounds of reason.60 Takeda formed a special controller development team. He believed that the controller was not just a console peripheral, but also an intermediary between man and machine, and even an extension of the human body. As the controller would be the most frequently used part of the console, the controller development team aimed to create a simple and comfortable controller, which everyone would like to touch.61 The team created a series of prototypes. Early designs were molded out of clay or Styrofoam. The more promising designs were turned into plastic prototypes with working buttons. One prototype had a touch panel like the Nintendo DS. Another featured a mouse-like pointing device. There was also a track pad, and even a hat-like controller that allowed gamers to play without using their hands. The team constantly experimented with the designs, but decided a pointer-based controller was the best way to go. 58 “Wii Remote: Taking Control Back To The Drawing Board,” Wii.nintendo-europe.com, December 2006. Accessed from http://wii.nintendoeurope.com/164.html in December 2010. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 61 Kouji Sasaki, “Interview with Satoru Iwata,” Nikkei Business, November 27, 2006. 14 NINTENDO’S “REVOLUTION” Sangbeom Kim, Ian Lamont, Hiroshi Ogasawara, Mansoo Park, Hiroaki Takaoka But within the team, there were debates about what the controller should look like.62 Console gaming had been based on a two-handed experience since the first joysticks were developed in the 1970s. One pointer-based design was a two-handed controller with a pointer in the middle. This prototype was named “Gunbai,” after the referee’s fan in Japanese Sumo wrestling. However, Miyamoto was interested in a one-handed device — perhaps something that resembled a familiar device like a mobile phone — that was easy to use and not intimidating to new gamers. Iwata seized upon the idea of something that looked like a TV remote control. Eventually, Ashida and his staff drew up a rodshaped pointer, and a demonstration unit was prepared.63 Decision Point Iwata eagerly entered the conference room and looked at the new rod-shaped device on the table. He had tried pointer-based prototypes before, but this single-handed design appealed to him: “From the moment I picked it up, t. I had handled other pointer devices before, and . The pointer idea itself was also good, but in this case i ,t , that was particularly good.”64 But some members of the team had reservations. Ashida reminded the group Revolution to be able to play G as well as Most of these games required two-handed play. On top of that, they also had to consider the t Despite all of the attention on the “mom” crowd and other new audience segments, Nintendo needed to convince serious gamers to give the Revolution a chance. The team knew that overseas gamers preferred first-person shooters and other action titles s.65 that worked well with In addition, Ashida pointed to game developers, who had their own ideas about innovation: “There were also requests from the development teams for Metroid and other software titles asking for a new kind of controller that uses both hands, that can offer a new type of game-play.”66 Iwata knew that the team was taking a big gamble with a new controller design. While they had brainstormed and experimented extensively, the company refused to bring in focus groups to test out the designs, partially out of fear of leaks. As a result of this decision, the company would only know user reaction after the Revolution’s launch. 62 “Wii Remote: Taking Control Back To The Drawing Board,” Wii.nintendo-europe.com, December 2006. Accessed from http://wii.nintendo- europe.com/164.html in December 2010. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 15 NINTENDO’S “REVOLUTION” Sangbeom Kim, Ian Lamont, Hiroshi Ogasawara, Mansoo Park, Hiroaki Takaoka Besides user reaction, there was also the question of how the proposed one-handed rod could be used with older Nintendo console games that had been designed for two-handed controllers. Backwardscompatibility with the older games was required, to give an incentive for the existing customers who owned them to upgrade to the new console. How could the Revolution’s rod controller be modified for two-handed action? Iwata and his team had little time. At the 2005 E3 gaming exposition in Los Angeles, Nintendo planned to announce the Revolution, and maybe even demonstrate the console and controller. Industry buzz was pointing to both Microsoft and Sony announcing their own next-generation consoles at E3. Would Nintendo be able to deliver? 16 NINTENDO’S “REVOLUTION” Sangbeom Kim, Ian Lamont, Hiroshi Ogasawara, Mansoo Park, Hiroaki Takaoka Exhibit 1 Nintendo Famicom/NES 17 NINTENDO’S “REVOLUTION” Sangbeom Kim, Ian Lamont, Hiroshi Ogasawara, Mansoo Park, Hiroaki Takaoka Exhibit 2 Nintendo Virtual Boy 18 NINTENDO’S “REVOLUTION” Sangbeom Kim, Ian Lamont, Hiroshi Ogasawara, Mansoo Park, Hiroaki Takaoka Exhibit 3 Nintendo 64 Source: Ciro Duran/cirofono, http://www.flickr.com/photos/ciroduran/3109883260/. 19 NINTENDO’S “REVOLUTION” Sangbeom Kim, Ian Lamont, Hiroshi Ogasawara, Mansoo Park, Hiroaki Takaoka Exhibit 4 Nintendo GameCube* *GameCube accessories include bongo drums, used for titles such as Donkey Kong Jungle Beat. 20 NINTENDO’S “REVOLUTION” Sangbeom Kim, Ian Lamont, Hiroshi Ogasawara, Mansoo Park, Hiroaki Takaoka Exhibit 5 Hanafuda 48 Cards 21 NINTENDO’S “REVOLUTION” Sangbeom Kim, Ian Lamont, Hiroshi Ogasawara, Mansoo Park, Hiroaki Takaoka Appendix 1 Most Popular Game Types (% of games sold in U.S., 2004) Genre Console games PC games Action 30% 4% Sports 18% 5% Shooter 10% 16% Children & family entertainment 10% 20% Racing 9% N/A RPG 9% 10% Fighting 5% N/A Strategy N/A 27% Adventure N/A 6% Appendix 2 Top-selling U.S. Console and Portable Games, 2004 Name Console Units (million) 1 Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas PS2 5.1 2 Halo 2 Xbox 4.2 3 Madden NFL 2005 PS2 3.2 4 ESPN NFL 2K5 PS2 1.5 5 Need for Speed Underground 2 PS2 1.4 6 Pokémon FireRed (with adapter) GameBoy 1.2 7 NBA Live 2005 PS2 1.2 8 Spider-Man 2 PS2 1.1 9 Halo: Combat Evolved Xbox 1.1 10 ESPN NFL 2K5 Xbox 1 22 NINTENDO’S “REVOLUTION” Sangbeom Kim, Ian Lamont, Hiroshi Ogasawara, Mansoo Park, Hiroaki Takaoka Appendix 3 Production and Sales Information, FY 2004 Production 2003 2004 Handheld 128,902 200,502 Console 171,730 14,368 Others 39,156 24,835 Subtotal 339,789 239,707 Handheld 129,830 119,746 Console 107,204 94,727 Subtotal 237,034 214,474 Other Products 704 1,506 Total 577,528 455,687 Handheld 132,246 185,175 Console 101,554 54,366 Others 41,453 49,679 Subtotal 275,254 289,220 Handheld 123,369 132,911 Console 99,325 86,262 Royalty income and contents income 3,978 3,015 Other 476 881 Subtotal 227,149 223,070 Other Products 1,730 2,513 Total 504,135 514,805 Electronic entertainment products (Hardware) (Software) Sales Electronic entertainment products (Hardware) (Software) 23