Counterintelligence in the Kingdom and the States

Counterintelligence in the Kingdom and the States Executive Summary The United States and the United Kingdom have different kinds of organizations to defend their national security from espionage and terrorist threats. The US relies on the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), a law enforcement agency with counterintelligence functions, while the UK depends on the Security Service (MI5), a purely counterintelligence agency without law enforcement powers, to meet these challenges. The purpose of this paper is to examine the benefits, detriments, and the key motivations behind each system’s development for the sake of showing that MI5 has ultimately served the UK better than the FBI has served the US in the realm of counterintelligence. The historical trajectory of the Security Service is one of constant honing of counterintelligence work from its very inception. The history of the FBI reveals an organization that was initially established for law enforcement purposes and has never completely abandoned its preference for that mission amid US governmental pressure to become more intelligencedriven in times of international crisis (especially during World War I, World War II, and parts of the Cold War). The counterintelligence practices of the Service and the Bureau throughout their histories illustrate the deficiencies and proficiencies of each, which mutually contribute to the understanding of key counterintelligence qualities that are presented in the final chapter. These attributes are an overall penchant for secrecy, an external orientation, and a preventative operational culture. MI5 is shown to possess all of these qualities consistently while the FBI is found to have strived toward them in particular instances and only in contradiction to its own preferences. The final analysis indicates that the FBI can learn from its own history and MI5’s history to defend the US from new threats in the future, if it only chooses to do so. Chapter 1: Introduction Every nation in the world seeks to protect its own secret information while attempting to learn other countries’ secrets. There are countless reasons that national governments engage in the practice of intelligence. For example, a state may desire to estimate a rival’s military capabilities, to improve diplomatic bargaining power, or to learn what a rival truly knows and thinks in secret to predict the future outcome of events. At the same time, states go to great lengths to protect their own proprietary information from foreign and domestic prying eyes for the sake of maintaining various advantages but also to protect their populations from inimical influences and physical danger. The intelligence component of national security is recognized by every nation, but there is great variation in the organizational structures that have been adopted to fulfill this mission. The United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) eventually built their modern intelligence communities (ICs) with similar yet notably distinct structures. Both countries have foreign intelligence systems that engage in espionage abroad – the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the US and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6) in the UK. The major point of intelligence organization departure in these two governments is found in their differing approaches to counterintelligence – the practice of identifying, apprehending, deterring, and manipulating enemy intelligence operatives or agents. The UK has the Security Service (MI5/the Security Service/the Service) for the mission of counterintelligence and domestic intelligence, which is the application of intelligence practices against purely domestic threats. When the US has deemed it necessary to concentrate on these missions, it has turned not to a pure intelligence organization but rather to the primarily law enforcement and investigative agency of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI/the Bureau). MI5 has never had police 1 powers nor an anti-crime mission (except for briefly in the 1990s) whereas the FBI has had independent police powers to carry weapons and make arrests since the mid-1930s.1 To put it concisely, the US relies on the Bureau for law enforcement, domestic security, and counterintelligence while the UK’s MI5 has focused on the latter two missions. Eventually, both organizations were also called upon to take the lead in countering the international and domestic threat from terrorism. The terrorist attacks against the US on September 11, 2001 and subsequent international terrorist acts against the UK provided an occasion for both countries to reexamine the steps each had taken to counter foreign intelligence and terrorist threats. The debate in the US was particularly heated because the FBI had, in part, been blamed for failing to prevent the 9/11 attacks. This turn of events sparked a vigorous debate concerning the future of the US intelligence community (USIC). The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (or the 9/11 Commission) charged the FBI with intelligence failures and addressed the possibility of creating a new organization for the US modeled on the UK’s MI5.2 However, the commissioners did have serious reservations about recommending such a dramatic step – in the end they did not push for this policy prescription.3 Judge Richard Posner, a leading advocate for an American MI5, argued that the Bureau’s culture of law enforcement has prevented it from preventing terrorist threats on account of the necessary law enforcement emphasis on arrest and prosecution.4 John P. Mudd, a veteran of the CIA and Deputy Director of the Bureau’s National Security Branch, staunchly criticized Judge 1 FBI. "A Short History of the FBI." FBI Records: The Vault. 6. http://vault.fbi.gov/FBI%20History/FBI%20History%20Part%201%20of%208/view (accessed March 26, 2014). 2 Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri. The FBI: A History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007. 247. 3 Ibid. 4 Posner, Richard A. "We Need Our Own MI5." Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/08/14/AR2006081401160.html (accessed March 26, 2014). 2 Posner’s conclusions, arguing that the Bureau is perfectly capable of fulfilling its intelligence mission and that it is generally unhindered by its law enforcement mandate.5 Mudd also argued that the separation of police and intelligence functions would increase bureaucratic confusion, though the UK has lived with this arrangement since the founding of its IC.6 James A. Lewis, a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, rightly points out the fundamental differences between the UK and US systems of governance but nonetheless maintains that the US can learn important lessons from UK security organization even if it cannot adopt the same model in its entirety.7 A Congressional Research Service report by Todd Masse in 2003 further stressed the differences between the US and the UK, concluding that each democracy approaches the balance between civil liberty and security in different ways.8 Masse suggests but does not state outright that there is little merit in comparing the two systems given these differences.9 The UK did not engage in similar soul-searching in part because, while the UK lost the most lives to a single terrorist attack than ever before on 9/11, the attacks had occurred on US soil, not UK home territory. In end, the UK ultimately decided to keep its longtime arrangement of pure counterintelligence in MI5 separate from its various police organizations and the US doubled down on its perennial preference to combine intelligence and law enforcement in the FBI. To be sure, there are substantial reasons that complicate the comparison of MI5 and the FBI. First of all, the US is much larger than the UK with a population roughly five times the 5 Mudd, John P. "In Domestic Intelligence Gathering, the FBI Is Definitely on the Case ." FBI National Press Releases. http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/in-domestic-intelligence-gathering-the-fbi-is-definitelyon-the-case (accessed March 26, 2014). 6 Ibid. 7 Lewis, James A. "Why Can’t the US Have Its Own MI5?" Center for Strategic and International Studies. 4. https://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060816_mi5_envy.pdf (accessed March 26, 2014). 8 Masse, Todd. "Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom: Applicability of the MI-5 Model to the United States." Congressional Research Service. 14-15. http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31920.pdf (accessed March 26, 2014). 9 Ibid. 3 UK’s.10 Policy prescriptions that work for one will not necessarily work for another on account of the sheer size difference – an American MI5 would need to be much larger and more bureaucratic than MI5, possibly limiting the projected benefits of this policy choice. The second obstruction to simple comparison can be found in the nature of the UK and US systems of governance – the FBI is a federal organization that is required to work while respecting local and state law jurisdictions. MI5, lacking police powers, does need to coordinate with the UK’s police agencies very closely, but the nature of this relationship between the Service and police is much less complicated than the Bureau’s relationships at local levels. Third, while US culture and UK culture are hardly dissimilar (given the two countries’ shared heritage), their approaches to civil liberties are very different, which has independently shaped how each country provides security for its citizens.11 In general, Americans are thought to value civil liberties much more than their European partners. This in turn has shaped how policy makers have acted and it is frequently cited to deflate comparison of US and European security practices. Fourth, the security concerns of the US and the UK have been shaped by their respective geographical positions in the world. The UK has always had a hotbed of competitive neighbors on the European continent while the US has lived relatively peacefully with its North American neighbors since the end of the 19th century. This respective distance and proximity to foreign threats and influence has certainly shaped how these nations have chosen to defend themselves with MI5 and the FBI. None of these differences, however, change the fact that the US and the UK have called upon MI5 and the FBI to perform the same counterintelligence functions throughout the twentieth century. This is the primary reason that I have chosen to examine these organizations 10 World Bank. "Population (Total)." The World Bank. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL (accessed March 26, 2014). 11 Masse, 10-11. 4 side by side. A secondary reason for comparison is the fact that both organizations and both countries have faced the same global threats at essentially the same time, which caused MI5 and the FBI to shift their focus and operation in various similar and dissimilar ways. Third, as discussed above, the US looks to the UK’s MI5 as a potential model for counterintelligence while the UK has looked to the US to learn more about centralized law enforcement.12 This recent mutual examination means that the topic of this paper may have policy significance for both the US and the UK. Fourth, while there is bountiful literature comparing the modern Security Service and Bureau, these debates rarely reach far back into either organization’s history to inform current thinking. The careful examination of an organization’s history can shed light on future projections concerning capabilities and adaptability. The comparison of the Bureau and the Service across national lines throughout their histories provides a further layer of analysis for the sake of revealing the deeply-rooted preferences in the cultures that encompass these two organizations. The overarching question that I seek to answer in this work is the following: why have the US and the UK adopted and maintained different approaches to counterintelligence and what are the benefits and detriments of each? Secondarily, I ask if one system is superior to the other. It is my contention that these questions cannot be answered sufficiently without examining the operational and organizational histories of MI5 and the FBI. Both organizations continue to evolve with the passage of time, and looking at their histories should assist in understanding their future development. It is my hope that this work will fill a gap in literature concerning counterintelligence and law enforcement at critical moments in the history of the twentieth century. While the analysis in this paper does not advocate the creation of an American MI5 (or 12 Johnston, Philip. "The National Crime Agency: Does Britain need an FBI?." The Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/10361009/The-National-Crime-Agency-Does-Britain-needan-FBI.html (accessed March 26, 2014). 5 a British FBI), it does posit that there is much that the US can learn from British counterintelligence practice and organization, regardless of whether or not it adopts the very same approach. In the end, key qualities of successful counterintelligence organizations will be drawn from the histories of the Service and the Bureau for the sake of indicating whether the present course of each country has sufficiently prepared them to combat twenty-first century threats from terrorism and achieve future counterintelligence success. The next chapter will present the founding and early operational period of the FBI and MI5. The security concerns of each government, the organizations’ founding requirements, and their respective character soon after establishment will provide a starting point for each organization’s trajectory to be compared in the analysis section at the end of the chapter. These cases will be examined to determine qualities in the early Service and Bureau that either helped or hindered counterintelligence missions. The origins of any organization are crucial to understanding its character because the initial mission and surrounding atmosphere of its founding will likely shape how it operates for years to come. Indeed, it will be demonstrated that breaking free from initial tendencies has been remarkably difficult for both MI5 and the FBI. The third chapter will follow the counterintelligence practices of Service and the Bureau through the tremendously formative years of 1914 through the late 1940s. This chapter will present the Bureau and the Service separately like the previous chapter, but each case will be sub-divided into four smaller sections due to the amount of relevant events and developments found in this timeframe. The two world wars, the interwar period, and the early post-war years all provide excellent tests of each organization’s founding preferences and practices established in the previous chapter. Until the turn of the century, this period showed MI5 and the FBI acting in more similar ways and performing the most similar tasks than at any other time. 6 In the fourth chapter, the cumulative counterintelligence experiences of MI5 and the FBI will be tested with the unprecedented rise of international terrorism and the renewed threat of domestic terrorism. Successes, failures, efforts, and significant changes in each organization will be examined to provide an assessment of their performance in this arena. Terrorism represented a new threat, but both the US and the UK realized that it required a return to old counterintelligence practices. The shift was more painful and complicated for the Bureau than for the Service, but both proved to be capable in the realm of counter-terrorism soon after making various adjustments. Finally, there will be a concluding chapter in which I will offer an answer as to why each country has developed counterintelligence practices as such and whether one system is superior to the other. I will also propose several qualities of successful counterintelligence operations and organizations examined here that might be integrated into a theory of counterintelligence. Ultimately, this paper does not praise either the FBI or MI5 uncritically. Rather, the purpose here is to determine the best practices of each system and to see whether or not they fall into mutually exclusive categories. While the analysis is more interested in collecting lessons from the British MI5 for the sake of enriching US understanding of counterintelligence, the conclusions presented here are optimistic for the future of both US and UK national security for different reasons. 7 Chapter 2: Origin, Establishment, and Early Life On both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, the late 1800s and early 1900s were a time of great change for the US and the UK. Domestic issues and foreign relations increasingly pressed upon governmental leaders in both countries to adopt new policies for the sake of adapting to a rapidly changing world. For completely different reasons, the US established the FBI and the UK set up MI5. Both organizations were born into extremely uncertain environments where success in their respective missions was anything but guaranteed. It would have been impossible to predict in 1908 and 1909 that each would rise to the level of global prestige and domestic importance that they were soon to obtain. The following section will present this formative chapter in the FBI’s history, which will immediately be followed by a treatment of MI5’s founding. The cases will then be analyzed together in order to illustrate a few similarities but many more differences in their early years and in the needs of their governments at this time. Although both organizations experienced successes and failures early on, the focus here will not be on the severity of these errors but rather on the nature of these mistakes for the sake of revealing crucial qualitative distinctions. In the end, one of these organizations was prepared for the First World War and the other was not. Federal Law Enforcement for the United States The history of federal law enforcement and federal investigation in the US did not begin with the Bureau’s founding in 1908, but should rather be traced back to the actions of the newly established Department of Justice (DOJ) in 1870.13 In the wake of the devastating American Civil War (1861-1865), Congress enacted several laws to protect the newly-granted civil liberties 13 Theoharis, Athan G. The FBI & American Democracy: A Brief Critical History. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004. 15. 8 of former slaves.1415 These federal laws, however, required federal investigation to guarantee that they were upheld. The US military found itself overwhelmed in its own post-war duties and requested assistance in combating racist crimes committed by white hate groups such as the Klu Klux Klan (KKK).16 The DOJ had no permanent investigative service, so it resorted to borrowing Secret Service agents or hiring private detectives to counter this threat.17 The DOJ was remarkably successful in this endeavor. This federal agency had its agents employ significant intelligence and espionage techniques such as penetrating groups by feigning sympathy, gaining information after gaining a target’s confidence, allowing targets to run free for the sake of obtaining greater strategic insight, employing a diverse array of agents (such as African Americans), and offering amnesty to induce confessions.18 It is apparent that these methods were extremely effective by early 1972.19 Unfortunately, the DOJ’s newly-acquired skills were destined to languish after the southern states successfully cast such federal actions as tyrannical and the northern states, weary of division, pushed for national reconciliation.20 As suggested by the discussion so far, crime was not the purview of the federal government at this time – it was a state or local affair.21 Indeed, by the beginning of the 1900s, the federal government’s primary functions were only to negotiate territorial acquisitions, increase trade, grow the economy, and defend states from external threats.22 By 1908, however, there were numerous domestic reasons to favor the strengthening of federal power. First of all, 14 Mcpherson, James. "A Brief Overview of the American Civil War: A Defining Time in Our Nation's History." Civil War Trust. http://www.civilwar.org/education/history/civil-war-overview/overview.html (accessed March 26, 2014). 15 Theoharis, 15. 16 Jeffreys-Jones, 3. 17 Theoharis, 15. 18 Jeffreys-Jones, 17-28. 19 Ibid., 31. 20 Ibid., 31-32, 34. 21 Kessler, Ronald. The Bureau: The Secret History of the FBI. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2002. 9. 22 Theoharis, 14. 9 along with the development of US cities, crime grew in new and dangerous ways by drawing in more and more people into concentrated centers beyond the total control of local police.23 Second, technological improvements, while wonderful in themselves, provided for greater mobility and wider organization of criminal groups.24 This meant that it was easier for criminals to evade arrest once the authorities identified them, but it also meant that criminals could hop state lines at will, throwing off the jurisdiction of state and local police.25 Third, political corruption had become far too commonplace in politics and business monopolies.26 Fourth, the increasing connectivity of the US and the recognition of the first three developments led many to identify with the Progressive Movement, which demanded reforms that would make the federal government more responsive to and involved with justice in American society.27 President Theodore Roosevelt and Attorney General Charles Bonaparte were two such “progressives,” and in 1908 they were given the opportunity to reshape US law enforcement.28 In 1892, Congress had forbidden the DOJ from hiring private detectives in response to concerns that such a situation led to conflicts of interest.29 In mid-1908, Congress ruled out the DOJ’s other practice of borrowing Secret Service Agents because of a case in which the Navy Department had used such agents to spy on an employee’s personal life and because the DOJ had used Secret Service agents to investigate members of Congress for land fraud.30 In regard to this latter revelation, Congress accused President Roosevelt of using the Secret Service for political 23 FBI. "The FBI: A Centennial History, 1908-2008." FBI. 1. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/a-centennialhistory/the-fbi-a-centennial-history-1908-2008 (accessed March 26, 2014). 24 Theoharis, 14. 25 FBI, “Centennial History,” 2. 26 Ibid., 1. 27 FBI, “Short History,” 1. 28 Ibid. 29 Theoharis, 16. 30 Ibid. 10 ends.31 Left with no alternative for the DOJ to investigate violations of federal law, Bonaparte maneuvered around Congress by independently establishing a permanent investigative organization under the DOJ on July 26, 1908 while Congress was adjourned.3233 In testimony before Congress several months later, Bonaparte successfully argued for the continuation of his new organization, managing to dodge a legislative limit the scope of the FBI and while assuaging some fears that the FBI would become a secret police or “spy system.”34 All along, President Roosevelt supported the FBI through the challenges to its founding.35 At first uncertain about its future, the FBI restricted itself to investigating violations of land fraud, national banking, bankruptcy, antitrust, and naturalization laws.36 However, in June of 1910 the FBI was given an opportunity to expand its powers by the passage of the Mann Act, which prohibited the “the transportation therein for immoral purposes of women and girls, and for other purposes.”37 This allowed the FBI to pursue criminals who had broken countless state and local laws but who had never clearly violated federal law previously.38 This was an invaluable asset to the ability of the FBI to combat crime. It is regrettable that it was not used even-handedly. In 1912, the FBI arrested the famous prize fighter, Jack Johnson, under the Mann Act (for having transported a woman over state lines for illicit purposes).39 The problem with this case was not that Johnson was being charged for anything he had not done, but the fact that he was a prominent and famous black man and he had indulged in prostitution with a white 31 Ibid.; FBI, “Centennial History,” 4. Theoharis, 16-17. 33 The Bureau was originally called the “Bureau of Investigation” and it was not until 1935 that its title officially became the “FBI.” For the sake of simplicity, I have chosen to refer to it only as the FBI in this chapter and in the period before 1935. FBI. "How the FBI Got Its Name." FBI. http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2006/march/fbiname_022406 (accessed April 5, 2014). 34 Kessler, 10; Theoharis, 16. 35 Jeffreys-Jones, 41-56. 36 FBI, “Short History,” 2. 37 Ibid.; "The Mann Act." The University of Hawaii System. http://www.hawaii.edu/hivandaids/The%20Mann%20Act%20(1910).pdf (accessed March 26, 2014). 38 FBI, “Short History,” 2-3. 39 Jeffreys-Jones, 57. 32 11 woman. Many have claimed that this was the reason that the FBI targeted him, specifically.40 In this instance, the FBI appears to have acted according to the overarching feeling of white Americans who wanted to see Johnson taken down a notch for his womanizing and success against white boxers.41 On this matter, the FBI appears not to have acted exceptionally racist but merely to have reflected the racial prejudices of the time. Nonetheless, Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones argues that this case marked the beginning of the FBI’s “loss of mission,” especially in light of the DOJ’s noble operations in defense of African Americans after the Civil War.42 In general, it is not clear to me that the issue of race should occupy the dominating characteristic of such large swaths of FBI history that Jeffreys-Jones claims. However, it is clear that very soon after the FBI’s rather politicized founding, the Bureau was paying very close attention to the political mood swings of American society and acting accordingly. This is evidenced by the first FBI head, Stanley W. Finch, playing upon popular fears of “white slavery” to increase the FBI budget and expand the Bureau’s influence.43 Unfortunately, a return to counter-terrorism and counterintelligence practices in the South against anti-black groups would not have been a popular move, as Jeffreys-Jones points out.44 At the advent of World War I, the FBI had very little knowledge of counter-espionage and counterintelligence tradecraft.45 Indeed, there was a distinct lack of knowledge in the Bureau regarding international affairs and foreign events.46 This should hardly be surprising given the primarily domestic focus of the FBI in its early years and its founding mandate to hunt 40 Ibid., 58. Ibid. 42 Ibid., 57-80. 43 Ibid., 60-61. 44 Ibid., 59-60. 45 Andrew, Christopher M. For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995. 30-31. 46 Ibid., 53. 41 12 domestic criminals, not the pervasive agents of foreign powers. It makes no sense to fault the FBI for this inexperience in countering foreign espionage because the Bureau had not yet been directed to perform counterintelligence duties. However, the Bureau had already adopted an “arrest culture” that would prove to be antithetical to the craft of counter-espionage that dictates allowing foreign agents free to operate under surveillance with the hope of discovering more and more details of the enemy’s intelligence requirements, networks, and intentions.47 In summary, the early FBI was not an organization capable of solid counterintelligence practice, even though the history of DOJ federal law enforcement included instances of strong counterintelligence operations against domestic terrorist organizations in Reconstruction Era (especially against the KKK). The political atmosphere into which the formal Bureau was born shaped it into a politically conscious organization that allowed itself to be used an instrument of public fears and prejudices.48 This entrenchment in politics ensured that the early FBI would be internally focused and relatively ignorant of the external threats soon to challenge the US. Much would change, however, over the course of two world wars. Counterintelligence for the United Kingdom The early 1900s were a time of great international competition in Europe. The UK had started to realize that the gap of power between its expansive empire and the Continental powers was narrowing.49 This was especially the case with Germany, which was firmly pursuing the development of a navy that could challenge that of the UK.50 Before it was apparent to the UK that there was imminent conflict in Europe, however, the South African War (also called the 47 Jeffreys-Jones, 66. Ibid., 69. 49 Jeffery, Keith. The Secret History of MI6: 1909-1949. New York: Penguin Press, 2010. 3-4. 50 Ibid. 48 13 Second Boer War) of 1899 – 1902 had had a significant impact on how the UK perceived its security and intelligence capabilities.51 The South African War was fought by the British Empire against two Boer (South African) Republics and eventually ended in a British victory.52 This victory, however, came at great cost: it had taken 450,000 men and three years for the mighty British Empire to subdue groups of unruly famers.53 The war had required almost all of the British Army to be deployed away from home at a time when the UK’s relations with its closer neighbors were anything but cozy.54 This led the island nation to greatly fear foreign invasion during and after the conflict, feeding into serious apprehensions of Germany’s push for a world-class navy.55 In addition to these general strategic concerns, the South African War also revealed the poor state of British intelligence at the turn of the century.56 Indeed, it is likely that France, Russia, and Germany all had significantly better intelligence organization and capabilities at this time.57 This is surprising given the territorial scope of the British Empire, its peerless navy, and its solid economic power at the time. Germany had even clandestinely supported the Boers and educated them in intelligence tradecraft, giving the Germans significant experience in compromising British operations.58 Even on the UK homeland, it was easy to observe that Germany was running espionage operations under the leadership of Gustav Steinhauer, known as the “Kaiser’s Master Spy.”59 51 Pretorius, Fransjohan. "The Boer Wars." BBC News. http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/victorians/boer_wars_01.shtml (accessed March 26, 2014). 52 Ibid.; Andrew, Christopher M. Her Majesty's Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community. New York, N.Y., USA.: Viking, 1986. 34. 53 Andrew, Her Majesty’s, 34. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid., 33. 56 Deacon, Richard. British Secret Service. Rev. ed. London: Grafton, 1991. 139. 57 Ibid., 138. 58 Ibid., 143. 59 Ibid., 146. 14 His success was due less to exceptional German espionage practice, but more to relatively relaxed British security.60 Even those politicians who were knowledgeable of his true purpose appealed to the lack of British laws that would enable the government to counter his operations.61 It seems apparent that there was serious concern over German military developments and the threat of foreign invasion while at the same time there were many who refused to compromise German-British relations by taking up a strong counter-espionage stance. It was in the anxious atmosphere after the South African War that the UK established the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1902.62 Fortunately for the future of UK security, this body recognized the intelligence implications of the South African War and that war on a larger scale was likely inevitable on the European continent.63 However, it was not until 1909 that the Committee set up a sub-committee to investigate the “nature and extent of foreign espionage that is as present taking place within this country and the danger to which it may expose us.”64 It concluded that there was an “extensive system of German espionage” at work in the UK and that the British Government had no adequate organization to penetrate it.65 Acting on this recommendation, MI5 and MI6 were founded as one organization in October 1909, which was called the Secret Service Bureau.66 A year later, the Secret Service Bureau was permanently split between home (MI5) and foreign (MI6) sections.67 Initially, MI5 and MI6 were military organizations (hence the names “Military Intelligence” 5/6 that have remained even though both eventually became civilian organizations) 60 Ibid., 146-147. Ibid., 147. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 Andrew, Christopher M. Defend the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009. 3. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid., 28. 61 15 that reported to the War Office.68 As the two parts of the Secret Service Bureau, their collective mission was to protect the military from foreign espionage, serve as a conduit between the military and British spies abroad, and manage counter-espionage.69 This new organization of intelligence priorities represented a huge improvement over the uncoordinated efforts for foreign intelligence undertaken by the military previously.70 The British military services had (unsurprisingly) focused exclusively on military intelligence such as force capabilities, weapons development, technical intelligence, and the organization of an early warning system in case of German aggression.71 Therefore, the creation of the Secret Service Bureau, even though it was a military organization, represented a significant reordering of British intelligence to meet the new threat of organized foreign espionage as opposed to mere conventional power. MI5 was extremely fortunate to have very experienced leaders in its early years even if its resources and personnel levels were rather lacking. Vernon Kell, the first head of MI5, ran a one-man operation for the first months of his tenure.72 Kell was extremely worldly – he had grown up with foreign nationals from the European continent and grew up learning Polish, French, German, and Italian.73 While serving in the army, Kell picked up Russian and Chinese as well.74 He had even gained experience working in the War Office German section and the Committee of Imperial Defense secretariat – both of these positions assured that Kell was acutely aware of the threat from Germany and was always looking abroad for threats to the UK.75 William Melville was another important figure in MI5’s first years, and he brought significant 68 Richelson, Jeffrey. Foreign Intelligence Organizations. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Pub. Co., 1988. 11., and MI5. "What's in a name?." MI5. https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/who-we-are/whats-in-a-name.html (accessed March 26, 2014). 69 Richelson, 11. 70 Jeffery, 5. 71 Ibid. 72 Deacon, 148. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid., 149. 16 investigative and counter-espionage tradecraft to Security Service.76 Both of these men were extremely serious about counter-espionage work and had time to focus on little else.77 Another person who was absolutely essential to the early development of MI5 was Winston Churchill, who served as Home Secretary from 1910 to 1911.78 First, Churchill gave Kell’s organization an introduction to all of the chief constables in England, Wales, and Scotland, greatly expanding MI5’s network of information and cooperation with law enforcement.79 Second, Churchill greatly facilitated the process of acquiring warrants for MI5 to intercept and open suspicious mail, which was to become Kell’s most effective weapon against foreign espionage.80 It is important to remember that MI5 has always lacked police powers, which meant that cooperation with the police was essential to catching spies from the start. Fortunately, this fact was appreciated from the beginning by Kell – his legendary pre-World War I secret index of foreign nationals in the UK was established with the help of local police after Churchill had facilitated MI5’s connections with police services.81 The close cooperation between the military MI5 and the civilian police forces throughout the UK proved to be a formidable asset for the UK in the war.82 In the first two years of MI5’s operation, however, the intelligence reports it received were of little value and the counter-espionage organization unearthed few actual German spies.83 However, by 1912 MI5 was proficiently countering real espionage attempts by Germany.84 The biggest mistake that MI5 made was to persistently hold on to the belief that the German 76 Andrew, Defend, 5-7, 25. Ibid., 34-35. 78 Ibid., 29. 79 Ibid., 29-30. 80 Ibid., 36-37. 81 Ibid., 30. 82 Deacon, 148. 83 Andrew, Defend, 52. 84 The cases of Max Schultz and Armgaard Karl Graves are particularly illustrative of MI5’s engagement of German espionage before the war. Ibid., 38-41. 77 17 espionage attempts uncovered by MI5 were indicative of German plans to invade the UK.85 In reality, Germany was most interested in conducting naval intelligence so that its navy could compete with the UK’s navy in the event of war and not the kind of intelligence that would prepare a battlefield.86 In the end, however, when it came to the First World War, MI5 was substantially prepared.87 On August 4, 1914, the UK declared war on Germany.88 Kell immediately organized the arrest of twenty-two enemy agents and, in the first major counterintelligence success of MI5, crippled the German spy network for the rest of the war.89 Kell’s staff of seventeen had accomplished this feat through coordination with local police throughout the UK.90 Steinhauer himself acknowledged the early war initiative by MI5 as a “wholesale round-up” that infuriated the Kaiser.91 Christopher Andrew has recognized, however, that Kell did exaggerate the scope of MI5 success in the first month of World War I, and it should be noted that Andrew refers to German espionage as “third-rate.”92 Nevertheless, it was completely decimated by a 17-man counter-espionage unit that had only been operating for five years. In summary, MI5 assured that the UK was a hard target for espionage before the nation embarked on the Great War. Indeed, MI5 and its founders acted as if they were on a war footing from 1909 onward. Beyond MI5, the overall British government knew that it needed to seriously apply language skills and foreign area expertise in order to protect the UK. The Secret Service Bureau certainly got off to a slow start with only two members (Kell and Mansfield Cumming, the future head of MI6) but it absolutely filled a gap in UK security functions – that of 85 Ibid., 30, 34. Andrew, Defend, 34, 52. 87 Deacon, 171. 88 Andrew, Defend, 53. 89 Ibid., 51-52. 90 Ibid., 50. 91 Ibid., 51. 92 Andrew, Her Majesty’s, 73. 86 18 specifically protecting the nation from enemy spies. The UK had thus learned from the strategic failures of the Boer War. While MI5 failed to grasp the true nature of German espionage before the war and it took many months before it even found solid evidence of real German espionage, MI5 had already started to hone its counter-espionage strategies and tactics. The high level of experience that its early leaders brought to MI5 also made sure that it began with high awareness of espionage and would quickly learn from future successes and failures. Comparative Analysis It is clear that the origins of the FBI and MI5 are very different. Nonetheless, they would both be called upon to perform the same kind of mission in the near and distant future. In the beginning, however, each was created to fill a different kind of gap: the FBI to fill a gap in American investigative law enforcement and MI5 to fill a gap in the UK’s defense against foreign espionage. These gaps reflected the different security concerns of both countries. Each organization’s initial requirements and early actions to meet those requirements stemmed from the nature of the respective weaknesses that they were intended to counteract. The early mistakes that the FBI and MI5 made are also illustrative of their roles in US and British government and society. Finally, the early years of the FBI and MI5 already display distinct cultural aspects of law enforcement missions as opposed to those of intelligence. As mentioned, the FBI filled a gap in US law enforcement and MI5 filled a gap in counterintelligence. The FBI solved a domestic problem, and MI5 solved a foreign policy problem. Necessarily, then, the FBI focused on internal legal violations at a time when MI5 was looking for espionage threats from abroad. Both countries had expanded their global reach in the years leading up to 1908 and 1909: the Spanish-American War had allowed the US to take 19 control of the Guam, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico while the UK had (at great cost) subdued the two Boer Republics.93 The US success in the Spanish-American War meant that it was less concerned with foreign policy issues, having pushed yet another European power out of the Western Hemisphere. For the British, however, the South African War exposed the relative paucity of their intelligence capabilities and gave them a sense of “imperial frailty.”94 It is therefore unsurprising that the US had turned inward while the UK feared external influence and danger. Geography also played a significant role in shaping the foreign policies of both nations – the US was more or less left in peace in the Western Hemisphere while the UK was just off the coast of a European Continent hurtling toward great power war. Apart from their encompassing governments’ specific concerns at the time of inception, the traditions that the organizations were born out of and the experience of their early leaders helped to establish and confirm the truly internally oriented character of the FBI and an externally oriented nature of MI5. The founding of the FBI was, as had been shown above, much more political in nature than the decision to formally establish MI5. Progressivism dictated that the federal government should be more, not less, involved in steering American society. Congress had restricted the DOJ from acting for, undoubtedly, a mixture of political and practical reasons, which forced Attorney General Bonaparte to act while Congress was not in session.95 These developments were certainly driven in large part by politics. MI5, on the other hand, was discretely set up without significant political influence.96 These different experiences meant that MI5 could focus more on tradecraft and less on politics while the FBI, to a certain extent, needed to justify its existence by remaining responsive to the political whims of the day. 93 "The World of 1898: The Spanish-American War: Introduction." Library of Congress. http://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898/intro.html (accessed March 25, 2014); Andrew, Her Majesty’s, 34. 94 Andrew, Her Majesty, 34. 95 Theoharis, 16-17. 96 Andrew, Defend, 17-21. 20 The case of the FBI’s targeting of Jack Johnson illustrates the FBI’s attentiveness to two sentiments popular in American white society at the time: prejudice against Johnson’s success because he was black and the more general fears of “white slavery.”97 The FBI had, therefore, allowed politics to trump its honorable mandate to evenhandedly enforce the law. Unfortunately, it made political sense at the time, but it also heralded an unfortunate reputation of intolerance for the Bureau. MI5’s early successes and failures were professional, not political. MI5 deserves much of the credit for preparing the UK for World War I, but also the blame for misunderstanding the intent of German espionage. However, all of MI5’s early actions, successes and failures alike, contributed to its experience with counter-espionage because it acted almost entirely in the professional, not political, realm. MI5’s role in British domestic society was practically non-existent in its pre-World War I years mostly owing to its small size and low visibility.98 Invisibility and secrecy are attributes desired by any intelligence organization, both counterintelligence and those attempting to penetrate targets abroad. Even within home territory, if an enemy cannot track the movements of a counterintelligence organization, that organization has a significant advantage. MI5 has a rich history of secrecy and attempted secrecy – from the beginning, the British government acknowledged the existence of MI5 but refrained from publicizing it.99 Its small staff and cooperation with uniformed police also helped MI5 to maintain its relative anonymity. The FBI, on the other hand, had a high profile in the government (given the events surrounding its foundation) and society especially after the passage of the Mann Act in 1910. As mentioned above, MI5 only had 17 employees at a time when the 97 Jeffreys-Jones, 60-61. Andrew, Defend, 21-52. 99 Ibid., 28. 98 21 FBI had expanded to over a hundred agents in 1914, support personnel aside.100 From the beginning, then, the FBI was extremely visible and MI5 significantly less so, according to the scope and intent of their different initial requirements. The vast majority of law enforcement involves reaction, not the prevention of specific illegal acts. An individual or group must break the law or definitively show that they are about to break the law (probably a rare occurrence) in order for a law enforcement agency to have grounds to act.101 Counterintelligence organizations cannot wait for its targets to reach their goals – their whole purpose revolves around preventing foreign espionage from gaining ground in the first place. The makings of these respective cultures were found in MI5 and the FBI early on, as evidenced by Kell’s preemptive cataloging of foreign nationals in anticipation of a world event (World War I) and the FBI’s expansion of power under the Mann Act, which significantly broadened the pool of criminals it had previously lack the jurisdiction to investigate. This divergence of preemptive and reactive cultures will become more explicit in the next two chapters. 100 Jeffreys-Jones, 62. This is hardly meant to belittle the practice of general law enforcement, but rather to distinguish it from the work of intelligence. Catching criminals is, arguably, more fundamental to a stable society than protecting it from spies, but the point to be made here is that these are mutually exclusive disciplines. 101 22