Saudi Arabia Air Force DA - Scholars - Gonzaga

Saudi Air Force DA - GDI Scholars 2019 NEG 1NC Shell – Saudi Air Force DA Uniqueness: Saudi Air Force key to check Iran war Ostovar, the author of Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and an assistant professor of national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, 17 Afshon, 4-18,-17, Foreign Policy, "The First Saudi-Iranian War Will Be an Even Fight", https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/07/the-first-saudi-iranian-war-will-be-an-even-fight/, accessed 6-30-19, JAA] Since 2011, first in Syria and then in Yemen, proxy forces of Iran and Saudi Arabi have been in constant, brutal competition. Both sides seem to have concluded that a direct war isn’t in their interest, with neither having ever directly attacked the other. But there has always been a risk of escalation — and that risk will heighten dramatically on Tuesday if President Donald Trump withdraws from the Iran nuclear deal, as seems likely. That could lead to an increase in military provocations by Iran in the region, and embolden any Saudi response. It’s far easier to assess the likelihood of direct conflict between Tehran and Riyadh, however, than to predict a winner. The outcome of the first Saudi-Iranian war would ultimately depend on the shape it ended up taking. Trending Articles U.N. Bureaucrats Just Want the Rohingya Off Their Plate Dumping refugees on a doomed island in Bangladesh is as callous as it is predictable. Powered By The two countries differ markedly in the size and capabilities of their forces. Iran has the larger military, with two forces — the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Artesh regular military — composed of complementary air, naval, and land branches. The Artesh has an estimated 350,000 active-duty soldiers and controls most of Iran’s more sophisticated conventional capabilities, especially in the air and maritime domains. By comparison, the IRGC, with an estimated force of 125,000, has maintained a focus on asymmetric warfare but also oversees Iran’s growing unmanned aerial vehicle fleet and strategic ballistic missile programs. Additionally, through its special forces division, known as the Quds Force, the IRGC commands Iran’s foreign military operations and relations with client allies, such as in Syria and Iraq. Since the 1980s, intermittent sanctions and political pressure from the United States have severely degraded Iran’s ability to procure military technology and weapons from other countries, which has made some of its military capabilities relatively outmoded and weak. Iran’s defense spending (around $12.3 billion in 2016) is modest compared with Saudi Arabia’s as one of the top defense budgets in the world ($63.7 billion in 2016 and $69.4 billion in 2017), and its defense technology generally falls well below that of other regional states. Iran’s air forces fly dated platforms, such as F-5 and F-14 Tomcat variants, which have been updated domestically from aircraft inherited from the pre-revolution Pahlavi state, but struggle with intermittent inoperability. Similarly, Iran’s mechanized armor is mostly a hodgepodge of pre-1979 U.S. stock (such as the M60A1) and older Soviet tanks (such as the T-72S) procured from Russia during the 1990s. Unable to update its military capabilities, Iran has instead invested in other areas, especially ballistic missiles, to provide a competitive edge with its neighbors. Its ground-to-ground ballistic missile variants, such as the Zolfaghar (435-mile range) and Shahab-3 (994-mile range), could potentially target strategic infrastructure and population centers well within Saudi territory. Those ranges and the large stockpile Iran has amassed have made ballistic missiles Iran’s core strategic deterrent. Iran showcased that capability in June 2017 when it fired six Zolfaghar missiles at Islamic State-held territory near the Syrian city of Deir Ezzor, some 435 miles from the launch points in western Iran. Beyond that hard deterrent, the IRGC’s investments have concentrated on developing less expensive platforms that can challenge adversaries through asymmetrical tactics. Foremost in this regard is the IRGC Navy’s large fleet of fast attack crafts, which includes various types of small speed boats that can be armed with 107 mm rockets, heavy machine guns, and anti-ship cruise missiles, or loaded with explosives and used in kamikaze-style strikes. These boats, along with its large stockpile of naval mines, are the IRGC’s primary offensive tool against maritime adversaries in the maritime domain. The Saudi military is smaller but better armed. Saudi Arabia’s primary military land, air, naval, and missile forces fall under the command of its Ministry of Defense. Combined with auxiliary forces in the Saudi Arabian National Guard, Royal Guard, and the Ministry of Interior’s border defense force, the Saudi military is estimated to have around 250,000 active-duty personnel. Its chief strengths lie in airpower and air defense. The Royal Saudi Air Force possesses several squadrons of F-15C/D Eagle and F-15 Strike Eagle fighters, along with three squadrons of Tornado multirole aircraft, and 72 Eurofighter Typhoon attack aircraft. The Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces have similarly impressive capabilities, focused mainly on U.S.supplied Patriot missile batteries concentrated around critical infrastructure, military bases, and population centers. Saudi Arabia also has a small but perhaps growing stockpile of ballistic missiles. Its Strategic Missile Force is believed to possess dozens of aging liquid-fueled Chinese DF-3 medium-range missiles (2,485- to 3,100-mile range) and possibly some solid-fueled DF-21 medium-range missiles (1,050-mile range) as well. Of course, capabilities are one thing, effectiveness on the battlefield another. Experience matters and can help a military identify its weaknesses and develop strengths. Both countries have had recent experience in combat, albeit in different ways and to different extents. Much of Iran’s military know-how was developed during the nearly eight-year Iran-Iraq War, where it fought against a technologically superior adversary with far greater international backing. If the Iran-Iraq War taught Iran’s armed forces how to survive and make limited gains through asymmetrical tactics, the post-2011 experience of the IRGC and its client allies (such as Lebanese Hezbollah and various Iraqi militias) in the Syrian, Iraqi, and Yemeni conflicts has helped it develop further in terms of command and control, integrated operations, and ground offenses. Although Iran and its clients have been inseparable from the ground successes in both Syria and Iraq, those advances have been paved by foreign air power (by the United States in Iraq and Russia in Syria). Without the support of such air power, it is doubtful that Iranian-led forces would have made any serious gains against Syria’s rebels or the Islamic State. Further, they have relied on artillery bombardments, which essentially flattened the adversarial-held population centers before they were retaken. The Saudis have comparatively less combat experience. In 1991, Saudi and Kuwaiti forces struggled to defeat an Iraqi tank column that had occupied the Saudi town of Khafji. They ultimately prevailed with U.S. support, but the battle exposed the inexperience of the Saudi military. In a precursor to the current conflict in Yemen, Saudi forces intervened across the southern border in 2009 in support of the Yemeni government’s war against the Houthis. The Saudi campaign, which included Jordanian and perhaps Moroccan troops, lasted only a few months and concentrated on the bombing of Houthi positions near the border. Despite retaking some strategic high ground along the border, the aerial campaign had only a small impact on the overall ground war. That limited track record clearly did not prepare the Saudis for the current war in Yemen. But the longer the current war continues, the more experience the Saudi military will gain. Thus, as crude as it might be to think of the ongoing Yemeni conflict as military practice for the Saudis, given the brutal toll it has had on civilians, that is precisely what it has been. Without dismissing Saudi’s legitimate national security concerns about Yemen, or minimizing the extensive suffering the war has caused, the conflict has offered an opportunity for the Saudis (and the Emiratis) to test their air and land capabilities in combat and to work on integrated joint operations. Still, the campaign has only had limited success. Although the Saudi-led coalition was effective early on in pushing pro-Houthi forces out of positions in the south, it has struggled to make advancements in the north. This is especially true regarding the capital, Sanaa, where Saudi Arabia’s extensive bombing campaign hasn’t led to corresponding gains on the ground. There have also been serious questions posed about Saudi Arabia’s targeting ability and its capabilities in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, particularly in the face of the severe civilian toll the bombing campaign in Sanaa has had. Given their respective capabilities and recent experiences in combat, both countries have strengths and weaknesses, but neither has a clear advantage over the other. Saudi airpower would enable it to maintain dominance in the skies in any conflict with Iran. It could likely strike Iran’s critical infrastructure and military bases along the coast with air-to-ground missiles, if not penetrate Iranian territory more deeply. Iran, for its part, would likely be able to achieve primacy in the maritime domain, especially in the Persian Gulf, where its fast attack craft, diesel submarines, and mine-laying vessels could be used to target Saudi shipping, naval ships, and ports. Iran could also strike Saudi strategic infrastructure and population centers with ballistic missiles. Although Saudi Arabia’s Patriot missile defense systems would likely reduce the effectiveness of such strikes, it is unlikely that those defenses could prevent all strikes from landing, especially were Iran to fire missiles in salvos. If a Saudi-Iran conflict were to occur in a vacuum, the war would not be about territory or regime change by force. Neither side can take the fight across the Persian Gulf, much less seize and hold strategic areas in adversarial territory. The conflict would be about inflicting damage to both punish the other side and compel it to cease hostile behavior. While the Saudis — with their superior air power, access to foreign military technology, and far greater wealth — might be better situated to endure such a conflict, if not impose greater costs on the Iranians, the Islamic Republic has less to lose and has shown an ability to withstand years of warfare against greater powers. Link: Ending US arm sales grounds the Royal Saudi Air Force for a prolonged time Riedel, senior fellow and director of the Brookings Intelligence Project. He was a senior advisor on South Asia and the Middle East to the last four presidents of the United States in the staff of the National Security Council at the White House. He was also deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Near East and South Asia at the Pentagon and a senior advisor at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Brussels, 18 [Bruce, 10-10-18, Brookings Edu, "After Khashoggi, US arms sales to the Saudis are essential leverage", https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/10/10/after-khashoggi-us-arms-sales-to-the-saudisare-essential-leverage/, accessed: 6-30-19, JAA] The Saudis have continued to buy spare parts, munitions, and technical support for the enormous amount of American equipment they have bought from previous administrations. The Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) is entirely dependent on American and British support for its air fleet of F15 fighter jets, Apache helicopters, and Tornado aircraft. If either Washington or London halts the flow of logistics, the RSAF will be grounded. The Saudi army and the Saudi Arabian National Guard are similarly dependent on foreigners (the Saudi Arabian National Guard is heavily dependent on Canada). The same is also true for the Saudis allies like Bahrain. Internal Link: Lack of retaliatory means gives Iran the opportunity to escalate, forcing US intervention Rosenfield et al. Institute for Defense Analysis Researcher and Author, 12 (Daniel, March 2012, IDA, Countering Iran with Arms Sales to the Gulf Cooperation Council States, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=731235 p.16 & 63, Accesssed Jun 30, 2019, VP) A third reason to sell major offensive weapons to the GCC states is that defensive weapons alone will not likely prove adequate to countering more intense low-level aggression by a nuclear-armed Iran. No system of defenses can be perfect, and without some fear of counterattack, an aggressor might have little reason not to repeatedly test the defenses arrayed against him. There is also a matter of cost-effectiveness: deterrence by the threat of punishing an attacker can make it far less costly to secure valuable targets spread over large geographic areas. For the GCC states, trying to defend both simultaneously and effectively all possible coastal and inland targets of low-level attack by Iran could well be cost-prohibitive. A fourth reason to sell major offensive weapons is that some of the weapons allow for retaliation against Iran in ways that could minimize the risk of further escalation… One of the few options available to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states is to augment their holdings of advanced conventional weapons, including major offensive ones like cruise missiles, modern strike aircraft, and precision-guided bombs. By strengthening their military power, these states lessen the risk to themselves in retaliating strongly for Iran’s lowlevel aggression, thereby helping to deter such aggression in the first place. Moreover, this process of strengthening helps signal to Iran that the country’s acquisition of nuclear weapons will not greatly enhance its regional influence. In fact, it is conceivable that Iran will become worse off for having acquired nuclear weapons, given significant changes to the conventional military power of its neighbors Impact: US-Iran war causes extinction Beres, Emeritus professor of international law at Purdue University, 17 [Louis René, 2-10-17, US News, "The Fast Track to Armageddon.", https://www.usnews.com/opinion/worldreport/articles/2017-02-10/donald-trump-iran-and-the-fast-track-to-nuclear-war-in-the-middle-east, ZAA] When all pertinent factors are taken into account, U.S. President Donald Trump could sometime undertake more-or-less selective military action against Iran. In response, the Islamic Republic – then having absolutely no meaningful option to launching at least certain forms of armed reprisal – would target American military forces in the region and/or carefully chosen Israeli targets. Whatever its precise configuration of selected targets, Tehran's retaliatory blow would be expressly designed so as not to elicit an unacceptably massive (possibly even nuclear) counter-retaliation. With particular regard to Israel, moreover, this sort of retaliation would plausibly include, inter alia, a substantial reliance upon Iran's own surrogate militia forces in Hezbollah. All such bewildering calculations, of course, must assume perfect rationality on all sides. If, for example, the new American president should cast all caution to the winds with his own first strike (a strike that would be defended by Washington, in law, as an allegedly legitimate expression of international lawenforcement, or "anticipatory self-defense"), the Iranian response, whether rational or irrational, could expectedly be "proportionate" – that is, comparably massive. In that prospectively escalatory case, any contemplated introduction of nuclear weapons into the ensuing conflagration might not necessarily be dismissed out of hand. At that point, moreover, any such introduction would have to originate from the American and/or Israeli side. This indisputable inference is "true by definition," "simply" because Iran would not yet have become an operationally nuclear power. In such circumstances, Trump, especially in view of his favored argumentum ad baculum stance in virtually all matters, might decide upon a so-called "mad dog" strategy vis-a-vis Iran. Here, the American president would display a last-resort dependence upon a strategy of pretended irrationality, or what I have called in my own latest books and monographs, the "rationality of pretended irrationality." Significantly, any such residual reliance, while intuitively sensible and apparently compelling, could still backfire, thereby opening up an "Armageddon path" to a now unstoppable escalation. If, on the other hand, Trump's "punishing" or defensive initial strike against Iran were conspicuously less than massive, a fully rational Iranian adversary would likely ensure that its chosen reprisal was correspondingly "limited." But if Trump's consciously rational and calibrated attack upon Iran were wittingly or unwittingly launched against an irrational enemy leadership, the Iranian response could then be "roaring missiles," or an all-out retaliation. This presumably unanticipated response, while non-nuclear, could be directed at some as yet undeterminable combination of U.S. and Israeli targets. Cumulatively, it could still inflict very substantial harms. For the moment, at least, any Iranian missile reprisal against U.S. interests and personnel would have to exclude the American homeland. This same limiting prediction, however, cannot be made in reference to any considered Israeli targets. On the contrary, any reciprocal Iranian attack directed against Israel would plausibly target that country's military assets and could also include a significant number of "soft" civilian populations and corollary infrastructures. Even if it is being played only by rational adversaries, the advancing strategic "game" would demand that each contestant relentlessly strive for "escalation dominance." Ominously, it is in the thoroughly unpracticed internal dynamics of any such rivalry that the serious prospect of a genuinely "Armageddon" scenario could sometime be realized. This intolerable outcome could be produced either in unexpected increments of escalation by any or all of the three dominant national players, or instead, by any sudden quantum leap in destructiveness undertaken by Iran, Israel and/or the United States. The only thing that is wholly predictable in usefully deciphering such complex dynamics is that they are all unpredictable. For example, even under the best or optimum assumptions of enemy rationality, all pertinent decision-makers would have to concern themselves with miscalculations, errors in information, unauthorized uses of strategic weapons, mechanical or computer malfunctions, poorly recognized instances of cyberdefense, cyber-war and even adversarial coups d'etats. In the final analysis, informed citizens and participants in these hideously complicated games of strategy will need to recall that it is mathematically meaningless to assign any comforting probabilities to unique events. Because an authentic nuclear war would represent precisely such an event, one with utterly unforeseen intersections, interactions and "synergies," we can never predict with any reassuring degree of precision whether such a conflict would actually be more or less probable. Indeed, should Trump ever proceed to strike Iran on the erroneously nonspecific assumption that his generals have already "got everything covered," he ought then to be reminded of the classic military warning of Carl von Clausewitz: Long before any military planners could even envision a nuclear war, the great Prussian general had cautioned about "friction," or "the difference between war on paper, and war as it actually is." Where it would be minimized or disregarded altogether by Trump, this difference could propel the unsteady Middle East toward an irreversible Armageddon. Uniqueness Uniqueness – Saudi Air Force Strong Now – Generic – 2NC Saudi Air Force strong now Joyner, Newsweek Global Executive Producer, 2018 [Alfred, 11/27/2018, Newsweek, “HOW STRONG IS SAUDI ARABIA'S MILITARY?,” https://www.newsweek.com/how-strong-saudi-arabias-military-1233164, 7/1/2019, AKS] With the best-equipped armed forces in the Gulf region, Saudi Arabia is a major player in Middle Eastern affairs. But just how strong is its military? Saudi Arabia has a defense budget of $76.7 billion—giving the oil-rich nation a significant advantage over its regional rivals Israel and Iran, which have respective budgets of $18.5 billion and $8 billion. The kingdom has invested heavily in recent years and in 2014 was the world's biggest importer of defense equipment. The majority of weapons come from U.S. companies, with the U.K. and Spain in second and third place. A 2017 arms deal with President Donald Trump saw Riyadh commit to purchasing $350 billion worth of U.S. weapons over the next 10 years. The country has an estimated 688,000 active personnel, with 227,000 troops, 600 heavy tanks, 780 light armored vehicles and 1,423 armored troop carriers. Saudi Arabia's navy is far less developed. The country has 55 naval assets, including seven frigates. However, with its lack of aircraft carriers or destroyers, the country's reach is limited at sea. Its air force boasts 313 fighter jets, including American F-15 Eagles, Tornados and Eurofighter Typhoons. Saudi Arabia also has started delivering its own model of the Eagle, the F-15SA. Saudi Arabia is not known to have a nuclear weapons program, with the kingdom publicly opposing nuclear weapons in the Middle East. However, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has set out plans for the nation to develop nuclear weapons if the Iran nuclear deal collapses and the Saudis' fierce rival resumes its atomic weapons program. Saudi Arabia is conducting a proxy war with Iran in war-torn Yemen, where Riyadh is supporting the regime with airstrikes against the Tehran-backed Houthi rebels. The civil war has been raging since 2015, killing nearly 6,000 civilians and putting 22.2 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, according to the United Nations. Saudi Arabia's difficulties in quashing the guerrilla fighters show the nation is struggling when it comes to asymmetrical warfare. Despite such difficulties, Riyadh has been reluctant to deploy ground troops. In response, the country has recently started shaking up its military leadership, under the crown prince's instruction. The overhaul in the ultraconservative kingdom has seen a number of changes, with women given military positions for the first time. The hope is that such measures will transform Saudi Arabia's military into a more effective fighting force and help the nation better project its power. Even so, it is questionable if the Saudis will be able to continue their extravagant military spending in the long run, with the Gulf kingdom hoping to shift its economy away from a reliance on oil. Selling oil and buying weapons had underpinned Saudi Arabia's strong diplomatic relations with the West. If those were to falter, the kingdom could find itself struggling to exert influence in the Middle East. Saudi Air Force is vast and growing Agence France-Presse, International news agency headquartered in Paris, 15 [ 3-26-15, Defense News, “Saudi Arabia: The Gulf's Best-Equipped Military”, https://www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2015/03/26/saudi-arabia-the-gulf-s-best-equippedmilitary/, accessed: 7-1-19, AKS] RIYADH, Saudi Arabia — Saudi Arabia has the best equipped armed forces in the Gulf region, while counting on its Western partners to guarantee its security, the International Institute for Strategic Studies says. The Saudi military numbers 227,000 troops, including 75,000 in the army, 13,500 in the navy and 20,000 in the air force. Some 16,000 personnel are committed to air defenses, 2,500 responsible for strategic missiles and 100,000 man the National Guard, according to the IISS Military Balance, 2015. The kingdom also has 24,500 paramilitary forces. The Saudi armed forces have close ties with foreign armies, particularly the United States, Britain and France which gives them access to training and equipment. The Saudi army regularly buys modern equipment, with the navy seeking to purchase submarines, according to the media. Riyadh's appetite for arms, already high due to a perceived threat from Iran, is fed by regional instability, notably in Yemen, where Saudi Arabia on Thursday launched air strikes as part of a multinational coalition. Sign up for our Early Bird Brief Get the defense industry's most comprehensive news and information straight to your inbox Subscribe It is traditionally a customer of the US and British arms industries, although Riyadh has also sealed contracts with France and Germany for its navy and has bought Eurofighter jets. The Saudi army has 600 heavy tanks, 780 light armored vehicles and 1,423 armored troop carriers. Its air force is equipped with 313 fighter jets, including F-15s, Tornados and Eurofighter Typhoons, as well as helicopters. Considered a priority, air defenses and deterrents include 16 batteries of Patriot missiles, 17 batteries of Shahine missiles, 16 of Hawk missiles and 73 Crotale/Shahine missile units. The National Guard is an autonomous force under its own ministry and plays a role both in internal security and conventional defense. Mainly a mechanized force, it includes a large, tribal-based militia. Modernization plans include orders for AT missiles, wheeled AFVs and CAESAR artillery. It is forming its own air wing with confirmed orders for US-built AH6i, Apache and Black Hawk helicopters. Uniqueness – Saudi Air Force Strong – Arms Key – 2NC Saudi Air Force main strength of the Saudi military, key to deterring iran Joyner, video producer at Newseek, 18 (Alfred, 11/27/18, Newsweek, “HOW STRONG IS SAUDI ARABIA'S MILITARY?”, https://www.newsweek.com/how-strong-saudi-arabias-military-1233164, accessed 6/30/19, TR) With the best-equipped armed forces in the Gulf region, Saudi Arabia is a major player in Middle Eastern affairs. But just how strong is its military? Saudi Arabia has a defense budget of $76.7 billion—giving the oil-rich nation a significant advantage over its regional rivals Israel and Iran, which have respective budgets of $18.5 billion and $8 billion. The kingdom has invested heavily in recent years and in 2014 was the world's biggest importer of defense equipment. The majority of weapons come from U.S. companies, with the U.K. and Spain in second and third place. A 2017 arms deal with President Donald Trump saw Riyadh commit to purchasing $350 billion worth of U.S. weapons over the next 10 years. The country has an estimated 688,000 active personnel, with 227,000 troops, 600 heavy tanks, 780 light armored vehicles and 1,423 armored troop carriers. Saudi Arabia's navy is far less developed. The country has 55 naval assets, including seven frigates. However, with its lack of aircraft carriers or destroyers, the country's reach is limited at sea. Its air force boasts 313 fighter jets, including American F-15 Eagles, Tornados and Eurofighter Typhoons. Saudi Arabia also has started delivering its own model of the Eagle, the F-15SA. Saudi Arabia is not known to have a nuclear weapons program, with the kingdom publicly opposing nuclear weapons in the Middle East. However, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has set out plans for the nation to develop nuclear weapons if the Iran nuclear deal collapses and the Saudis' fierce rival resumes its atomic weapons program. Saudi Arabia is conducting a proxy war with Iran in war-torn Yemen, where Riyadh is supporting the regime with airstrikes against the Tehran-backed Houthi rebels. The civil war has been raging since 2015, killing nearly 6,000 civilians and putting 22.2 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, according to the United Nations. Saudi Arabia's difficulties in quashing the guerrilla fighters show the nation is struggling when it comes to asymmetrical warfare. Despite such difficulties, Riyadh has been reluctant to deploy ground troops. In response, the country has recently started shaking up its military leadership, under the crown prince's instruction. The overhaul in the ultraconservative kingdom has seen a number of changes, with women given military positions for the first time. The hope is that such measures will transform Saudi Arabia's military into a more effective fighting force and help the nation better project its power. Uniqueness – Deterrence Working Now Anti-Iranian deterrence has continued to be hugely successful Barnes, New York Times National Security Advisor & Schmitt, New York Times Senior National Security Writer, 19 (Julian & Eric, May 10, 2019, The New York Times, Pentagon Builds Deterrent Force Against Possible Iranian Attack, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/10/us/politics/us-iran-patriot-missile-battery.html, Accessed Jul 2, 19, VP) The Trump administration’s pressure campaign has proved effective at damaging the Iranian economy, said Elizabeth Rosenberg, an analyst with the Center for a New American Security. The Trump administration has shown it can use unilateral sanctions to weaponize the international banking system “and cause a lot of pain.”… The intelligence analysis has helped shape the military response. The number of military assets moved to the gulf — four bombers, an aircraft carrier and escort ships — is high profile enough to send a deterrent message but still relatively small. The Lincoln was already on its way to the region and simply cut short European port visits. The Arlington is a replacement for a similar, if less capable, ship. The response also echoed a measured move by the Obama administration four years ago after the United States detected an Iranian arms shipment to some of Tehran’s proxy forces. In April 2015, the Obama administration ordered the aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt to move toward Yemen in a show of force to deter an Iranian shipment. That shipment was also thought to contain a ballistic missile or missile parts Deterrence against Iran is effective – Empirics prove Associated Press, The Guardian US Politics, 19 (Associated Press, Jun 7, 2019, The Guardian, Iran backed down in Gulf due to US 'deterrence', says American general, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jun/07/iran-backed-down-in-gulf-dueto-us-deterrence-says-american-general, Accessed Jul 2, 19, VP) The general said the US is showing enough force to “establish deterrence” without “needlessly” provoking its longtime adversary. “We’re working very hard to walk that line.” He said: “We’ve taken steps to show the Iranians that we mean business in our ability to defend ourselves,” referring to the accelerated deployment to the Gulf area of the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group, four Air Force B-52 bombers and additional batteries of Army Patriot air-defence systems. Trump, speaking beside French president, Emmanuel Macron, in French city of Caen, France, said US sanctions were crippling Iran’s economy, possibly yielding a diplomatic opening. “And if they want to talk, that’s fine,” the US president Trump said. “We’ll talk. But the one thing that they can’t have is they can’t have nuclear weapons.” Speaking at the Baghdad headquarters of the US-led coalition fighting the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria, McKenzie said he also has repositioned surveillance aircraft to more closely monitor the situation in the Gulf and in Iraq, where the U.S. has 5,200 troops on the ground, and has given Iran a “new look” by introducing more aerial patrols by land- and carrier-based fighters. “Cumulatively, all of these have caused them to sort of step back and recalculate the course that they apparently were on,” he said. Links Link – US Arms Key to Saudi Air Force – 2NC Saudi Air Force dependent on steady supply of US arms, alternatives fail Guyer, American Prospect Management Director and Foreign Policy Author, 19 (Jonathan, March 18, 2019, American Prospect, Needed: A U.S. Policy on Saudi Arabia, https://prospect.org/article/needed-us-policy-on-saudiarabia, Accessed July 1, 2019, VP) The Saudis, however, are dependent on expensive U.S. weapons platforms, and it will be difficult for them to begin buying weapons from Russia or China. Their weapons systems and aircraft squadrons are all American, and require almost constant American repairs. As a hardball tactic, Congress could try to pass laws that would effectively ground the Saudi air force. And the next administration could condition close military systems collaboration on Saudi behavior. Link-- US support is key to maintain the Saudi air force—anything else risks Iran escalation Feltman, Visiting Fellow at Brookings and Former UN Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs, 18(Jeffrey, 11/26/18, Foreign Affairs, “The Only Way to End the War in Yemen”, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/yemen/2018-11-26/only-way-end-war-yemen, accessed 7/1/19, TR) Yet the Saudis do not seem to be moving in this direction. They answered the calls for peace from Pompeo and Mattis with more air strikes. The Trump administration’s November cessation of midair refueling of Saudi-coalition flights does not seem to have changed Saudi calculations. Clearly, the United States needs other means to persuade them. There have been frequent calls to suspend arms sales to Riyadh. But Bruce Riedel, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, has pointed out that suspending the sale of military spare parts to Saudi Arabia would quickly ground the Saudi air force and be more effective. The U.S. Congress is currently willing to take punitive actions against Saudi Arabia, and the Trump administration can use this as leverage. A unilateral Saudi cessation is risky. The Houthis—who sparked the war with their military takeover in 2014—would undoubtedly exploit it to trumpet the victory of their “resistance” against the greater firepower unleashed against them. And there is a chance this could be construed as a victory for Iran. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates exaggerated the degree of Iranian influence on the Houthis at the beginning of the war as part of their justification for intervening. But today, even though the Houthis are still not quite a subsidiary of Iran in the same way as, say, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iranian influence in Yemen has grown significantly. Internal Links Saudi Retaliation Key – 2NC Threat of Saudi retaliation is the only thing deterring Iran Rashad, Reuters Senior Correspondent on Saudi Arabia, El Yaakoubi, Reuters Correspondent, 2019 [Marwa and Aziz , 5/30/2019, Reuters, “Saudi Arabia says firm stand needed to deter Iran, Iraq demurs,” https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-summit/saudi-arabia-says-firm-arab-stand-needed-to-deter-iranidUSKCN1T00OC, 6/30/2019, AKS] The right of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to defend their interests after the attacks on oil pumping stations in the kingdom and tankers off the UAE were supported in a Gulf Arab statement and a separate communique issued after the wider summit. Tehran denies any involvement in the attacks and in a sign of regional tensions, Iraq, which has good ties with neighboring Iran and Washington, said it objected to the Arab communique, which stated that any cooperation with Tehran should be based on “non-interference in other countries”. “The absence of a firm deterrent stance against Iranian behavior is what led to the escalation we see today,” King Salman told the two consecutive meetings late on Thursday. The ruler of the world’s top crude exporter said Shi’ite Iran’s development of nuclear and missile capabilities and its threats on world oil supplies posed a risk to regional and global security. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said on Thursday that attacks on four vessels near a major bunkering hub, just outside the Strait of Hormuz, were “efforts by Iranians to raise the price of crude oil around the world.” Riyadh accused Tehran of ordering the drone strikes. The attacks were claimed by the Iran-aligned Houthi group which has been battling a Saudi-led military coalition in Yemen for four years. U.S. national security adviser John Bolton said on Thursday that evidence of Iran being behind the tanker attacks would be presented to the U.N. Security Council as early as next week. “The kingdom is keen to preserve the stability and security of the region, to spare it the scourge of war and to realize peace and stability,” King Salman said. Iran, which is locked in several proxy wars with Saudi Arabia in the region, rejected what it called “baseless” accusations made at the summit, Iranian state news agency IRNA reported. “We see the Saudi effort to mobilize (regional) opinion as part of the hopeless process followed by America and the Zionist regime (Israel) against Iran,” IRNA quoted Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Abbas Mousavi as saying. Iraqi President Barham Salih, asking the gathering to support Iraq’s stability, said that rising tensions with Iran could spark a war if not managed well and voiced hope that Iran’s security would not be targeted. Pompeo has warned Iraqi leaders that if they failed to keep in check Iran-backed militias, which now form part of Baghdad’s security apparatus, the United States would respond with force. Tensions have risen between the United States and Iran after U.S. President Donald Trump a year ago withdrew Washington from a 2015 international nuclear deal with Iran, re-imposed sanctions and boosted its military presence in the Gulf. Bolton has said that Iranian mines were “almost certainly” used in the tanker attacks. An Iranian official dismissed that as “a ludicrous claim.” The Islamic Republic has said it would defend itself against any aggression. Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri has said Tehran was not allowed to pursue development of nuclear weapons as it was banned by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The final communique said regional stability required the establishment of an independent Palestinian state along 1967 borders to include Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem. U.S. special envoy for Iran, Brian Hook, said on Thursday that a repositioning of U.S. military assets in the region had deterred Iran, but that the United States would respond with military force if its interests are targeted. US support for the Saudi Air Force is key to deter Iran Raimundo 9 (Ian, Spring 2009, University of New Hampshire, “Saudi Arabia ' s use of air power capabilities to secure its national security assets in the northern Persian Gulf arena” https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9a36/00bccc74560861cc0130cb16acdfba71dc5d.pdf, accessed 7/1/19, TR) The United States extended conventional deterrence and established its credibility during four crises. During the Yemen conflict Washington signaled its broad willingness to 'intervene militarily if necessary to protect the Kingdom and secure the oil fields' as well as support the House of Saud from internal threats arising from the conflict.141 As part of Operation Hardsurface, six U.S. Air Force F-lOODs were deployed to Dhahran in July 1963 after the outbreak of the Yemen conflict to deter Egyptian air attacks in the Eastern Province.142 In February 1979 U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown 'pledged support for the kingdom against external threats, and proposed to base U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia to assist in its defense.'143 The next month the United States offered to send armed F-l 5 Eagle interceptors to the Kingdom in response to hostilities between North and South Yemen.144 Washington also deployed AW ACS aircraft to Riyadh to monitor the border war between the two Yemens in 1979, which remained in the Kingdom after the Iranian 37 Revolution and Iran-Iraq Conflict.145 The aircraft remained in the Kingdom until the RSAF AWACS and air defense network became operational in 1986.146 Due to domestic pressure and the rise of militant Islamic extremism within the Kingdom it is highly unlikely the U.S. will station a large contingent of forces on Saudi soil.147 The House of Saud perceives the presence of large contingents of foreign troops as more a liability than an asset, as it undermines the legitimacy of their regime.148 To support conventional deterrence, the U.S. maintains rapid-deployment power projection capabilities and a number of large bases in Europe. (USAF European Command Headquarters at Mildenhall, United Kingdom; US Army Europe Headquarters at Heidelberg, Germany; USAF 16th Air Force at Aviano, Italy; USAF 16th Air Force at Incirlik, Turkey; US Navy 5th Fleet in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean; US Navy 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea).149 38 U.S.-Extended Nuclear Deterrence150 The U.S. nuclear umbrella serves is a necessary deterrent due to the massive size of Iran's manpower resources; Army, 350,000; Reserve Army, 350,000; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, 125,000, Paramilitary, 40,000; Basij Resistance Force/Paramilitary militia, between 1,000,000 to 2,500,000.151 Furthermore, Iran has further demonstrated its ability to assemble large contingents of ground forces 'at short notice when it feels that its vital interests are threatened.'152 Iran's ability to absorb sustained damage over a prolonged period of time further necessitates U.S-extended nuclear deterrence.153 The Iranians are 'military professionals' who have gained valuable experience from their eight-year conflict with Iraq and closely observed the American military involvement with Iraq.154 Saudi Arabia cannot utilize its primary strike aircraft, the F-15S, without extensive U.S. logistical and material support, thereby limiting the ability to deter Iran by threat of severe retalliation.155 AT – Saudi Air Force Overreliance Turn Saudi Air Force is effective—empirics prove and it’s been the focus of development Al Saud, Lieutenant Colonel in the RSAF with a Masters from United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2 (Turki K., 2002, Marine Corps University, THE ROYAL SAUDI AIR FORCE AND LONG-TERM SAUDI NATIONAL DEFENSE: A STRATEGIC VISION, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=451113, accessed 7/2/19, TR) This is particularly the case with the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF). In the last 30 years, the RSAF has received a higher priority for upgrading and development than the other service branches -- army, navy and air defense force.1 In addition, Saudi air defense capabilities have been expanded in recognition of the increasing threat of longrange air attack by potential adversaries. A ground-based Royal Saudi Air Defense Force was created which shares the air defense mission with the RSAF. The RSAF also began to develop a long-range offensive capability with the acquisition of F-15 aircraft and air-to-air refueling aircraft, particularly since the Gulf War of 1991. The Gulf War demonstrated that the RSAF could mount successful longrange strike missions, leading to the purchase of more advanced F-15S aircraft in 1992 with a long-range strike capability.2 However, it has not as yet changed the basic missions of the RSAF as primarily air defense and support for the land force and the navy. The central argument of this paper is that technological advances employed in strategic offensive air operations during the Gulf War revolutionized war-fighting in a 2 desert environment, and that this provides a basis for developing a new Saudi strategic vision emphasizing the central role for strategic air power Even if they’re right that Saudi Air Force is weak in a vacuum, the Saudi Air Force is still stronger than the Iranian air force—the Yemen proof flips neg Worldview, subsidiary of Stratfor, 15 (Worldview, 4/22/15, Stratfor, “Yemen: Iranian Naval Presence Raises the Odds of Confrontation”, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/yemen-iranian-naval-presenceraises-odds-confrontation, accessed 7/2/19, TR) Iran is supporting serious conflicts throughout the region, stretching its limited resources. Moreover, Iran sees Saudi Arabia as one of the chief backers of many of its adversaries. Anything that distracts or wastes Riyadh's resources, Tehran considers a boon. Iran does not control the Houthi and Saleh-aligned forces in Yemen and has little to do with military operations there, though it has had no problem giving some logistical and political support to irritate Saudi Arabia in its own backyard. But the Saudi-led air coalition and naval blockade in support of local ground forces have isolated Yemen and blunted the rapid Houthi and pro-Saleh advances. By building a coalition, Saudi Arabia was able to make progress in Yemen while avoiding a potentially disastrous ground invasion over the mountainous Yemeni terrain against hardened indigenous fighters. Militarily, it would be impossible for Iran to force open supply lines to Houthi and Saleh ground units. Iran's navy has serious shortcomings in terms of age and capability, especially if it tries to project power beyond the cover of Iran's land and air forces. The Saudi coalition's air forces, meanwhile, enjoy complete air supremacy in Yemen because of their proximity. They would overwhelmingly outmatch any potential Iranian supply attempt. These circumstances raise questions about Tehran's true intention behind deploying unescorted supply ships. Impacts Iran War – Terrorism – 2NC War with Iran would be bloody and even if US wins, terrorist groups fill power vacuum creating a greater threat Snyder, Cornell University Geopolitical Analyst, 19 (Xandar, Jun 26, 2019, Real Clear World, Why War With Iran Isn’t in the United States’ Interests, https://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2019/06/26/why_war_with_iran_isnt_in_the_united_states_interests_11304 , Accessed Jun 28, 2019, VP) By now, the U.S. should have learned a thing or two from the Vietnam and Iraq wars. Distant foreign conflicts are difficult to win without a well-defined case for what success looks like and an overwhelming military commitment, the kind the American public is usually unwilling to provide unless faced with a massive and immediate threat. Small-scale engagements accomplish little and are instead more likely to evolve into larger conflicts. Installing foreign governments in the American image is more difficult, costly, time-consuming and even deadly than leaders are likely to claim. Backing a local proxy is often unpalatable for the country’s sense of ethics, but U.S. adversaries often have no such qualms. Those proxies are often an ineffective substitute for a U.S. military presence when it comes to pursuing U.S. objectives. And without a substantial, long-term commitment of U.S. forces, such wars are more likely to open a power vacuum when the U.S. withdraws. The result: a collapsed government, an invasion by a neighbor, a revolution that creates new and uncertain structures – or some combination of these. In fact, the U.S. has had few true victories in the wars it has fought since World War II. Consider the U.S. government’s options, then, for a war with Iran. If the U.S. chooses a kinetic response, the first and most likely option would be a limited strike, similar in scale to or perhaps somewhat greater than the strikes on Syria that the Trump administration ordered on Syria in April 2017 and 2018. But Iran is not Syria. Iran has a sophisticated air defense infrastructure and plenty of air denial capability, increasing the chance of U.S. casualties. Further, a limited air strike probably wouldn’t accomplish anything meaningful. It might take out a handful of radar and air defense installations, sending a political signal but affecting in no real way the strategic reality on the ground. The only time U.S. air power alone has significantly shifted the reality on the ground was in Kosovo, but Iran today is far more powerful than Serbia in 1999… Ground force is a less likely choice for the U.S., even with limited objectives (like eliminating specific military equipment or securing passage through the Strait of Hormuz). But it would be more likely to achieve what the U.S. really wants: for Iran to recall its foreign militias so that they will defend the home front. But when a military force is rapidly removed without a replacement ready to take its place, it creates a power vacuum and, therefore, an opportunity for others to fill the void. In this case – the Islamic State and other jihadist groups. Timing matters too. The pace at which Iran withdraws its militias from Syria and Iraq, states that are already precariously fragile, will create an outsized risk to violently alter the regional balance of power. If the Islamic State moves back into the space vacated by Iran, it would be the U.S. that would have to again deal with this problem, which would require reoccupying parts of Iraq while fighting Iran. That, in turn, would likely entail support from Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish forces, which would again put pressure on U.S.Turkey relations. But the Syrian Kurds may not see a long-term alliance with the U.S. as in its best interest after the U.S. threatened to leave them high and dry in December 2018. They could instead seek out a political resolution with Damascus, backed by Russia, that would protect them from Turkey. It’s possible that if the Islamic State re-emerged, Russia could step in to back Kurdish groups such as the Syrian Democratic Forces to fight back. But that would mean the U.S. would be depending on Russian assistance to cover its western flank, and in exchange for such cooperation Russia would likely demand U.S. concessions in places like Ukraine. In short, going all-in with Iran would require either a large-scale U.S. occupation or dependence on Russia in Syria and Iraq to prevent the Islamic State from coming back. Neither of those are appealing options for Washington. Iran War – Nuclear Weapons – 2NC Iran is acquiring nuclear weapons now pushes US- Iran war to the brink Mearsheimer, University of Chicago professor of political sciences, 7/1/2019 [John J., 7/1/2019, New York Times, “Iran is Rushing to Build a Nuclear Weapon and Trump Can’t Stop It,” https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/01/opinion/iran-is-rushing-to-build-a-nuclear-weapon-and-trump-cantstop-it.html,7/1/2019, AKS] President Trump says he wants to make sure Iran never acquires nuclear weapons. His policy, however, is having the opposite effect: It is giving Tehran a powerful incentive to go nuclear, while at the same time making it increasingly difficult for the United States to prevent that. On Monday the official Iranian news agency announced that the country had breached the limits for enriched uranium imposed on it by the 2015 international agreements. Indeed, American policy toward Iran over the past year makes it clear that Iranian leaders were foolish not to develop a nuclear deterrent in the early 2000s. Although there has not yet been a significant military clash, the United States has effectively declared war on Iran. Its wide-ranging sanctions campaign is strangling Iran’s economy, in the hope of gaining sufficient leverage to force Tehran to permanently dismantle its capacity to reprocess plutonium and enrich uranium, the main pathways to the bomb. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has also declared that Iran must fundamentally alter its foreign policy in ways that suit the interests of America and its Middle East allies. By imposing what it calls “maximum pressure,” the Trump administration is threatening Iran’s survival as a sovereign state. There is no evidence that Iran is likely to capitulate to American demands. If anything, the historical record demonstrates that great powers can inflict enormous punishment on their adversaries — with blockades, sanctions, sieges and bombing campaigns — and yet the pain rarely causes target states to surrender. American sanctions killed well over 100,000 Iraqi civilians in the 1990s, but Saddam Hussein remained defiant. Nationalism is a powerful force that invariably causes the people being pummeled to hang together, instead of rising up to demand that their leaders surrender to the enemy. States are also reluctant to capitulate to coercive pressure because it may tempt stronger powers to escalate their demands. If “maximum pressure” works once, Mr. Trump and other American hawks might conclude it would work again. Tehran has no interest in showing that it can be browbeaten. In fact, Iran has already shown that it will not sit by while its people die and its society is wrecked. The Iranians are likely to launch more covert attacks against tankers and oil facilities in the Persian Gulf and employ proxies to attack American troops and installations. We can also expect them to launch sophisticated cyberattacks against the United States and its allies. President Trump, in response, is likely to retaliate and further escalate the pressure on Iran. The aim will be to “reestablish deterrence” with Iran and force it to capitulate. But these measures will have the opposite result, as the two sides are now locked in a classic escalatory spiral. Iran will double down, which almost certainly means it will move to build its own nuclear arsenal. The Iranians had good reason to acquire nuclear weapons long before the present crisis, and there is substantial evidence they were doing just that in the early 2000s. The case for going nuclear is much more compelling today. After all, Iran now faces an existential threat from the United States, and a nuclear arsenal will go a long way toward eliminating it. Nuclear weapons are considered the ultimate deterrent for good reason: Adversaries are unlikely to threaten the existence of a nuclear-armed state, especially one with a deterrent that can survive a first-strike attack, because that is the one circumstance in which a state is likely to use its nuclear weapons. It is hard to imagine, for example, Israel or the United States attacking Iran — even with conventional weapons — if Iran had the bomb, simply because there is some chance that escalation might lead to nuclear use. Moreover, if its survival was at stake, Iran could credibly threaten to use a few nuclear weapons to completely shut down the flow of oil in the Persian Gulf. It might seem hard to imagine Iran using nuclear weapons first in a crisis, but history tells us that desperate states are sometimes willing to pursue exceedingly risky strategies — the Japanese decision to attack a far more powerful United States in 1941 and the Egyptian decision to strike mighty Israel in 1973 are the classic cases. The Trump administration would surely be aware of the dangers of provoking a nucleararmed Iran. In short, nuclear weapons would profoundly alter Iran’s strategic situation for the better. Of course, the last thing Washington, Tel Aviv and Riyadh want is for Iran to acquire the bomb. But it is hard to see how to avoid that outcome. The United States is certainly not going to invade and occupy Iran — forever — to ensure that it does not go nuclear. Hard-liners will instead advocate bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities, but the Iranians will go to great lengths to make them invulnerable to aerial attacks. Air power can delay a determined Iranian effort to get the bomb by a few years at most. It is also hard to imagine the United States bombing Iran year after year to prevent it from acquiring the bomb. Furthermore, Mr. Trump’s policy has backed the United States into a corner, leaving no clear diplomatic offramp in sight. For obvious reasons, Iranian leaders do not trust Mr. Trump, and they surely recognize he might eventually walk away from any deal they strike with him. If Mr. Trump tries to lower tensions by easing the sanctions, which Tehran insists he must do before it will even agree to talk, he will be savaged at home by the Iran hawks, who are an important part of his political base. Israel, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States will be equally critical. One might argue that Iran can wait out the Trump presidency, hoping that a Democrat wins the November 2020 election. After all, virtually all the Democratic candidates are committed to returning the United States to the nuclear deal. The election, however, is well over a year away, and Iran cannot know whether Mr. Trump will be defeated. Even if he is, Tehran cannot be sure the new president will deliver on that promise, not only because one can never be certain about the future intentions of foreign leaders, but also because AmericanIranian relations are likely to become even more poisonous between now and the election. No sensible Iranian leader is going to wage his country’s survival on who gets elected president of the United States. It makes much more sense for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons rather than gamble on the possibility that America’s Iran policy will radically shift once again. Surely many Iranian policymakers — and especially the hard-liners among them — now recognize that if they had acquired a survivable nuclear arsenal in the early 2000s, the Trump administration would not be threatening their survival today. The one slim chance for heading off a nuclear-armed Iran is a radical reversal of American policy. Mr. Trump would have to begin by parting company with the hard-line advisers who helped lead him astray. Ultimately, he would have to return the United States to the 2015 agreement, ease sanctions and appoint an experienced and fair-minded representative to negotiate a new deal. He would also have to endure the storm of protests that would come from his own party, influential donors, and allies like Israel and Saudi Arabia. Regrettably, Mr. Trump is more likely to escalate the pressure on Iran to salvage a flawed policy rather than accept the political costs of a course correction — a blunder that will drive Iran to join the nuclear club. Iran escalation causes nuclear proliferation Shinkman, Senior National Security Writer at US News, 6/17 (Paul, 6/17/19, US News, “Iran Threatens Nuclear Escalation as War Tensions Increase With U.S. “, https://www.usnews.com/news/worldreport/articles/2019-06-17/iran-threatens-nuclear-escalation-as-war-tensions-increase-with-us, accessed 6/30/19, TR) **We do not endorse ableist language—brackets indicate modified text** TENSIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. and Iran escalated Monday following reports that Tehran will cease to abide by restrictions implemented in the 2015 international agreement limiting its ability to produce nuclear weapons. Iran will increase uranium enrichment activities "based on the country's needs" and could exceed limits imposed by the 2015 deal in as little as 10 days, Behrouz Kamalvandi, a spokesman for Iran's nuclear agency, said Monday. Other countries fear that Iran's ability to produce enriched uranium brings it a step closer to developing weapons-grade nuclear material. Iran's latest threat comes at a time of heightened conflict with the U.S., days after two oil tankers were disabled by what the U.S. has said forcefully was an attack orchestrated by Tehran. The country's provocative statement on uranium enrichment serves as the first evidence that Iran may violate the nuclear agreement, brokered by the Obama administration and from which President Donald Trump has removed the U.S. Analysts previously thought Iran may have been trying to stay within the terms of the deal – which allowed it trade with American allies in Europe and Asia – until a new U.S. president would return to compliance. However, Iran has faced unsustainable pressure from [crippling] devastating new sanctions the Trump administration has subsequently imposed on its ability to sell oil abroad. Despite Tehran's repeated denials, U.S. diplomatic and military officials blame Iran directly for what they say were explosions that disabled two cargo ships on Thursday – the Norwegian-owned Front Altair and the Japanese Kokuka Courageous – in the Gulf of Oman near Iranian waters. The incident came as Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was meeting with Iranian leaders to attempt to deescalate tensions on behalf of the U.S. and to set the groundwork to allow Japan to return to purchasing the Iranian oil it needs without defying Trump's sanctions. U.S. Central Command, which oversees American operations in the region, has released a string of materials in recent days demonstrating what it says is Iran's involvement in the attacks. On Sunday, it published a statement confirming a U.S. Reaper drone was shot down June 6 over Yemen by what it says were Houthi rebels with Iranian assistance. A week later, a similar Iranian missile attempted to shoot down a drone that was monitoring what the military headquarters says was an attack by Iran's elite Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps navy on the Kokuka Courageous. Iran backs the Houthis and has provided them with the kinds of surface-to-air missiles Central Command says they used. In the statement, the military headquarters says it believes the missile strike was designed to thwart American forces' ability to surveil the Iranian attack. Iranian leaders deny any involvement in the attacks on the ships, with a local official responsible for Iranian maritime safety saying both of them appeared to suffer from independent technical issues. The owner of the Japanese vessel has also challenged the U.S. assertions, saying the explosions were caused by some sort of projectile, not the kinds of limpet mines that U.S. military officials believe Iranian agents employed. Iran asserts a combination of national security adviser John Bolton – a noted Iran hawk – as well as the governments of Iran's arch-rivals Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are to blame. The latest incidents have prompted noted Iran hawks to call for greater U.S. military intervention against the revolutionary government. Sen. Tom Cotton told CBS' "Face the Nation" on Sunday that Iran's recent behavior warrants "a retaliatory military strike." The Arkansas Republican, a veteran of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, attempted to undermine the Obama administration's efforts to broker the 2015 deal by publishing an open letter to Iran threatening congressional opposition to the agreement, angering many critics. Rep. Adam Schiff, chairman of the powerful House Intelligence Committee, warned on the same program that American allies appear to be distancing themselves from the U.S., despite what he considers overwhelming evidence that Iran was behind Thursday's attacks. "This is, I think, the worst of all situations. And the maximalist pressure campaign has massively failed and only heightened the risk of conflict," the California Democrat said, referencing the Trump administration's attempts to isolate Iran. "We should be trying to corral a response, though, from the international community to protect shipping, to impose sanctions. But because we have so alienated ourselves from our allies, that's not happening." Trump's top aides, including Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, "both seem to be taking actions to undercut that ambition to stay out of warfare" and "scuttle the president's effort to initiate a dialogue" with Iran, Schiff said. The owner of the Japanese vessel has also challenged the U.S. assertions, saying the explosions were caused by some sort of projectile, not the kinds of limpet mines that U.S. military officials believe Iranian agents employed. Iran asserts a combination of national security adviser John Bolton – a noted Iran hawk – as well as the governments of Iran's arch-rivals Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are to blame. The latest incidents have prompted noted Iran hawks to call for greater U.S. military intervention against the revolutionary government. AFF Uniqueness Saudi Air Force Ineffective Now The Saudi Air Force is ineffective, and US arms sales don’t help it- Yemen proves Fetouri, academic and recipient of the EU’s Freedom of the Press prize, 19 (Mustafa, 5/30/19, Middle East Monitor, “ How Saudi Arabia is losing the war in Yemen”, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190530-how-saudi-arabia-is-losing-the-war-in-yemen/, accessed 7/1 /19, TR) Is Saudi Arabia losing its military campaign in Yemen despite being the stronger party enjoying the support of its many allies? The Saudi-led coalition includes countries like Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Sudan, Jordan and Morocco, as well as Qatar before it fell out with Riyadh. Major countries like France and Italy help by providing arms while the US supplies arms, intelligence and technical assistance such as in-flight refuelling, although this was suspended recently. The coalition is fighting a loose cluster of groups headed by the disciplined and battle-hardened Houthi rebels who are, allegedly, supported by Iran. It is a very asymmetrical conflict. However, despite its military strength, available firepower and air supremacy, Saudi Arabia is actually losing the war. To understand this seemingly paradoxical analysis, we have to ask two important questions: what goals did Mohammad Bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince and de facto ruler, set for his war in Yemen; and is it possible to lose the war despite winning the battle? Saudi Air Force weak – Yemen proxy war proves Brimelow, Business Insider Military and Defense Unit Intern, 2017 [Ben, 12/16/2017, Business Insider, “Saudi Arabia has the best military equipment money can buy — but it's still not a threat to Iran,” https://www.businessinsider.com/saudi-arabia-iran-yemen-military-proxy-war2017-12, 7/2/2019, AKS] Saudi Arabia has some of the greatest military equipment money can buy, but its military is still not seen as a threat to its longtime rival Iran. Saudi Arabia's military has not proved capable of effectively fighting back Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen. Its arsenal is designed for a large conventional war — not proxy fighting. In the past few years, Saudi Arabia has led an intervention in Yemen's civil war, been the driving force behind a diplomatic crisis between Qatar and its neighbors and involved itself in the politics of Lebanon. All of these things appear to have one common objective: to push back against the influence of Iran. But experts say Saudi Arabia's ambitions are limited by its military, which is considered an ineffective force even though the kingdom is one of the world's largest spenders on defense. "The fact is, Iran is better at doing this stuff," said Michael Knights, a Lafer fellow at The Washington Institute who specializes in the military and security affairs of Iraq, Iran, and the Persian Gulf. "There's nobody in the Iranian General Staff that's afraid of Saudi Arabia on the ground," Knights said. Saudi Arabia's struggles in Yemen — where its multiyear conflict with the Houthi rebels has no end in sight — reveal its shortcomings against an adversary like Iran. "What we are really talking about is how they stack up in a proxy war," Knights said. "It's what they are doing in the region nowadays." One of the largest spenders on defense Saudi Arabia's military faces two main problems. It is too large, making it more susceptible to organizational and quality issues, and its arsenal is designed for a large conventional war rather than the proxy wars of the 21st century. For all Saudi Arabia's military ineffectiveness, it's hard to blame the kingdom's equipment. Last year, Saudi Arabia was the fourth-largest spender on defense products in the world, just behind Russia. According to IHS Jane's, a British publishing company specializing in military, aerospace, and transportation topics, Saudi Arabia was the world's largest importer of weapons in 2014. Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute shows that Saudi Arabia was the secondlargest importer of weapons in both 2015 and 2016. Arms imports into the kingdom have increased by over 200% since 2012, according to the institute. The weaponry being bought is not low quality, either. The majority of Saudi Arabia's military hardware is bought from US companies. In fact, 13% of all US arms exports in 2016 were headed into the kingdom. Companies from the UK and Spain were the second- and third-largest sellers. The Royal Saudi Air Force arsenal includes Eurofighter Typhoons, perhaps the most advanced fighter jet fielded by European militaries, and American F-15 Eagles, the undisputed king of the skies for three decades and still formidable. The Saudis even have their own model of the Eagle: The F-15SA (Saudi Advanced), which just started being delivered this year. The Royal Saudi Land Forces, the Saudi army, have everything from M1A2 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles to AH-64D Apache Longbow and UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters. Virtually every vessel in the Royal Saudi Navy was built in American or European shipyards, specifically for Saudi Arabia. Its newest frigates, the Al Riyadh class, are modified versions of France's La Fayette-class frigate. Saudi Arabia is one of the best-equipped nations in the world. Yet the Saudi military does not strike fear into the hearts of its adversaries, or would-be foes. The proxy war in Yemen Evidence of the Saudi military's shortcomings can be seen just south of the Saudi border in Yemen. Almost three years after Saudi Arabia, supported by other Gulf and Arab states, launched a military intervention to support Yemen's ousted president, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, Iran-backed Houthi rebels are still active and continue to hold Yemen's largest city and capital, Sana'a. Additionally, the Houthis have proved capable of launching high-profile attacks against the Saudis. Those include multiple cross-border raids into Saudi Arabia, successful attacks on Emirati and Saudi navy ships, and the launching of ballistic missiles into the heartland of the kingdom. In a more recent embarrassment, a report from The New York Times suggested that a ballistic missile fired by the Houthis that exploded at an airport in the Saudi capital of Riyadh was not actually shot down as previously claimed by the Saudi military. Yemen civil war, December 10, 2017 The state of the war in Yemen earlier this month. Red represents territory held by the Yemeni government backed by the Saudi-led coalition, white for Qaeda affiliates, black for ISIS, and green for Iran-backed Houthi rebels. Wikimedia commons Why there has been no victory in Yemen The Saudis have had a hard task in Yemen. They have to operate in the Houthi heartland against a welltrained, well-funded, and well-supplied fighting force. Saudi Arabia, however, has not deployed significant land forces into Yemen that would be required to win on the battlefield. "We don't know if the Saudi military is able to have a significant impact on the Yemen war, because we've only seen the deployment of Saudi airpower," Knights told Business Insider. "Generally, an airpower-only campaign is not going to have a great impact — particularly in this type of complex terrain with an enemy who is very adept at hiding from airpower and often looks like civilians," he said. Saudi army Yemen Knights estimates that 10,000 to 20,000 troops would be required to have the desired affect. Yet the Saudi military has not deployed its ground forces — most likely because the Saudi leadership knows that, as Knights says, they "suffer from significant weaknesses." These weaknesses include a lack of logistical equipment and experience needed to carry out such a campaign. "They have no experience in an expeditionary operation," he said, noting that the Desert Storm campaign against Iraq — which Saudi Arabia did contribute to — was largely an American effort. Additionally, Saudi ground forces as a whole are not trained well enough to where they would be able to perform successfully in large-scale operations. As such, a Saudi ground force in Yemen may cause more harm than good. Bilal Saab, the senior fellow and director of the Defense and Security Program at the Middle East Institute, told Business Insider that Saudi Arabia understood the potential harm of its ground forces. In an email, Saab said Saudi Arabia would not deploy large contingents of ground forces "because their casualties would be severe and they most probably would cause tremendous collateral damage in Yemen." Air strikes empirically can’t dislodge Houthi forces in Yemen Juneau, University of Ottawa School of International Affairs Associate professor specializing in the Middle East, 16 (Thomas, Chatham House, “Iran's policy towards the Houthis in Yemen: a limited return on a modest investment,” 6 May 2016, https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/92/3/647/2326947, page 654, Accessed 1 July 2019, JDC?) On 25 March 2015, Saudi Arabia announced the formation of a coalition of ten mostly Arab states to launch air strikes with the stated objectives of stopping and rolling back the Houthis and reinstating Hadi.26 The United States backed the coalition politically—albeit cautiously—and provided it with logistical and intelligence support. The following three months witnessed the emergence of a stalemate, as the Houthis for the most part stopped advancing but were not rolled back, even though air strikes destroyed a significant proportion of their heavy equipment. The tide turned in July and August, in large part because of growing support for pro-Hadi forces from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, including through the deployment of several thousand Saudi and Emirati troops, and hundreds from other coalition partners.27 Pro-Hadi forces took back Aden in July, and started pushing north. Their progress was slow, however, in the face of spirited resistance from the Houthi–Saleh bloc. The coalition managed to expel Houthi–Saleh forces from five southern governorates, but failed to take Taiz, south-central Yemen’s main city. The Houthis were overstretched in the deep south, making their defeat in those areas probably inevitable. They are unlikely to be entirely defeated, however, as they are deeply entrenched in the centre and, even more, in the north-west. As a result, by February 2016 the war had reached a stalemate, with neither side strong enough to defeat the other decisively. There was, moreover, growing insecurity in southern areas occupied by the pro-Hadi coalition, with both AQAP and Islamic State’s Yemen branch seizing the opportunity to expand their presence in the country.28 The war had already killed more than 6,000 people, injured more than 30,000 and exacerbated the country’s humanitarian crisis, with 80 per cent of the population in need of assistance.29 Saudi Deterrence Fails Now Saudi military growing but it’s not ensuring success Griffing, Tel Aviv University Master’s Degree in Political Science, 18 [Alexander, 7/22/2018, Haaretz, “Explained Why Saudi Arabia and ‘Little Sparta’ Still Can’t Defeat Iran in Yemen,” https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/saudi-arabia-vs-iran-why-the-arab-coalition-can-t-winthe-war-in-yemen-1.6273832, 7/1/2019, AKS] In the annual U.S. News & World Report “Power Rankings” that came out last week, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were ranked the ninth and 10th most powerful countries in the world, respectively. Yet these two military powers are currently embroiled in the fourth year of conflict in one of the world’s poorest countries, Yemen, against Iran-backed rebels whom they just can’t seem to defeat. The Saudi and UAE militaries are two of the best funded and equipped in the world. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Saudi Arabia even surpassed Russia in 2017 with the world’s third-largest military expenditure, totalling $69.4 billion. The think tank also ranked Saudi Arabia as the second-largest importer of weapons in both 2015 and 2016, noting that such imports have increased by over 200 percent in the past six years. However, the limitations of the Saudi military are well-known. Despite its massive budget and arms purchases, it suffers from a lack of experience, a reliance on U.S. refueling and resupplying, and from a human capital issue. “They haven’t fought a war since 1991,” says Dr. Yoel Guzansky, a senior researcher at Tel Aviv University’s Institute for National Security Studies, while on the other side the Houthi rebels have “decades of guerrilla-warfare experience and fighting on this terrain, which is difficult.” The Arab coalition fighting in Yemen, led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, has been forced into a stalemate in recent weeks following an attempt to take the key port city of Hodeidah from the Iran-backed Houthis. Iran, which is fighting various proxy wars in the Middle East, has been accused by both the U.S. and Saudi intelligence agencies of arming the Houthis with weapons and rockets, which are currently aimed at Saudi Arabia’s Jizan Economic City, where Saudi Aramco, answering a call from U.S. President Donald Trump to help stabilize the global oil market, is building a 400,000-barrel-per-day refinery that is expected to become fully operational in 2019. The coalition claims its goal is to cut off the Houthis’ main supply line and force the group to the negotiating table. However, little progress has been made since the campaign was launched on June 12, as the Red Sea city is heavily defended by land and sea mines. The United Nations fears the campaign could trigger even more widespread famine, since the port is a lifeline for an impoverished state where 8.4 million are believed to be on the verge of starvation. Guzansky notes that in Yemen it is actually the UAE, and not the Saudis, doing the heavy lifting. The Saudis are primarily providing aerial support, he says, while the UAE has actual troops on the ground – albeit many of them mercenaries from countries like Sudan – constituting a fighting force to be reckoned with. The UAE has even “earned itself the nickname ‘Little Sparta,’” in the U.S. military, says Guzansky, citing current U.S. Defense Secretary and former U.S. Marines Gen. James Mattis as having “an admiration for what they’ve done – and what they can do.” The UAE, like the Saudis, is extremely well equipped with the most advanced weapons systems, purchased with its enormous financial resources. The Stockholm research institute claims the UAE should be listed among the world’s top 15 military spenders but notes that the lack of publicly available data has resulted in the country’s absence from its survey. Additionally, and unlike the Saudis, the UAE has gained extensive operational experience in countries such as Afghanistan, Somalia and Bosnia. Its forces are led, at least in part, by former Australian Gen. Mike Hindmarsh, who is currently commander of the UAE Presidential Guard – a military division that includes both conventional and special-ops units, which are active in Yemen. Guzansky explains the extent of the UAE’s military reach, noting it is the only Arab country to have opened a military base outside of its borders with a naval and air force base in Eritrea - eyeing even more bases on the Red Sea and in Libya. However, the UAE’s involvement in Yemen does have its domestic critics, which was highlighted last last week by reports of the May defection of an Emirati prince to Qatar, who feared for his life after criticizing the war and accused the UAE of hiding the true death toll of Emirati soldiers in Yemen. Last week the UAE announced it extended compulsory military service for Emirati men from 12 to 16 months. The Saudi problem The Saudi military has a highly centralized operational structure, a feature common in many nondemocratic countries, where command and loyalty come from the top. Princes and other royals do not serve as soldiers, according to Guzansky, although “maybe they will pilot a fighter jet, something with prestige” – an inequity that does not help to boost morale among the troops. In February, Saudi King Salman, paving the way for his son Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to further consolidate power ahead of his ascension to the throne, fired all his top military commanders. The crown prince, who also serves as defense minister, has staked his reputation and rule on winning the war in Yemen and rolling back Iranian influence in the Middle East. As a result, the Saudis keep information regarding the conflict secret. Guzansky notes that Crown Prince Mohammed “is afraid of casualties, which is why in four years of war there has never been an official count from the Saudis.” The ineffectiveness of the military mirrors deeper issues in Saudi society in general – particularly those involving the economy. The United States has been helping to equip and train Saudi armed forces since U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt and Saudi King Abdulaziz Al Saud struck an oil-for-security alliance in 1945. To this day, the kingdom relies heavily on the United States for refueling and maintenance of its military assets. In the 1970s, Dutch social psychologist Geert Hofstede created the Power Distance Index, which ranks how hierarchical a country is. Hofstede found that countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE are among some of the most hierarchical in the world, and as a result their flexibility in solving problems both large and small is limited, as is their ability to innovate. Israel, which is lauded for its military prowess and innovative economy, ranks second lowest of all countries on Hofstede’s Power Distance Index of 2009. However, Guzansky cautions that, despite its military advantages, adaptability on the battlefield and experience fighting an insurgency, Israel would face many of the same problems in Yemen as the Saudis and the UAE and would not necessarily be more successful against experienced guerrilla fighters. As a result, the Arab coalition’s inability to win or even to advance in Yemen has a two-pronged diagnosis: The fact that the Houthis are well-situated to repel foreign fighting forces; and the fact that the Saudi military suffers from its own systemic ineffectiveness – despite the UAE’s efforts to bring its power to bear in the fight war. Impact inevitable—Iranian deterrence fails—uranium and aggressive policies prove Bolan, Professor at the Army War College, 19 (Christopher J., 6/14/19, Defense One, “Deterrence Is Failing — Partly Because Iran Has No Idea What the US Really Wants”, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/06/restoring-deterrence-iran/157756/, accessed 7/1/19, TR) Iran is accelerating its enrichment of uranium, the IAEA says. Iran attacked four tankers near the Strait of Hormuz, the Trump administration says. If all this is true — Tehran has hinted at the first, though it strenuously denies the second, and there are doubters in world capitals and at home — then U.S. policymakers need to conduct an honest assessment of where and why U.S. policies have failed to deter Iranian actions. As Washington Post columnist David Ignatius summarizes the mounting tensions, “Trump’s maximum pressure campaign has collided head on with [Iranian Supreme Leader] Khamenei’s maximum resistance.” Leaders in Washington and Tehran alike have miscalculated. The Trump administration applied devastating economic pressure on Iran without providing leaders in Tehran with a clear roadmap for how to escape punishment. This put Iran in the penalty box without evident prospect for rehabilitation. As Europe, Russia, and China failed to deliver any meaningful economic relief to Iran, and as the unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, or JCPOA, solidified the position of hardliners in Tehran, it was virtually inevitable that Iran would strike back in order to demonstrate its ability to inflict pain on opponents. Yet Iranian leaders have badly miscalculated as well, by threatening to stop complying with at least some provisions of the JCPOA. Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency have recently verified that Iran is increasing its production of nuclear fuel and Iranian President Rouhani has pledged that the next step will be to increase the level of enrichment above allowable levels. These steps are only likely to increase Iran’s diplomatic isolation and will push even reluctant U.S. allies to back whatever retaliatory action might be taken by the United States. Meanwhile repeated threats by Iranian leaders to close the Strait of Hormuz to international traffic only bolster the public case for Iran’s culpability in the recent attacks on tankers. In the immediate term, the central question that should occupy U.S. policymakers in Washington is how to restore deterrence in the wake of these Iranian attacks. As options are considered, U.S. decision-makers would be well advised to review some of the enduring insights from the vast academic literature on the topic. At base, deterrence policy is developed to change the decision-making calculus of an opponent. As such it is a game of perception management and clear communication. Successful deterrence requires clear delineation of acceptable and unacceptable behaviors. It requires that the opponent understand that unacceptable behavior will be met with a credible punishment whose costs will outweigh any potential benefit to be gained. Finally, prospects for successful deterrence are improved when threats of punishment are combined with positive incentives to alter the opponent’s unacceptable behavior. Saudi Air Force is ineffective at deterring Iran—Yemen proves Pereira, paralegal at Kaufman, Borgeest, and Ryan and former intern at Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, 17 (Jacob, 10/18/17, A Contest of Ideas, “The Forgotten War: Understanding the Saudi Air Campaign in Yemen” https://www.acontestideas.com/new-blog/2017/10/18/theforgotten-war-understanding-the-saudi-air-campaign-in-yemen, accessed 7/2/19, TR) Since the Houthi insurgency against President Mansour Hadi began in 2014, Yemen has been one of the primary battlefields for proxy conflicts between Saudi Arabia and Iran. While Saudi Arabia deserves criticism for its actions in Yemen, it is reasonable to view the situation in its neighboring country as a threat to national security and stability. In the past, Houthi insurgents have caused great disturbances along the Saudi-Yemeni border in the Saudi city of Riyadh. In 2009, prior to the current Yemeni Civil War, Houthi rebels crossed into Saudi territory and seized control of two border villages. Saudi Arabia responded with a massive military deployment, but this anti-Houthi maneuver proved to be embarrassing and costly. The Royal Saudi Air Forces's (RSAF) aerial strikes were ineffective, dropping rounds in the desert without hitting many Houthi targets at the cost of 133 troops in the ensuing engagement on the ground. Though the Houthi forces eventually retreated to their homeland in Northern Yemen, the Saudi Arabian military realized a Shia insurgency along its southern border, like that of the Houthi, would be more problematic than originally thought. This concern increased upon the Saudi realization that the Houthi forces were, in fact, heavily backed by Iran, Saudi Arabia's great geopolitical rival. The Saudis worried that if Iran were to gain enough influence in Yemen by controlling the Houthi, it would have the capacity to exacerbate sectarian tensions in Saudi Arabia’s predominantly Shia southern and eastern provinces. Due to heightened tensions in the Saudi-Iranian Cold War, which is a series of recent and ongoing proxy wars between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the rival states have intensified their respective mi, paralitary efforts in Yemen, further exacerbating the existing competition to achieve regional hegemony. According to former Deputy Secretary of State Tony Blinken, Saudi officials claim the goal of their intervention in Yemen is to “eliminate all traces of Iranian influence” in that country, thus halting Iran’s advance in Saudi Arabia's sphere of influence. This hardline approach towards Iran’s progress has impeded peace-seeking efforts between the nations, making it more likely that the future of Yemen will be closely tied to those of the other proxy battlefields in the Saudi-Iranian Cold War. Saudi air power doesn’t deter Iran Brimelow, Business Insider Military and Defense Intern interviewing a Washington Institute Persian Gulf and Iran Military and Security affairs Lafer fellow, 17 (Ben, Business Insider, “Saudi Arabia has the best military equipment money can buy — but it's still not a threat to Iran” 16 December 2017, https://www.businessinsider.com/saudi-arabia-iran-yemen-military-proxy-war-2017-12, Accessed 2 July 2019, JDC?) The Saudis have had a hard task in Yemen. They have to operate in the Houthi heartland against a welltrained, well-funded, and well-supplied fighting force. Saudi Arabia, however, has not deployed significant land forces into Yemen that would be required to win on the battlefield. "We don't know if the Saudi military is able to have a significant impact on the Yemen war, because we've only seen the deployment of Saudi airpower," Knights told Business Insider. "Generally, an airpower-only campaign is not going to have a great impact — particularly in this type of complex terrain with an enemy who is very adept at hiding from airpower and often looks like civilians," he said. Link Internal Link No Link – Saudi Air Force Independent of US Saudi Air Force can deter without US arms assistance in the Status Quo Friedman, Stratfor founder with a Cornell Government Ph.D., 15 (George, Stratfor, “The Middle Eastern Balance of Power Matures,” 31 March 2015, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/middle-eastern-balancepower-matures/, Accessed 2 July 2019, JDC?) Last week, a coalition of predominantly Sunni Arab countries, primarily from the Arabian Peninsula and organized by Saudi Arabia, launched airstrikes in Yemen that have continued into this week. The airstrikes target Yemeni al-Houthis, a Shiite sect supported by Iran, and their Sunni partners, which include the majority of military forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. What made the strikes particularly interesting was what was lacking: U.S. aircraft. Although the United States provided intelligence and other support, it was a coalition of Arab states that launched the extended air campaign against the al-Houthis. Three things make this important. First, it shows the United States' new regional strategy in operation. Washington is moving away from the strategy it has followed since the early 2000s — of being the prime military force in regional conflicts — and is shifting the primary burden of fighting to regional powers while playing a secondary role. Second, after years of buying advanced weaponry, the Saudis and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries are capable of carrying out a fairly sophisticated campaign, at least in Yemen. The campaign began by suppressing enemy air defenses — the al-Houthis had acquired surface-to-air missiles from the Yemeni military — and moved on to attacking al-Houthi command-and-control systems. This means that while the regional powers have long been happy to shift the burden of combat to the United States, they are also able to assume the burden if the United States refuses to engage. US supporting mostly with intelligence in Status Quo – air force can function without US Chen, Syracuse University International Relations Department graduate, 17 (Victoria, Syracuse University, “Saudi Arabia and Iran: Sectarianism, a Quest for Regional Hegemony, and International Alignments,” 10 August 2017, https://surface.syr.edu/honors_capstone/1000/, page 50, Accessed 1 July 2019, JDC?) Arguably even worse than the United States’ failure to acknowledge Saudi war crimes in the region, the U.S. has previously provided the Saudis with unchecked military sales for fighting in Yemen. Approvals of these sales have significantly increased the civilian death toll. Saudi Arabia’s naval blockade in Aden and alHudaydah has cut off essential supplies to Yemenis and has largely contributed to fatal instability in the country. In April, Riyadh agreed to provide Yemen with $274 million for humanitarian relief, but has since failed to transfer the funds. London and Washington have tried to “quietly” persuade the Saudis to moderate its tactics in Yemen, but so far, Saudi Arabia’s policy has remained the same(Carasik 2015). At the same time, the United States has provided intelligence and some logistical support to the Saudi-led coalition of nine African and Middle Eastern countries that launched Operation Decisive Storm in March 2015. This action has been responsible for bombing hospitals and weddings, causing hundreds of civilian causalities, and blockading which cuts off Yemen’s food and medicine supplies (Knights and Mello 2015). Experts claim, however, that the March 2015 Saudi-led coalition airstrikes against the Houthis have been carried out despite few new arms support from the U.S., who have supported the Kingdom with intelligence instead of weaponry. This suggests that the Kingdom has become capable of carrying out sophisticated military campaigns, independent of continued aid from the U.S.(Friedman 2015) Saudi Air Force Overreliance Turn The Saudi Air Force is ineffective, and overreliance on it destroys Saudi military capabilities—turns the disad and exacerbates violence in Yemen Exum, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for Middle East policy, 19 (Andrew, 6/21/19, The Atlantic, “U.S. Arms Sales to the Gulf Have Failed”, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/us-military-support-gulf-all-backwards/592249/, accessed 7/2/19, TR) Compounding these failures is the fact that our Gulf partners have largely invested in those areas where they cannot match the United States, and not in those areas for which the United States could actually use partner capacity. They have spent a lot of money building very expensive air forces, for example, that largely cannot do what their leaders need them to do. But these countries—whose economies depend on their ability to move oil and gas to the market by sea—haven’t spent much money at all on naval forces that can patrol their sea lanes, or minesweepers that can reopen those same sea lanes through either the Strait of Hormuz or the Bab el-Mandeb. That’s why you are more likely to see a U.S. naval vessel escorting an oil tanker through the Strait of Hormuz than you are to see a Gulf naval vessel. As a U.S. military officer wryly lamented to me on a visit to one Gulf country, “Out of the three services here, sir, the navy ranks fourth in terms of priority.” But ground forces don’t fare much better. Like naval surface warfare, ground combat and the things one has to do to be good at it are not sexy. You need to be physically fit (which involves running a lot), spend a lot of time on the rifle range (which involves sweating a lot), and rehearse battle drills and other collective tasks ad nauseam (which involve both running and sweating a lot). I once spent five months doing all that with a light-infantry platoon in the heat of the Kuwaiti desert and … well, it’s not always fun. The sun sucks, the sand sucks, and you’re trying to keep a bunch of teenagers focused in 100-degree heat. I get it. Getting shot by the enemy, though, is less fun, and along the border with Yemen, Saudi ground forces in particular have proved largely incapable of closing with and engaging the enemy—which is the entire point of possessing ground-maneuver forces. The failure of Saudi and allied ground forces has contributed to their overreliance on air forces, which have spent most of the past few decades practicing air-to-air combat (which they’re still not very good at, if we’re not grading on a curve) and were largely unprepared for what they were asked to do over Yemen—as lots of Yemeni civilians sadly discovered. Impact Saudi Air Force Bad – Instability Turn - Saudi war planes intentionally target civilians, commit numerous war crimes, military solutions are not possible and new weapons exacerbate the conflict Abrahamson, Arms Control Association arms control and conventional arms transfers senior fellow, 17 (Jeff, Arms Control Association, “U.S. Arms Policy & Sales: New Policies Promote Arms, Drone Exports,” May 2017, https://www.armscontrol.org/taxonomy/term/36?page=1, Accessed 1 July 2019, JDC?) *Ableist language in this card, deal with it before reading The Yemeni rebel movement, the Houthi, seized the capital Sanaa in 2014. Since 2015, the United States has backed a Saudi-led coalition fighting nominally on behalf of exiled president Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, often providing refueling for war planes and other support. The coalition has retaken portions of Yemen, including Aden, which Hadi ostensibly uses as a base for his government. But many Yemenis still live in areas outside of Hadi’s control, including in the capital Sanaa. All sides in the conflict have been implicated for violations of international humanitarian law, including the Saudis who have ignored U.S. “no target” lists and bombed hospitals, civilian areas, and funerals in attacks that may amount to war crimes. The war has also fueled a humanitarian disaster. After two years of fighting, the United Nations launched an appeal early this year on behalf of 18.8 million people who it found needed assistance in Yemen—more than two-thirds of the country’s population. At that time, it warned of a possible famine with 3.3 million people being acutely malnourished. UN Secretary-General António Guterres painted a chilling picture April 25 of what he called “a tragedy of immense proportions,” noting that “On average, a child under the age of five dies of preventable causes in Yemen every ten minutes.” Now, Houthi leaders in Sanaa have declared a state of emergency after a cholera outbreak that has killed more than 100 people. The flow of new weapons to states involved in the conflict will only worsen the humanitarian situation. Ignoring UN findings that a military solution is not possible and pleas to unblock access to ports to help address the “largest humanitarian crisis in the world,” the port city of Hodeida is identified as a next target for the Saudi-led coalition. Despite being crippled by earlier strikes and blocked from receiving new cranes for unloading supplies, a significant portion of humanitarian assistance enters the country through the port. An attack there would likely further cut supplies and significantly escalate human suffering. News of the potential sale of precision-guided munitions as well as an attack on Hodeida have swirled in Congress since at least March, with many members wisely engaging to express concerns about addressing the humanitarian situation, Saudi behavior, and authority for U.S. military action. Notionally, precision-guided munitions would better enable Saudi forces to avoid civilian casualties, but evidence suggests that munition accuracy is not the primary reason why Saudi forces are hitting civilian targets. During a March 9 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Yemen, Dafna Rand, a former deputy assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights, and labor in the Obama administration, testified that despite hopes in 2015 that the Saudi-led coalition would use precision-guided munitions for better targeting, “what we’ve seen since is not an improvement in the targeting and the issue itself is the target selection.” Saudi Air Force exacerbates the Yemeni humanitarian crisis – toxic gases and community disasters Carapico, University of Richmond International Studies Concentration Advisor for Middle East Politics and Diplomacy, 18 (Sheila, POEMPS, “War and de-development,” 2018, https://pomeps.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/02/POMEPS_Studies_29_Yemen_Web-REV.pdf#page=59, Accessed 1 July 2019, JDC?) Secondly, military activity pollutes the air and the biosphere . Fighter planes emit more reactive, toxic gases and particles than commercial airliners . Their fuel consumption is so vociferous that the United States provides the Royal Saudi Air Force in-flight refueling to sustain its bombing raids . While quantitative scientific evidence is elusive, common sense indicates that the carbon footprint of hundreds of sorties a week for more than a hundred weeks is substantial . Offensive high explosive munitions, like the air-to-surface Hellfire missile, a 100-pound “tank-buster,” and a range of other pyrotechnic devices produce sonic or subsonic blasts that endanger livestock as well as terrestrial and aquatic wildlife . Both gravity-driven bombs and fuel-powered missiles leave craters, disturb water tables, and spread shrapnel and contaminants . Disruptions to terraces or irrigation trenches can cause spillover erosion across a wide ecosystem, further injuring landscapes and farms . In addition, as Omar Dewachi observed in Iraq, contamination by cement dust from collapsed buildings and heavy metals from munitions have dire consequences for public health and air quality Air war in Yemen destroys infrastructure and leads to permanent Failed state status, strengthening Houthi rebel groups Hokayem, International Institute for Strategic studies Middle East Security Senior fellow, Roberts, King’s College London Defense Studies Department Qatar specialist, 16 (Emile, David B., Taylor & Francis, “The War in Yemen.” http://proxy.foley.gonzaga.edu/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=119597 live, Accessed 1 July 2019, JDC?) Ultimately, the coalition's way of war has proven to be flawed. While the participants have demonstrated their will to intervene, it is still too soon to determine whether they will be equally willing to sustain the operation to a successful end. Importantly, the coalition has not found a way to achieve its operational aims while minimising its losses. By mid-2016, force had compelled the Houthis to sit at the negotiating table, but not to agree on a political settlement. In the meantime, the costs of the operation continue to mount, not just in terms of massive financial outlays (believed to run into the billions of dollars every month),[76] but of the suffering of the Yemeni people, including the Houthis, their supporters and opponents. The coalition's overreliance on airstrikes has led to an egregious number of civilian deaths and the widespread destruction of Yemen's infrastructure as the number of military targets has diminished. Nevertheless, the coalition has pressed on with its air war. A functioning post-conflict Yemeni state is probably unattainable now, regardless of the levels of financial support for reconstruction. For Saudi Arabia and the UAE, a plausible outcome of the intervention is a failed state at their border, in which the Houthis survive as a key military actor dominating a vast territory, and in which the conditions for radicalisation and jihadi recruitment are ideal. If nothing else, both countries face complex decisions and uncomfortable entanglements with opportunistic and unreliable local factions and politicians. While they have demonstrated their readiness to deploy force against perceived threats in proximate territories, the conclusions that other states draw from the campaign will be strongly influenced by its still-uncertain outcome. The Yemen campaign is at most a model for limited intervention in weak countries, not a template for strategic self-sufficiency or for future inter-state wars in the Gulf region. It remains to be seen whether this war will serve as the impetus for a rethink of Gulf defence or compel the Gulf states to embrace a more inclusive and better calibrated approach to the perennially weak state of their southern neighbour. Saudi Air Force Bad – Iran Saudi intervention leads to increased Iranian influence Byman, Center for Middle East Policy Senior Fellow, 18 (Daniel L., Brookings Institute, “Yemen after a Saudi withdrawal: How much would change?” 5 December 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/orderfrom-chaos/2018/12/05/yemen-after-a-saudi-withdrawal-how-much-would-change/, Accessed 2 July 2019, JDC? Strategically, a close to the Saudi intervention would also benefit a key U.S. ally in the region—Saudi Arabia. Riyadh justified its intervention as a way to counter Iran, fight terrorism and restore a stable government in Yemen. But terrorists remain active in Yemen, and stability is farther off than ever. The Saudi-backed president of Yemen, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, has no power base and little popular support. Perhaps most important from Riyadh’s point of view, Iran’s position in Yemen is stronger than ever. The war has increased the Houthis’ dependence on Iran for arms and financial support. In addition, the court of world opinion has come to see Saudi Arabia, not Iran, as the aggressor in the conflict, and it is Saudi Arabia whose reputation is damaged by the ongoing disaster there. No Iran Escalation Iran has been continuously looking for peace options in the past, they won’t escalate the war Hafezi, Reuters Chief Iran Correspondent, 18 (Parisa, Dec 3, 2018, Reuters, Iran backs Yemen peace talks, wants end of crisis: state TV, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-iran/iran-backs-yemen-peace-talks-wantsend-of-crisis-state-tv-idUSKBN1O20N0, Accessed Jul 1, 2019, VP) Iran supports U.N.-sponsored Yemen peace talks and is ready to help find a political solution, Iranian state television reported on Monday. “Iran welcomes the talks in Sweden...Tehran is ready to help international talks to end the crisis and underlines the importance of accelerating providing humanitarian aid to the people,” the Foreign Ministry said in a statement quoted by TV. Iran supports Houthi rebels fighting a Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. Houthi officials are expected to travel to Sweden shortly for talks as early as Wednesday to end the nearly four-year-old war after the Saudi-led coalition allowed the evacuation of some of their wounded for treatment. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif expressed his support for the talks in a tweet on Monday. “All sides should enter constructive and responsible engagement to end the crisis in #Yemen,” Zarif wrote. “The world has a historic responsibility to back dialogue including by halting arming of aggressors.” War Would be Quick – US Wins War with Iran would be ended quickly, US has a massive advantage in cyberwarfare capable of crippling Iranian defense systems Volz, WSJ Cyber Security Reporter & Yousef, WSJ National Security Correspondent, 19 (Dustin, & Nancy, Jun 23, 2019, Wall Street Journal, U.S. Launched Cyberattacks on Iran, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-slaunched-cyberattacks-on-iran-11561263454, Accessed Jun 28, 2019, VP) The U.S. covertly launched offensive cyber operations against an Iranian intelligence group’s computer systems on Thursday, the same day President Trump pulled back on using more traditional methods of military force, according to U.S. officials familiar with the matter. The cyberstrikes, which were approved by Mr. Trump, targeted computer systems used to control missile and rocket launches that were chosen months ago for potential disruption, the officials said. The strikes were carried out by U.S. Cyber Command and in coordination with U.S. Central Command. The officials declined to provide specific details about the cyberattacks, but one said they didn’t involve loss of life and were deemed “very” effective. They came during the peak of tensions this week between the U.S. and Iran over a series of incidents across the Middle East, including Tehran’s shooting down of an American reconnaissance drone. The attacks also came as U.S. fears have grown that Iran may seek to lash out with cyberattacks of its own, as multiple cybersecurity firms said they had already seen signs Tehran is targeting relevant computer networks for intrusion and appeared particularly focused on the U.S. government and the American energy sector, including oil and gas providers. While little was known about Thursday’s digital attacks, they were the latest indication that the U.S. has ramped up its willingness to use disruptive or destructive cyber weapons under President Trump after years of caution and drawn-out interagency deliberations that often led to inaction in previous administrations.