University:
Indiana University Bloomington
Course:
Financial and Managerial Accounting: Information for Decisions - John J. Wild
Academic year:

2024
Views:

227

Pages:

2
Author:

bratrochanter

Summary of the Clayton Act, Robinson–Patman Act, and Antitrust Exemptions Indirect Price Discrimination Under the Robinson–Patman Act Indirect price discrimination occurs when sellers provide unequal payments or services to customers that result in anticompetitive outcomes. The Act addresses these practices through the following sections: 1. False Brokerage (§ 2(c)): o Prohibits phony commissions or discounts in lieu of services rendered. o Liability Standard: Per se; no need to prove competitive harm. o Defenses: Neither cost justification nor meeting competition defense is allowed. 2. Discriminatory Payments and Services (§§ 2(d) and 2(e)): o § 2(d): Prohibits unequal payments for customer-performed services, such as advertising or promotional activities. o § 2(e): Bans unequal provision of services, like equipment or display materials, to customers. o Payments/services must be offered proportionally to all competing customers. o Defenses: Only the meeting competition defense applies; cost justification is not available. 3. Buyer Inducement (§ 2(f)): o Makes it illegal for buyers to knowingly induce or receive discriminatory pricing that violates § 2(a). o Buyers are not liable if the seller has a valid defense, such as meeting competition in good faith. Antitrust Exemptions 1. Statutory Exemptions: o Labor Unions: Protected under the Clayton and Norris–LaGuardia Acts, but not when combining with non-labor groups for anticompetitive goals. o Agricultural Cooperatives: Collective marketing of agricultural products is exempt under the Capper–Volstead Act, provided it avoids predatory practices. o Export Activities: Joint export efforts are exempt if they don’t impact domestic prices (Webb–Pomerene Act). o Insurance: Exempted under the McCarran–Ferguson Act when regulated by states, unless practices involve boycotts or coercion. 2. State Action Exemption (Parker v. Brown): Antitrust laws do not apply to state-mandated anticompetitive activities. o Conditions:  Must be an explicit state policy.  Requires active state supervision.  Municipal activities are immune only when authorized and foreseeable. 3. Noerr–Pennington Doctrine: o Protects the right to petition the government (e.g., lobbying or lawsuits) from antitrust scrutiny. o Exceptions:  Sham Activities: Petitioning solely to interfere with competitors, rather than to influence government action, is not protected.  Direct Antitrust Injury: Liability may arise if bona fide petitioning causes direct antitrust harm (e.g., coercion in FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n). o Illustrative Cases 1. Armstrong Surgical Center v. Armstrong County Memorial Hospital: o Issue: Whether petitioning during a state Certificate of Need (CON) process is exempt from antitrust liability. o Ruling:  Protected under Noerr–Pennington if aimed at legitimate government action (denial of CON).  Sham petitioning claims failed because the petitioning sought actual government outcomes. 2. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association: o Public defenders’ concerted refusal to work aimed at pressuring the government for higher pay was not protected under Noerr– Pennington. o The conduct caused direct antitrust harm by disrupting market competition.