Procedural Requirements Governing Contested Cases There has been a worldwide loss in the advantages (ecosystem services) that society gets from ecosystems, which has been attributed to the ecological consequences of an increasing human population, as well as increased ambitions and capacity for consumption (MEA, 2005; Rockstro¨m et al., 2009). Although there is a growing understanding of the factors that contribute to environmental deterioration, the mechanisms that may potentially facilitate a transition toward more sustainable trajectories are not well characterized. Laws and regulations that punish actions that are not sustainable (for example, the regulation of water pollution) and market approaches that align economic incentives with sustainability goals (for example, payment for ecosystem services or green certification programs) can motivate more sustainable resource use (Kinzig et al., 2011). This is accomplished by concentrating on policy and market instruments that incentivize desired outcomes. However, the choices that society makes about the use of its resources are not only driven by economic self-interest or the fear of being punished. According to Berkes (2008), Louv (2005), and Raymond et al. (2013), regulations and payment for ecosystem services have the potential to marginalize other, more basic incentives for appreciating and responding to environment, or they may weaken alternative cultural approaches to stewardship. An other strategy that may be used is to utilize the connection that individuals have to certain locations or characteristics (for example, biodiversity) as a means of motivating them to be environmentally responsible citizens. In order to offer a basis for stewardship efforts, is it possible for this "sense of place" to give insight into the mechanisms that relate people's attachment to their location to the activities that they do there? When it comes to incorporating an understanding of the linkages between people and places at large scales, Earth-System and Integrated Assessment Models typically concentrate on biophysical, economic, and demographic dimensions (Michetti and Zampieri, 2014; Schneider, 1997), while ignoring the social processes that intervene in the process. In this paper, we aim to bridge the gap between the fine-scale understanding of psychological and social processes that connect people to places and the urgent need to foster long-term stewardship at scales ranging from local places to the planet (Chapin et al., 2009; Folke et al., 2011; Turner et al., 2003). Specifically, we want to bridge the gap between the two. Various online platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, as well as Coursera and Uber, have been actively engaged in a broad variety of civic activities. As a consequence of this, they have begun to play a significant part in the accomplishment of significant public values and policy goals related with these activities. These objectives include the freedom of speech, diversity, public safety, transparency, and socio-economic equality. Within the scope of this paper, a conceptual framework for the governance of the public role of platforms is developed, and the notion of joint responsibility for the fulfillment of essential public policy goals in Europe is elaborated upon. State institutions in Western Europe were principally responsible for the arrangement of public space and for the protection of public ideals during the whole of the twentieth century. Since then, this social structure has been subjected to an increasing amount of strain as a result of the liberalization of the economy and the privatization of public institutions and services (Dean 2007; Garland 1996; Miller and Rose 2008). It is becoming more difficult to keep up with this trend as a result of the proliferation of digital middlemen in the form of online platforms. It is possible that these intermediaries are platforms that serve a broad function for social communication and information exchange (for example, Facebook and Twitter), or they may be platforms that are particular to certain industries, such as education, transportation, and hospitality (for example, Coursera, Uber, and Airbnb). Generally speaking, online platforms may be characterized as socio-technical frameworks that facilitate and direct contact and communication between users by means of the gathering, processing, and circulation of user data (Van Dijck, Poell, and De Waal forthcoming; Plantin et al. 2016). Most of the time, it seems as if these platforms make public action easier to do with very little assistance from public institutions. As such, they are lauded as vehicles of what has become known as “participatory culture” and the “sharing” or “collaborative” economy (Botsman and Rogers 2011; Jenkins 2006; Shirky 2008). people have the potential to successfully take on their role as producers of public goods and services, as well as to act as independent and responsible citizens, with the help of online platforms, which offer the promise of empowering people. This promise has not been delivered by internet platforms to this day, despite the fact that they have been available. Instead, it seems that in many instances, they are further magnifying the pressure that the market exerts on significant public values. These values include the non-discrimination and transparency in service delivery, the civility of public communication, and the variety of material in the media. Despite the prevalence of neoliberal discourse, public institutions continue to be significant organizational and regulatory players. As we shall illustrate in this essay, their economic interests and the strategic reasons that correspond to them do not always fit well with those of public institutions. In this paper, we will argue that platforms should assume their role as organizational and regulatory actors with reference to important public values. It is not at all easy to see how they should go about doing this. It is complicated by a number of different elements. To begin, the most prominent internet platforms are multinational firms located in the United States. These organizations make global architectural choices, yet they store and process the majority of user data in the United States. In the second place, there is the very complicated and opaque nature of the platform architecture and the algorithms that are used below it. A second issue that contributes to the complexity of the situation is the division of work between users and platforms. It is not only the platforms themselves that play a role in the realization or degradation of public ideals on these platforms; active users also play a part in this decision. At the same time, it is abundantly obvious that the power connection between users and platforms is uneven. This is not the least of the reasons in which the operations of platforms are not transparent. When it comes to accountability, the issue of where the platform's obligation stops and the user's responsibility begins is notoriously difficult to answer. The idea of algorithmic governance has arisen over the course of the last decade, but it is based on an idea that has been around for a much longer period of time: the notion that digital technologies organize the social in certain ways. Interacting with the idea of algorithmic governance is difficult due to the fact that several study areas are interested in the phenomena, each of which uses various terminologies and focuses on different aspects of the phenomenon. Inquiring into what constitutes algorithmic governance is a significant addition to modern social theory since it involves investigating the function of algorithms and the influence that they have on the ordering of things. Computer-based epistemic processes that are exceptionally complicated are what we refer to as algorithms. However, the definition of complexity is contingent upon the context in which it is used. The intrinsic mathematical logics and statistical practices that algorithms possess are what have the ability to form operations. As a result of this, the discussion around algorithmic governance often overlaps and crosses with discussions about datafication (see to Mejias & Couldry, 2019 as part of this particular section) and artificial intelligence (AI). However, algorithms may also work on "small data" and use calculus-based techniques that do not learn and are not adaptable. This is a common occurrence. In spite of the fact that governance is a contentious concept, we describe its essence as the coordination of actors following a set of rules. Not only does governance include regulation, but it also involves unintended coordination (Hofmann, Katzenbach, & Gollatz, 2016). In addition to regulation, governance does not necessarily involve purposeful and goal-directed behavior (Black, 2001). Governance, on the other hand, precludes any kinds of social ordering that are merely sporadic and do not depend on any kind of norm. Governance implies a minimal degree of stability, which is something that is required for players to establish expectancies, which are a prerequisite for coordination (Hobbes, 1909). We have decided to use the term "algorithmic governance" rather than "algorithmic regulation" due to the fact that governance is able to take into consideration the myriad of social orderings that exist in relation to actors, procedures, structures, degrees of institutionalization, and the allocation of authority. A social ordering that is analytically and structurally decentralized and not state-centered is purposefully embraced by this kind of social organization. Because of this, algorithmic governance is a better reflection of the objective of this study, which is to conduct a comprehensive investigation of the ways in which algorithms establish social order. Accordingly, we concentrate on governance by algorithms rather than the governance of algorithms (Musiani, 2013; Just & Latzer, 2017). This is because of the aforementioned reason. To summarize, algorithmic governance is a kind of social ordering that is founded on rules, involves especially complicated computer-based epistemic processes, and depends on coordination between actors. It is a form of social ordering. The need of dealing with algorithmic governance becomes apparent when considering the several conflicting narratives that describe the changes that occur in governance as a result of the use of algorithms. One of these narratives states, for instance, that governance ends up becoming more powerful, invasive, and ubiquitous. A alternative narrative emphasizes that government becomes more inclusive and responsive, and is able to accommodate a greater degree of social variety. This is something that we shall emphasize in the chapters to follow. It is possible to trace the origins of this idea all the way back to the history and sociology of science, technology, and society if one takes a wide perspective. According to Bijker and Law (1992) and Latour (2005), technology has always been able to both reflect and reorganize the social structure. From Socrates’ concerns with writing and literacy (Ong, 1982) via cybernetic’s radically interdisciplinary connection between technical, biological and social systems and their control (Wiener, 1948) via Jacques Ellul’s bureaucratic dystopia of a 'technological society' (1964) to Langdon Winner’s widely cited, yet contested 'politics of artefacts' (1980) – the idea that technology and artefacts somehow govern society and social interactions is a recurring theme. The famous tagline "code is law" that was coined by Lawrence Lessig is the more direct antecedent of algorithmic governance. In this context, software code or, more broadly speaking, technological structures are considered to be one of the four variables that regulate social behavior. The other three factors are the law, the market, and social norms. There have also been conceptualizations of the institutional nature of software and algorithms made by academics (Katzenbach, 2017, 2012; Napoli, 2013; Orwat et al., 2010). In 2009, Rouvroy and Berns coined the phrase "gouvernance algorithmique." However, it was Muller-Birn, Dobusch, and Herbsleb (2013) who were the first to use the term "algorithmic governance." They presented it as a coordinating mechanism that was in contrast to "social governance." 1. The term "algorithmic regulation" was first presented by Tim O'Reilly, a publisher from the United States, in 2013. This notion emphasizes the effectiveness of automatically managed areas, but it ignores the depoliticization of extremely contentious topics that occurs when these concerns are delegated to technology solutions (Morozov, 2014). On the other hand, the interdisciplinary field of critical software studies has complicated – in the best sense – the intricate mutual dependencies of software and algorithms on the one hand, and social interactions and structures on the other (MacKenzie, 2006; Fuller, 2008; Berry, 2011; Kitchin & Dodge, 2011). This is in contrast to the implicit technological determinism that is present in these accounts. Administrative adjudication and rulemaking are the two fundamental forms of agency actions that are governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). When "legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party are to be determined by a state agency after an opportunity for adjudicative hearing," this circumstance is referred to as adjudication. 4. In most cases, the enabling law of an agency will specify the circumstances under which an adjudicative or disputed case hearing is necessary. In the process of handling a disputed case, the APA outlines the processes that an agency and the parties involved in the issue are required to follow. Generally speaking, adjudication takes place when an agency decides not to provide a license to a person or company, revokes an existing license or permission, imposes an administrative penalty, or otherwise takes action that affects the legal rights of a person or entity. A license encompasses any "permit, certificate, approval, registration, or similar form of permission required by law" issued by a state agency. The Americans with Disabilities Act (APA) calls adjudicative processes "contested cases." In accordance with the American Bar Association (APA), a disputed case is defined as a procedure "in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party are to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for adjudicative hearing." Due to the fact that the APA is a procedural legislation, it does not confer any substantive rights on a case that is being disputed. Only in the event that "some other law, statute, or rule requires that agency licensing action be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing" is it necessary to comply with the requirements of the APA that pertain to disputed cases. Consequently, the procedural safeguards provided by the APA are not need to be adhered to in every single decision made by the organization. There are a variety of various situations that may lead to an agency denying a license, revoking an existing license, or disciplining a licensee who is already in possession of a license. It is possible for an agency to make the decision to refuse a license based on the information that is included in the licensing application package. When a member of the general public lodges a complaint against a licensee, the agency may receive the complaint. Other times, the agency's own personnel may discover information via investigations or by informal or approved random compliance visits conducted to licensees or licensed facilities. These visits may be performed in order to ensure compliance with regulations. At the point in time when adverse action is being considered for the first time, the agency will typically advise the licensee that an inquiry or complaint is being conducted. Using a letter as a medium of communication is one alternative. Additionally, a licensee will typically get a copy of any complaint that has been lodged against them by the agency. However, the legislation does not mandate that the licensee be provided with a separate notification of investigation prior to the formal notice of hearing, with the exception of situations in which the enabling laws of an agency stipulates different conditions. In addition, throughout the course of an inquiry, an agency may make requests for information from other parties. The means and the acquisition of evidence in the disputed procedure are essential procedural acts that enable the verification of a comprehensive and fair factual situation. This is the means by which the court, as a state agency, ensures that the judicial process is impartial and fair. In the disputed process, the means of evidence serve the purpose of verifying the facts that have been provided by the parties, or verifying the facts that need to be resolved by the court ex officio in situations where the parties desire to dispose of rights that they are unable to freely dispose of. A recognition procedure is the primary action that the court performs in order to identify the material truth about the challenged issue and every other judgment for the disclosure of this truth. This process is the only thing that the court does. It is important to keep in mind that the disputed method only validates the facts that are considered to be relevant for the resolution of the dispute. Following the development of the factual situation that will serve as the foundation for applying the material law, the court will decide which facts are to be regarded important for the purpose of establishing the factual situation. In the majority of situations, the court is responsible for determining which facts belong to the past and which are incongruous with the time period during which the subject is being evaluated in the court. With regard to the evidence and the manner in which it is obtained in the contested procedure, Article 321, Paragraph 1 of the LCP suggests that it is not necessary to prove facts that are universally recognized, nor is it necessary to prove facts that the court has verified in previous judgements. An earthquake, floods, war, and other natural disasters are examples of universally acknowledged facts. These are the kinds of things that the average person is aware of. Taking into consideration the legal definition that was presented earlier, we have seen that even facts that have previously been established within prior final judgments or decisions do not need re-verification, even if they are employed in a new case. For example, should we assume that the final judgment has established that the damage has been caused and has also conclusively identified the person responsible for the damage, in the contested procedure, for the reduction or increasing of the lifetime rent, the issue of (non-)existence of damages and responsible person will not be reviewed, given that said facts have already been established through the final decision of a previous judgment. It is only possible to achieve the essence of the contested procedure if the judgment that is issued in the procedure where there are contested facts between litigants is accurate. On the other hand, this is something that can only be accomplished if the factual situation that is confirmed in the method is the same as the events that have occurred in the past. When doctors think that life-prolonging therapies should not be delivered, one of the most ethically contentious problems that arises in intensive care units (ICUs) is the question of how to react to requests from surrogates to administer such interventions. Due to the fact that they put into conflict the significant interests of patients, professionals, and society as a whole, these situations are among the most challenging available. Patients have an interest in obtaining care that is in accordance with their values and preferences throughout their treatment. Clinicians have a vested interest in avoiding situations in which they perceive themselves to be obligated to behave in a manner that is contrary to their professional commitments. The protection of individual rights, the promotion of clinician professionalism, and the guarantee of equitable distribution of medical resources are all essential concerns for society. An further factor that contributes to the difficulty of these instances is the absence of clear substantive norms to which an appeal may be made. Furthermore, impacted individuals are often vulnerable due to their incapacity, have little choice about the professionals who are treating them, and have little opportunity to seek therapy inside other facilities. This multi-society statement offers a framework to describe disagreements, explains mechanisms to address intractable treatment disputes, and proposes ways to avoid treatment disputes in intensive care units (ICUs). The statement also places a focus on procedural fairness. It is based on the assumption that it is unethical to provide total power for treatment choices to either patients/surrogates or individual doctors. This is the foundation upon which it is built. Instead, doctors and patients or surrogates should work together to make choices on treatment. When there is a dispute, the clinicians should first increase their efforts to establish a negotiated compromise, which may include enlisting expert advisors. It is recommended that therapists use a process-based approach to conflict resolution in the very rare instances in which an intractable disagreement arises. The world reached a consensus on 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the year 2015. These goals are intended to address the concurrent global concerns that are associated with issues such as deprivation and hunger, inequalities, wellbeing, education, clean water, climate change, ocean and land resources, governance, consumption, and economic growth, among other issues. Many academics have taken notice of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) agreement and its implementation, which has resulted in the emergence of an entirely new narrative on the method in which the SDGs should be realized in an integrated fashion. The ‘sustainability' discourses on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) tend to converge on the necessity of approaches that intertwine the principles of economic growth, social development, and environmental protection through robust governance frameworks that facilitate their implementation. These discourses originate from the natural, social, and political science spectrums. A number of works that concentrate on the sustainability of natural capital, such as the oceans, marine biodiversity, marine space, and fishery resources, have been produced as part of the ongoing discussion over the implementation of Sustainable Development Goal 14 (SDG 14), which is titled "Life below water." A step further in the debate is taken by Singh et al., who investigate in detail the connections between the seven aims of the Sustainable Development Goal 14 (SDG14) and other Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as well as the contribution to other SDG goals by analyzing the co-benefits and trade-offs that are inherent to the accomplishment of such goals. In this study, we will continue the research by concentrating on one of the secondary aims of Sustainable Development Goal 14, which is explicitly related to small-scale fisheries (SDG14b). This target requires small-scale fishers to be provided with access to resources and markets. When compared to other industries, such as agriculture or mining, the special focus that is given to small-scale fisheries in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is remarkable. This indicates to the need of having a conversation on how small-scale fisheries sustainability may be accomplished, both via SDG14b and other SDGs. In light of the fact that the concerns of small-scale fisheries extend beyond problems of access, we contend that it is of the utmost importance to establish a relationship between Sustainable Development Goal 14b and other objectives, as well as with other global processes. As a sector that derives livelihoods from the oceans, has close connections to both land and sea, and is socially and culturally embedded in the communities, small-scale fisheries are not only one of the key actors in the governance for ocean sustainability, but they also have the potential to play a significant role in the achievement of food security (SDG 1), reduced poverty (SDG 2), community wellbeing (SDG 3), gender equality (SDG 5) and economic growth (SDG 8). During a recent workshop, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) acknowledged the interconnectedness between the various Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the context of small-scale fisheries. The workshop highlighted the trajectory of adopting a holistic approach to resolve small-scale fisheries concerns pertaining to the alleviation of poverty, gender equality, food security, and ocean conservation. During these discussions, the Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication, also referred to as the "SSF Guidelines," which were adopted by FAO Member States in 2014, have been highlighted as an important tool to achieve Sustainable Development Goal 14b. This is accomplished by integrating these guidelines into legal frameworks and relevant processes. Synergies may be generated in the formulation of policies and strategies to accomplish both the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SSF Guidelines) because of the mutuality that exists between the two sets of goals. They argue for the significance of small-scale fisheries and the contribution they make to society, and they provide a broad spectrum of how the achievement of their sustainability is critically linked to the political, social, economic, natural, and governance systems in which they operate. The SSF Guidelines speak directly, with breadth and depth, on the various dimensions of small-scale fisheries. For instance, the SSF Guidelines provide direction on how to lessen the vulnerability and insecurity of fishing people by acknowledging their fundamental human rights. These rights include the rights to food, a healthy environment, fishery resources, capacity-building and education, as well as the rights to livelihoods and employment. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) include objectives and goals that are important to all of them. Consequently, as an international instrument, they have a great deal to contribute to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) components that are directly related to small-scale fisheries. And by connecting the two instruments, the governance portfolio may be reinforced. It goes without saying that the successful integration and coordination of the two instruments in any given environment is contingent upon a number of factors. These factors include the pre-existing rules and regulations that govern the system, the capability of the governing system, and the ability of the local communities to mobilize concerted efforts around the effective implementation of these instruments in order to address the concerns and challenges that are faced by smallscale fisheries. In accordance with the interactive governance theory, these are the most important problems about "governability." Initiatives of transnational private governance (hereinafter referred to as private governance) that address environmental and social problems are now gaining prominence across all economic sectors around the world. They often incorporate certification and product labeling with the purpose of communicating such better business conduct in order to get access to possible market advantages. They urge firms and manufacturers to embrace responsible business practices. From resource management to industrial production processes (Bartley 2003), private governance has been advocated for in order to address critical challenges. These challenges include the depletion of fisheries (Gulbrandsen 2010), the degradation of forests (Meidinger 2006), the climate change (Levin et al. 2009), the sustainability of biofuel and agricultural products (Partzsch 2011), and the recycling of electronic waste (Renckens 2015). These efforts are united by a concern for the social sphere throughout their whole. The variety of issues that arise in the social domain, on the other hand, has resulted in the development of unique problem-oriented logics, which are explanations for the manner in which institutions will address issues. These logics influence the minds of actors about the manner in which private governance efforts should be structured. As opposed to converging towards a dominant institutional logic in a developing field (Dingwerth & Pattberg 2009), we discover that competing, problem-oriented logics have an effect on the evolving rules and practices of private governance. This is a pattern that is consistent with recent research on institutional and organizational change (for example, Schneiberg & Soule 2005; Lounsbury 2007). We will concentrate on two of the many different logics that might have an effect on private governance. We demonstrate that each of these factors has played a role in the development and establishment of private certification institutions, which, once they have been institutionalized, have subsequently affected and limited the options that agents have regarding particular policy substance. The first aspect of a "logic of control" is that it places an emphasis on reducing the negative effects of corporate activity on the environment and society. It promotes the notion that some desirable actions, such as enhanced environmental performance, are often expensive to carry out and, as a result, need the establishment of institutions that are able to manage behavior in order to guarantee compliance. This rationale incorporates the assumption that in the absence of prescriptive standards, compliance audits, and incentives for compliance, operators would be persuaded to join certification programs, but they would subsequently do nothing to improve their behavior, which would result in "green washing" and/or ineffectiveness. The second concept is referred to as a "logic of empowerment," and it encompasses concepts on the exclusion of underprivileged players in the global economy. It proposes recommendations for how institutions might better the socio-economic position of the immediate targets of private governance, for example, small farmers from the global South. Therefore, according to the logic of empowerment, programs should provide assistance to participants who are economically excluded and disadvantaged by providing them with counsel, assisting them in finding methods to improve their market position, working together to improve management, and advocating for their interests on the international arena. In spite of the fact that concepts about stakeholder engagement as a method of empowerment are connected to our second line of reasoning, we contend that it is essential to examine them independently. In point of fact, we demonstrate how an emphasis on such stakeholder engagement has become more prevalent as a method of pursuing inclusion within private governance. This is the case in programs that began with a logic of control as well as those that began with a logic of empowerment. It is important to note that this highlights a significant point: the logics cover a variety of ideas about how to handle issues that are associated with the social domain. We have discovered that the logic that a program prioritizes in its original design has an effect on how that program develops over time. Programs that started out by emphasizing empowerment have been confronted with rising demands to institutionalize the logic of control, and vice versa. This is an essential piece of information. In light of this, it is essential for academics and practitioners to comprehend that the original logic emphasized (i.e. concepts) and the institutionalized norms that the logic supports (i.e. a program's rules and procedures) both have a significant role in shaping the manner in which program agents respond to particular policy decisions as the program develops. Our study, in this regard, highlights the repercussions of overlapping fields (Fligstein & McAdam 2012, pages 9–13), which are areas in which various notions about the role of private governance intermix and are challenged. We see the difficulties that programs have had when attempting to strike a balance between the two when independent spheres of private governance across problem areas and sectors have started to combine (compare Bartley 2003; Bartley & Smith 2010). We elucidate the distributional consequences of these challenges in terms of wealth (i.e. the distribution of aggregate, accumulated wealth), power (i.e. the distribution of who exercises control over others), and regulatory capabilities (i.e. the distribution of the potential to exert regulatory power), as specified by Cafaggi and Pistor (2012; 2015). This process is accomplished by discussing the means by which private governance has attempted to overcome these challenges. An explanation for why one or more logics were used in the design of any particular program is not something that can be presented within the confines of this article given its breadth. Identifying these diverse logics and elucidating the implications of their significance is the only objective of our work. Since this is the case, we strongly recommend that future study investigate the processes that are responsible for the pressure that programs feel to accommodate one logic or the other. There are a number of plausible mechanisms, such as: shifts in the macropolitical climate that increase the prominence of the problem that one logic is supposed to address (for example, the crises in Europe involving growth hormone and bovine spongiform encephalopathy [BSE], which helped justify more stringent EU risk regulation in accordance with our logic of control; see Vogel 2012, pages 54–66; Mattli & Buthe 2005); learning processes, in which information is shared between program officials and stakeholders in order to generate new understandings of how problems might be solved by adhering to an alternative logic (for example, the emulation of the Fairtrade model by the Forest Stewardship Council [FSC], see Auld 2014a); or political contestation, in which different participants in a program's policy community seek to transform rules in order to better fit the logic that is supposed to be addressed. In addition to being a pioneer in sustainable production (Kolk, 2005; Ponte, 2002), the global coffee industry is also an important transnational arena for private regulation (Bartley, 2007; Muradian and Pelupessy, 2005; Reinecke et al., 2012). This industry is responsible for employing more than 100 million people across more than 80 nations. One of the most fascinating paradoxes is presented by the advent of sustainability. According to the Sustainable Supply Chain Initiative (SSI), by the year 2013, all of the main coffee companies had implemented sustainability standards, and forty percent of the world's coffee was produced in compliance with standard. The large multinational coffee roasters that control the business are using the rhetoric of sustainability to explore their interactions with the natural environment and stakeholders. Additionally, they are reforming their supply chains in order to engage farmers directly. However, when seen from a different angle, there has been very little change. The early conceptualizations of activists for a global coffee order that is more ecological, egalitarian, and responsible have been watered down and adopted by the mainstream corporate community. According to Bitzer et al. (2008) and MacDonald (2007), the concept of sustainability has been reduced to a collection of standards and certifications for the purpose of controlling risks related to reputation, quality, and supply chain management. Within the context of advancing these market-oriented objectives, the standards that are produced by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are increasingly similar to those that are imposed by businesses. This paradox is a reflection of a larger debate that has been going on in the literature regarding political corporate social responsibility (PCSR), which includes standard setting and labeling. This debate "suggests an extended model of governance [...] where private actors such as corporations and civil society organizations play an active role in the democratic regulation and control of market transactions" (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011, p. 901). According to Baur and Arenas (2014), Matten and Crane (2005), Scherer and Palazzo (2007), and others, a number of academics have adopted an optimistic perspective that places an emphasis on the positive role that businesses play as benign participants in pluralist global governance arenas. This is done in order to advance the public good in situations where states lack the capacity or the will to do so. The political nature of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in governance arenas is seen by more critical scholars as neither benign nor democratic. Rather, it is seen as a strategy for enhancing the power, profitability, and legitimacy of private corporations, which in turn undermines the efforts of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to bring about progressive change (Banerjee, 2008; Fooks et al., 2013; Whelan, 2012). This conundrum of progress versus stagnation, as well as the accompanying conflicts of opinion on the political nature of corporate social responsibility, served as the impetus for our longitudinal research of the development of sustainability standards in the coffee industry. The question that we have is as follows: how does PCSR function as a process that facilitates interactions between incumbents and challengers on sustainability practices, and how does the interpretation and application of sustainability change as a result of this process? As a result of the study's efforts to answer this issue, it adds a significant temporal dimension to our understanding of PCSR as a protracted and participatory process of political contestation and accommodation. We propose that the political dynamics of corporate social responsibility (CSR) are a negotiated process of constructing or contesting a "value regime." This is a process in which configurations of economic value and normative values coevolve under specific governance mechanisms (Appadurai, 1986; Levy and Spicer, 2013). As a result of Thompson's warning (2008, page 498) that it is unhelpful to regard deliberative democracy as "a testable hypothesis," we have come to the conclusion that PCSR does not achieve the principles of deliberative democracy, nor should it be rejected as just cosmetic greenwash. By taking temporality seriously, we are able to build a viewpoint that is more realistic and nuanced. This perspective incorporates aspects of both the more optimistic and the critical views, and it highlights both the potential and the constraints of bringing about substantial change over a longer period of time. This method also sheds light on a second fundamental mystery, which is the manner in which non-governmental organizations (NGOs), although having low resources, have been able to have a significant amount of influence on corporate sustainability practices and business models, as well as business and consumer standards, and governance processes. We come to the conclusion that PCSR goes beyond deliberation, which is defined as "debate and discussion aimed at producing reasonable, well-informed opinions" (Chambers, 2003, p. 309; Thompson, 2008). PCSR encompasses a wider range of strategies and moves, both conflictual and collaborative, that result in long-term change that is sometimes unintended.