Criminal Homicide - Depraved Heart Murder, Involuntary Manslaughter

Criminal Homicide: Depraved Heart Murder, Involuntary Manslaughter Depraved Heart Murder I. II. III. Introduction a. Express Malice: When an individual acts w/ an intent to kill another human being. i. Malice may be implied where D intended to commit grievous bodily injury; or killed during the commission or attempted commission of a qualifying felony. ii. Also implied when the individual who kills acts w/ “an abandoned & malignant heart.” *This type of murder is called depraved heart murder* b. Malice will be implied in a homicide case if it can be shown that D acted w/ gross recklessness & manifested an extreme indifference to human life, meaning that the defendant realized that his actions created a substantial & unjustified risk of death & yet went ahead & committed the actions anyway. c. Homicides that involve a “depraved heart” shown by gross recklessness can be punishable as 2nd degree while unintentional kills that involve simple recklessness or gross negligence generally can only be punished as involuntary manslaughter. i. Line between extreme recklessness (DHM) & criminal negligence (involuntary manslaughter) cannot be drown with clarity – fact specific. d. Depraved-heart killer evidences a “don’t give a damn attitude, in total disregard of the public safety.” e. Often equated with “extreme recklessness” a conscious disregard of a substantial & unjustifiable risk of death (not just of serious bodily injury). i. Conscious disregard suggests the person KNOWS the act is dangerous & does it anyway 1. Contrast w/ knowing homicide in MPC – know w/ virtual certainty death will occur 2. Contrast w/ negligence homicide in MPC – should have known of a substantial & unjustifiable risk of death. ii. Substantial does not mean more likely than not. Examples a. Intentionally shooting a firearm into an occupied room, killing a person (acted w/ depraved heart). b. Driving well overspeed limit in bad weather while intoxicated, killing car occupant (acted w/ depraved heart). c. Failing to feed child for 2 weeks out of indifference, resulting in death (acted w/ depraved heart). Commonwealth v. Malone a. Facts: Long, age 13, was killed by a shot from a 32-caliber revolver held against his right side by the defendant, then aged 17. When D went to a moving picture theater, he carried in the pocket of his raincoat a revolver which he had obtained at the home of his uncle. Long procured a cartridge from his father’s room & he & D placed it in the revolver. They met at a dairy store, put one bullet in the chamber, & played “Russian Poker.” D placed the revolver against the right side of Long & pulled the trigger 3x. The 3rd pull resulted in a fatal wound. D said when he pulled the trigger, he did not “expect to have the gun go off.” b. TC: Guilty of 2nd degree & sentenced to a term in the penitentiary for between 5-10 years. c. Issue: If an individual commits an act of gross recklessness for which he must reasonably anticipate that death to another is likely to result, does he exhibit that wickedness of disposition & cruelty which proves he possessed malice? d. Precedent: i. Com. V. Hillman: “Malice in the law means a depraved & wicked heart that is reckless & disregards the rights of others…if a man fires a gun into a crowd & IV. kills another it is murder, b/c the fact of the reckless shooting of a gun into a crowd is malice in law. ii. Com. V. Knox: “When a man uses a gun loaded w/ powder & shot & aimed at a vital part of the body of another & discharges it, he must be presumed to know that death is likely to follow.” e. Holding: The killing was intentionally done in reckless & wanton disregard of the consequences which were at least 60% certain from his thrice attempt discharge of a gun known to contain one bullet & aimed at a vital part of Long’s body. It is murder, for malice in the sense of a wicked disposition is evidenced by the intentional doing of an uncalled-for act in callous disregard of its likely harmful effects on others. In a trial for murder proof of motive is always relevant but never necessary. Sentence may be carried out. People v. Knoller a. Facts: Knoller (D) & husband Noel were attys who 4 four large dogs from a client. A veterinarian warned her that the dogs lacked any training or discipline & that they would be dangerous. He also implied that the dogs might attack humans. While with the former owner, 2 of the dogs had attacked & killed the owner’s sheep & cat, & another ate his own doghouse. Former owner expressed concern about all the dogs & suggested that 2 of them be shot. On April 30, 2000, Ds brought 2 of the dogs to stay at their apt. On Jan 26, 2001, the dogs attacked & killed Diane Whipple, who lived on the same floor. Between the date Knoller & Noel brought the dogs home & the date of Whipple’s death, there were approximately 30 incidents where dogs were out of control or displayed threatening behavior. Knoller was charged w/ 2 nd degree murder. b. Procedural Posture: i. TC: The jury convicted Knoller based on a theory of implied malice. Knoller moved for a new trial & the trial court granted the motion. The trial court held that implied malice required a finding that Knoller was aware of the high probability that her conduct would cause another’s death & ruled that Knoller lacked this awareness. ii. CoA: Held that 2nd degree murder conviction, based on theory of implied malice, can be based on D’s awareness of the risk of causing serious bodily injury to another. 1. SC of CA’s Response: A conviction for 2nd degree murder, based on a theory of implied malice, requires proof that a defendant acted w/ conscious disregard of the danger to human life. In holding that D’s conscious disregard of the risk of serious bodily injury suffices to sustain a conviction, the CoA erred. c. Issue: Does a finding of implied malice require one to act only w/ a conscious disregard for the risk of serious bodily injury to another rather than w/ a conscious disregard for human life? Whether the TC abused its discretion in granting D Knoller a new trial on the 2nd degree murder charge? d. Precedent/Applicable Law: i. A killer acts w/ implied malice only when acting w/ an awareness of endangering human life. It is implied, when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned & malignant heart. ii. 2nd degree murder is the unlawful killing of a human being w/ malice aforethought but w/o the additional elements, such as willfulness, premeditation, & deliberation, that would support a conviction of 1 st degree murder. iii. Thomas Test: Malice is implied when “D for a base, antisocial motive & w/ wanton disregard for human life, does an act that involves a high degree of probability that it will result in death.” iv. Phillips Test: Malice is implied when the killing is proximately caused by “an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another & who acts w/ conscious disregard for life.” e. Holding: TC based its ruling on an inaccurate definition of implied malice, & it inappropriately relied on the prosecutor’s failure to charge codefendant Noel w/ murder. Trial court properly instructed the jury in accordance w/ the Phillips test. But when the court evaluated the defendant Knoller’s new trial motion, it relied on language from the Thomas test, & as explained below, its description of that test was inaccurate. Under the proper test, malice is implied when D acts w/ conscious disregard for life. Because it based its order granting a new trial on an erroneous definition of implied malice, TC must reconsider its order granting a new trial in accordance w/ this opinion. Involuntary Manslaughter I. II. III. Introduction a. There are two ways a prosecutor can secure an involuntary manslaughter conviction: (1) requisite mens rea for involuntary manslaughter, or (2) through an application of the misdemeanor manslaughter rule. i. The prosecutor can prove that D had the requisite mens rea for involuntary manslaughter. 1. Most courts agree that something more than ordinary civil negligence is required, but they are split over whether “criminal negligence” means something akin to “gross negligence” or whether it means “recklessness.” 2. A minority of courts have held that simple negligence is all that is required for an involuntary manslaughter conviction. ii. A second way one can be convicted of involuntary manslaughter is though application of the misdemeanor manslaughter rule (mini-felony rule). b. The difference between a reckless state of mind & a negligent state of mind turns on whether or not the defendant was aware of a substantial & unjustifiable risk & chose to disregard it. i. Recklessness requires an awareness of the risk. ii. Negligence does not require an awareness of the risk. Involuntary Manslaughter a. Two types: i. Engaging in conduct one SHOULD HAVE KNOWN created substantial & unjustifiable risk of death; or ii. Failing to take precautions one SHOULD HAVE KNOWN created substantial/unjustifiable risk of death. b. Blackstone: when a person does an act, lawful in itself. But in an unlawful manner and w/o due caution and circumspection c. Criminal Negligence: A gross deviation from the standard for care that reasonable people would exercise in the same situation i. Contrast: Playfully firing a gun knowing it is loaded ( DHM) versus playfully firing a gun mistakenly convinced it is unloaded (involuntary manslaughter) ii. Contrast: Ignoring a child’s known need for food or medical care ( DHM) versus being ignorant of what should have been an obvious need for food or medical care (involuntary manslaughter). Commonwealth v. Welansky a. Facts: D spent most of his evenings running a night club he owned in Boston. Nightclub was a mix of various rooms, narrow hallways, & poorly marked exit doors. Three of the emergency exits were in obscure locations, poorly marked, & accessible only to knowledgeable employees. 1 of the emergency exits was blocked by a screen & several dining tables. Another exit was kept locked to prevent patrons from leaving w/o paying their bill. During a 3-week period, D was in the hospital. One evening during that IV. period, a nightclub bartender asked an employee to turn on a light in a dark area of a room. The employee lit a match to see the bulb, turned the bulb in its socket to light it, & blew out the match. The flame of the match ignited a palm tree, which then ignited a low-hanging cloth. Fire spread rapidly. Crowd of around 1k panicked & tried to get out of the nightclub. Many patrons & employees were killed. D was charged & found guilty of numerous counts of involuntary manslaughter through wanton or reckless conduct based on overcrowding, installation of flammable decorations, absence of fire doors, & failure to maintain proper means of egress at the night club. b. Issue: If D owes duty of care for safety of business visitors invited to premises controlled by him, does he act wantonly or recklessly if he intentionally fails to take appropriate care in disregard of the probable harmful consequences to business visitors, even if he did not subjectively foresee risk posed by the unsafe conditions? c. Precedent/Legal Rules: i. Usually wanton or reckless conduct consists of an affirmative act, but where, as in the present case, there is a duty of care for the safety of business visitors invited to premises which the defendant controls, wanton or reckless conduct may consist of intentional failure to take such care in disregard for the probable harmful consequences to them or their right to care. ii. Commonwealth v. Pierce: “To constate wanton or reckless conduct, as distinguished from mere negligence, grave danger to others must have been apparent, & the defendant must have chosen to run the risk rather than alter his conduct so as to avoid the act or omission which caused the harm…but even fi a particular D is so stupid…that in fact he did not realize the grave danger, he cannot escape the imputation of wanton or reckless conduct in his dangerous act or omission, if an ordinary normal man under the same circumstances would have realized the gravity of the danger. iii. It is now clear that in this Commonwealth that at CL, conduct does not become criminal until it passes borders of negligence & gross negligence & enters into the domain of wanton or reckless conduct. d. Holding: Wanton or reckless conduct is intentional conduct, by way either of commission or omission where there is a duty to act, which involves a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to another. Wanton or reckless conduct consists of an affirmative act committed in disregard of probable harmful consequences to others, such as reckless driving or discharging a loaded gun. If there is a duty of care for safety of visitors to business, wanton/reckless conduct may consist of an intentional failure to take reasonable measures to protect those visitors from probable harmful consequences. Standard for what constitutes wanton or reckless conduct is objective & subjective. A person does not need to subjectively foresee the deadly consequences of his omission to engage in wanton & reckless behavior. Rather, it is enough that the person is subjectively aware of conditions that would cause a reasonable person to foresee a high likelihood of deadly consequences. To convict D, prosecution was not required to prove he caused the fire by wanton or reckless conduct. It was sufficient for prosecution to prove death resulted from D’s wanton & reckless disregard of safety of patrons. Although D was not present at nightclub on the night of fire, he still controlled its management. He also was aware of unsafe nature of the nightclub, including lack of a sufficient number of accessible exits & its inoperative fire doors. D did not need to specifically foresee the risk of death caused by the unsafe conditions, so long as a reasonable person in his place would have foreseen it. A reasonable person in D’s position would have foreseen the risk. Affirmed State v. Williams a. Facts: Ds were charged with manslaughter for negligently failing to supply their 17month child w/ necessary medical attention, as a result of which he died on September 12, 1968. Ct found that both Ds were aware their son was ill during the period of Sept 1 b. c. d. e. to Sept 12. They were ignorant. They did not take the baby to a doctor because of fear that the Welfare Department would take the baby away from them. A doctor testified that the child died b/c an abscessed tooth had been allowed to develop into an infection of the mouth & cheeks, eventually becoming gangrenous. Eventually produced pneumonia, causing the death. Evidence showed that in critical period the baby was fussy; that he could not keep his food down; & that a cheek started swelling up. Ds thought swelling would go down & were waiting for it to do so. There is no evidence that Ds were physically/financially unable to obtain doctor, or that they did not know an available doctor, or that the symptoms did not continue to be a matter of concern during the critical period. TC: They had no excuse that the law will recognize for not taking the baby to a doctor. Ds were negligent in not seeking medical attention for their son. Issue: The contentions raise two basic issues (1) the existence of the duty to furnish medical aid charged by the information to be violated & the seriousness of the breach required; & (2) the issue of proximate cause, i.e., whether Ds were put on notice, in a time to save the child’s life, that the medical care war required. Precedent/Legal Rules: i. Parental duty to provide medical care for a dependent minor child was recognized at CL & characterized as a natural duty. ii. In Washington, the crime of involuntary manslaughter was deemed committed even though the death of the victim is the proximate result of only simple or ordinary negligence. iii. People v. Pierson: Properly defines the duty as – a reasonable amount of discretion is vested in parents, charged w/ the duty of maintaining & bringing up infant children; & that the standard is at what time would an ordinarily prudent person, solicitous for the welfare of his child & anxious to promote its recovery, deem it necessary to call in the services of a physician. Ruling: There is sufficient evidence from which the court could find, as it necessarily did, that applying the standard of ordinary caution, the caution exercisable by a man of reasonable prudence under the same or similar conditions, Ds were sufficiently put-on notice concerning the symptoms of the baby’s illness & lack of improvement in the baby’s apparent condition in he period from Sept 1 to Sept 5 to have required them to obtained medical care for the child. Affirmed.