Resurrecting Emerson-4

36 CHAPTER THREE SELF-RELIANCE THROUGH THE ABSTRACT As one of the founders of transcendentalism, Emerson often allowed his writing to drift from the societal sphere and into the realm of the conceptual, particularly in his early works. Consequently, scholars often point to the lack of “abstraction” in Emerson’s later essays as a sign that he abandoned his early thought (Richardson, Jr. 4).4 John Carlos Rowe exemplifies this view when he says that Emerson’s later writing “tries valiantly to avoid the sort of idealistic rhetoric that characterizes his early and most often cited works, such as Nature, ‘Self-Reliance,’ and ‘The American Scholar’” (24). By “idealistic rhetoric,” Rowe means both Emerson’s early ideas, such as self-reliance, and his abstract presentation of them. Though Rowe’s stance is prevalent in Emersonian scholarship, his argument fails for two reasons. First, as I demonstrated in the previous chapter, Emerson’s cogitations about societal activities and norms in his later work did not signify his renunciation of self-reliance, a notion that epitomizes his youth’s idealism. Second, some parts of Society and Solitude, a work that I have treated as representative of his later writing, contain “idealistic rhetoric” that evoke his youth’s speeches and essays. The presence of the idealistic Emerson in Society and Solitude serves as this chapter’s central focus. At times, his abstraction—a term that I employ to describe moments when Emerson explores the immaterial—is immediately apparent to readers. For example, this chapter’s first section investigates “Success” and “Courage,” two essays that exclusively examine intangible human traits—success and courage—and could quite easily be mistaken for works in Essays or Essays: Second Series from three decades earlier. The mere fact that Emerson discusses these attributes in Society and Solitude refutes Rowe’s claim that Emerson relinquished 4 See also Lydenberg 356 and Rowe 24. 37 his “idealistic rhetoric” as he grew older, but my analysis also points to specific abstract moments within these conceptual essays as a means to counter the entirety of Rowe’s contention (24). More specifically, I look at the relationship between these human traits and self-trust, which is the most fundamental dimension of self-reliance. However, there are other instances in Society and Solitude when Emerson’s abstraction is less obvious because of the concrete context in which it appears. This chapter’s second section analyzes a couple of essays, “Clubs” and “Art,” that talk about societal activities but also possess moments of abstraction that reveal Emerson’s allusions to democratic individuality and religiousness. In both sections, the illustration of abstraction’s presence and promotion of self-reliance in Society and Solitude counters the scholarly consensus that Emerson deserted self-reliance, the pillar of his early work’s idealism. I. Overt Abstraction: Self-Trust in “Courage” and “Success” For Emerson, society has a tendency to mischaracterize human traits. It exaggerates or misinterprets people’s actions, heaping praise on unworthy figures and forgetting commendable individuals. More importantly, people rarely challenge these widely embraced definitions of certain human qualities. In Society and Solitude, Emerson focuses specifically on two abstract attributes, courage and success, and their connection to self-trust. When they are properly defined, courage and success can embody self-trust. Conversely, the masses’ false impression of these two traits typifies the thoughtless conformity that is rampant in society. Throughout “Courage” and “Success,” Emerson demonstrates how people can misunderstand, properly accept, and ultimately view courage and success as forms of self-trust by repeatedly utilizing abstractions to explain his beliefs. 38 In “Courage,” Emerson examines a trait that society frequently ascribes to some of history’s most prominent figures. He first illustrates that courage is often wrongly associated with military greatness, the “[a]nimal resistance” that people need to defeat violent foes (SS 205). He subsequently notes that courage is supposed to be a “rare” quality, yet “the instinct of the male animal when cornered...is no doubt common” (205). This statement’s abstract nature is undeniable because it involves a broad generalization about the “instinct[s]” of all “male animal[s].” Moreover, this sweeping assertion allows Emerson to depict society’s conception of courage as a trait that all individuals possess and can potentially act upon. To further convey this point, he lists a multitude of historical and mythological military figures, such as Hercules and Napoleon Bonaparte. It could be argued that this list does not establish valor’s pervasiveness because the seventeen individuals who Emerson names hail from eras that span numerous centuries, but Emerson demonstrates that courage applies to more than just these figures by elaborating on society’s idea of “animal resistance” in the same section of the essay. He says that society ascribes courage to “any man who puts his life in peril in a cause which is esteemed” (205). If we treat “cause” as a reference to war, a subject that is clearly the focus of this section of “Courage,” we see that society’s definition of courage could be applied to millions of individuals; it is no longer a “rare” attribute. Through an abstract affirmation about animals’ instincts, Emerson shows that courage’s connection to military involvement has diminished the word’s meaning. Consequently, the popular exaltation of military figures signals a thoughtless embracement of this notion of valor. Although he believes that many people misunderstand courage, Emerson suggests that individuals’ acceptance of the attribute’s traditional definition can exemplify mental selfreliance, an aspect of self-trust, if this adoption stems from one’s own thinking (Kateb 31). In 39 another abstract moment that expands the scope of his investigation of courage, Emerson compares a person’s ability to independently define courage to an individual’s capacity to withhold judgment on a highly criticized book, saying, “In all applications [it] is the same power, —the habit of reference to one’s own mind, as the home of all truth and counsel” (SS 215). Emerson’s employment of “counsel” signifies that people should use their own “mind[s]” to guide their opinions. Basically, people must practice, or “appl[y],” mental self-reliance in order to fully express the “truth.” Furthermore, the statement’s diction—“all,” “power,” and “truth”— conjures a sense of universality and profundity that characterizes Emerson’s early abstraction (215), the kind of “idealistic rhetoric” that Rowe claims Emerson’s later work lacks and makes it “impossible [for Emerson] to deal with the world of actualities” (Rowe 24; Lydenberg 356). As we see here, Emerson does ground his idealism in reality. He provides a plausible example of how mental self-reliance, an “idealistic” construct, can influence individuals’ perception of books (Rowe 24). It is certainly not “impossible” to fathom an individual who refrains from critiquing a book before reading it, just as it is not “impossible” to imagine a person who develops his or her own definition of courage (Lydenberg 356). By tying these two situations together through an abstract assertion of mental self-reliance, Emerson suggests that the traditional understanding of courage is only inadequate if it is accepted without independent thinking. Emerson certainly encourages people to arrive at their own conclusions about selfreliance, but he also believes that self-trust is indisputably a form of courage. To demonstrate this concept, Emerson once again turns to war imagery in a distinctly abstract depiction of courage: “[T]he pure article [of courage], courage with eyes, courage with conduct, selfpossession at the cannon’s mouth, cheerfulness in lonely adherence to the right, is the 40 endowment of elevated characters” (SS 205). Emerson’s use of “self-possession” certainly evokes the notion of self-trust, but it is the words preceding “self-possession” that truly illustrate this idea. In an Emersonian context, the word “pure” generally refers to the natural essence of someone or something, and self-trust is inherent to people. Self-trust also involves observation of the surrounding world—“eyes”—and independent “conduct.” This diction indicates that Emerson’s characterization of courage is indistinguishable from a description of self-trust. Additionally, the personification of the “cannon” and the employment of “elevated” give this passage a valiant and dramatic tone that illuminates Emerson’s intangible aim, which is to stress the sense of heroism in practicing self-trust. As Emerson proclaims in “Heroism” (1841), “Selftrust is the essence of heroism” (Essays 132). If we treat heroism as synonymous with courage, it is clear that Emerson views self-trust as inextricably linked to valor. Perhaps the most abstract expression of self-trust as a form of a courage arrives near the end of the essay when he says the following: Sacred courage indicates that a man loves an idea better than all things in the world; that he is aiming neither at pelf or comfort, but will venture all to put in act the invisible thought in his mind. He is everywhere a liberator, but of a freedom that is ideal; not seeking to have land or money or conveniences, but to have no other limitation than that which his own constitution imposes... . He wishes to break every yoke all over the world which hinders his brother from acting after his thought. (SS 219) Initially, we are unsure about the nature of the “idea” that “man loves” more than anything else in the “world,” but we learn at the end of this passage that “[h]e”—“man”—“wishes” to uphold self-trust, or the “acting after [one’s] thought.” As a result, we now consider the “idea” to be 41 purposefully ambiguous; it is a symbol for any “invisible thought[s]” that people possess. The significance of this opening is merely to establish self-trust as a necessity for “courage.” An individual must be willing to “venture all” in order to enact their own beliefs. A moment in “Self-Reliance” helps us understand how the “yoke” that “hinders” humanity from possessing self-trust is conformity. “Self-Reliance” asserts that the “world whips you with displeasure” for refusing to conform to the masses (S-R 24). In both “Courage” and “Self-Reliance,” a sense of punishment, either through the burden of the “yoke” or via the pain of the “whips,” awaits those who attempt to think and act independently (SS 219; S-R 24). Thus, the maintenance of self-trust is an act of courage. This passage’s elucidation of self-trust’s relationship to courage exemplifies Emerson’s abstraction in Society and Solitude because he refers to intangible concepts such as “freedom” and “thought” rather than social norms and activities (SS 219). His accentuation of the individual’s liberty invalidates Stephen E. Whicher’s claim that Emerson realizes, beginning with his second-to-last major work, The Conduct of Life, that “freedom lies only in obedience” (168). Essentially, Emerson recognizes that his vision of courage and, accordingly, self-trust is both nonconformist and “ideal,” a classification that he also makes earlier in the essay (SS 219). Through his theoretical association of courage and self-trust and his own awareness of this connection’s “ideal” nature, Emerson illustrates that his work still heavily relies on his youth’s abstraction. Emerson believes that success, like courage, is misunderstood by society, particularly in the United States. In “Success,” he contends that Americans increasingly view the attribute as exclusively a result of competition amongst each other, and he reflects that the American emphasis “on wealth, victory, and coarse superiority of all kinds” is “of very recent origin” 42 (230). Emerson’s employment of “coarse” conveys a disdain for this new American attitude, so this moment epitomizes Emerson’s critique “of the shallow materialism entailed by the conventional American idea of success” (230; Robinson 140). Emerson’s disapproval of America’s notion of success also appears in an abstract form when he discusses this false characterization’s roots. He says, “Cause and effect are a little tedious; how to leap to the result by short or by false means? We are not scrupulous. What we ask is victory, without regard to the cause” (SS 231). Within this passage alone, there are three references to intangible concepts: “cause,” “effect,” and “victory.” Through these abstract terms, Emerson demonstrates that America’s idea of success is a product of a desire to achieve fame and glory without a proper “regard” for the process, or “cause,” that is necessary to achieve these ends. He feels that this outcome-focused view of success is a manifestation of “egotism” (231). While self-trust certainly involves a turn inward and therefore could be considered somewhat self-centered, it also benefits society by producing a culture that fosters unique perspectives. In contrast, egotism merely benefits one individual. Emerson provides an example of this selfishness: “Men see the reward which the inventor enjoys, and they think, ‘How shall we win that?’” (231). There is no concern for the method of obtaining this “reward,” just a desire for the end itself. Similar to the way in which military figures become associated with courage simply because of people’s past misinterpretations of the word, competition and results become linked to success because of the thoughtless acceptance of a definition that neglects the process that is necessary to attain this attribute. Once again, it is critical to note that, as with courage, Emerson does not oppose the adoption of the trait’s traditional definition even though he believes that it is inadequate. His denunciation of society’s idea of success is solely related to the process that individuals utilize to 43 arrive at conclusions about success. In Emerson’s model community—a group that is entirely composed of self-reliant individuals—people would define success in their own ways and resist the urge to unthinkingly embrace others’ views of the attribute. Yet, in reality, “it is rare to find a man who believes his own thought” (233-234). In other words, it is unusual to discover a person that practices self-trust because most people doubt their own opinions if they do not mirror their peers’ positions. This statement’s theoretical nature—it advances the notion that individuals tend to question their own “thought[s]”—further idealizes self-trust. While a self-trusting person could certainly arrive at the mass attitude that success is tied to “victory” (231), Emerson abstractly asserts that the embellishment of personal achievement—an effect of his peers’ mischaracterization of success—directly counters self-trust: “He only who comes into this central intelligence, in which no egotism or exaggeration can be, comes into self-possession” (236). As previously noted, “self-possession” is an abstract reference to self-trust, and the use of “central intelligence” alludes to the Universal Mind, an immaterial dimension of self-reliance. This intangible terminology supports the idea that individuals cannot embody the Universal Mind unless they have a steadfast dedication to the “Truth” (Nature 27). Since self-trusting individuals belong to the Universal Mind, it follows that these people cannot possibly hold a view of success that is based on a hyperbolic inflation of one’s own accomplishments. Thus, even though a proper devotion to independent thinking could still result in an acceptance of courage’s traditional definition and exemplify self-trust, Emerson abstractly contends that a person who possesses self-trust would never freely choose this characterization of the term. Emerson emphasizes that people can define success in a variety of ways as long as they practice self-trust, but he also maintains that self-trust is itself a form of success. This declaration begins a paragraph that is initially forthright but becomes progressively more abstract: 44 Self-trust is the first secret of success... . It by no means consists in rushing prematurely to a showy feat that shall catch the eye and satisfy spectators. It is enough if you work in the right direction. So far from the performance being the real success, it is clear that the success was much earlier than that, namely, when all the feats that make our civility were the thoughts of good heads... . It is the dulness [sic] of the multitude that they cannot see the house, in the ground-plan; the working, in the model of the projector. (SS 234-235) Emerson’s use of “of” instead of “to” in his affirmation that self-trust “is the first secret of success” is significant because “of” implies that self-trust is a part of success rather than a characteristic that leads “to” success. Emerson further clarifies this distinction by conveying selftrust’s superiority in relation to society’s traditional conception of success. He says that self-trust “by no means consists in rushing prematurely to a showy feat,” which is a reference to the “shallow materialism” and outcome-focused, or “performance”-focused, nature of society’s notion of success (234; Robinson 140; SS 234). Essentially, self-trust values the process, or the “thoughts,” that ultimately result in certain accomplishments, not the “feats” themselves (234). This idea is reminiscent of a moment in “The Poet” (1844) when Emerson calls “paths” and “methods” “ideal and eternal” (Essays 215). In the above passage, Emerson suggests through abstract analogies that the masses, or the “multitude,” do not appreciate that the process for attaining success is important (SS 235). He metaphorically illustrates that society is so intent on instant gratification that it cannot “see the house” or “the model of the projector” before they are actually physically built (235). More explicitly, society cannot comprehend the method or work that is necessary to assemble these structures. These metaphors involve physical structures, but the equation of these two separate comparisons powerfully portrays Emerson’s extremely 45 theoretical idea that his culture does not value the method for achieving success. This example typifies Emerson’s complex representations of his beliefs throughout “Success” that enhance his readers’ understanding of his ideas about the trait; by abstractly depicting self-trust as a form of success that stresses the importance of independent thinking and action and hence challenges society’s impression of the trait, Emerson generates “a standard less prone to entanglement in the webs of social conformity” (Robinson 161). Consequently, although Emerson emphasizes that an adherence to self-trust can create diverse opinions about the nature of courage and success, he ultimately asserts that self-trust is itself a form of both traits, which is an abstract notion in its own right. II. Abstraction Amid the Concrete: Democratic Individuality and Religiousness in “Clubs” and “Art” Unlike “Courage” and “Success,” “Clubs” and “Art” explore concrete subjects, so Emerson’s mere examination of these topics does not demonstrate a persistence of his youth’s abstraction. These essays’ practical nature is perhaps best conveyed by the precision of his advice for intellectual organizations’ meetings in “Clubs”: “[T]o a club met for conversation a supper is a good basis, as it disarms all parties, and puts pedantry and business to the door” (SS 198). This specific counsel exemplifies Emerson’s predominantly pragmatic writing in both “Clubs” and “Art,” but there are other moments in these essays when Emerson allows his writing to drift into the intangible. In “Clubs,” Emerson’s abstraction arrives in his investigation of social relations and reveals his promotion of democratic individuality, a dimension of self-reliance that is primarily expressed by the essay’s frequent echoing of “Character” (1844) and “Friendship” (1841). In “Art,” Emerson’s abstraction emerges in his discussion of nature’s effect on human creativity and underscores the Universal Mind’s impact on self-reliant individuals’ artwork by 46 mirroring his portrayal of this spiritual essence in “The Over-Soul.” By drawing parallels between these essays and Emerson’s early thought, this section illustrates that Emerson still abstractly advances democratic individuality and religiousness, two dimensions of self-reliance. For a large portion of “Clubs,” Emerson contemplates the nature of people’s conversations and social interactions, straying from his essay’s practical focus on intellectual associations and abstractly reiterating his ideas about democratic individuality that he had set forth decades earlier in “Friendship” and “Character.” For example, when Emerson talks about the nature of arguments between two independent thinkers, he reflects, “[T]here may easily be obstacles in the way of finding the pure article we are in search of; but when we find it, it is worth the pursuit, for besides its comfort as medicine and cordial, once in the right company, new and vast values do not fail to appear” (SS 188). Basically, Emerson believes that people should endure their quarrels with certain individuals because they can potentially discover the “pure article” by maintaining a relationship with their adversaries. The “pure article” is quite abstract; Emerson never explicitly defines this concept, so we are initially unclear about its meaning. However, his use of “pure” ascribes a moral significance to this passage and evokes Emerson’s early descriptions of character, a force of the Universal Mind that involves the internal ascertainment of a higher truth. Emerson’s employment of “search” and “pursuit” further supports the notion that he alludes to character in this passage. A crucial component of Emerson’s construct of character is that people who grasp this moral fiber within themselves will seek justice in society. For Emerson, justice is the “application” of character’s higher “truth,” a “purity” that resides within people, to affairs in a community (Essays 245). Thus, the “pure article” that the quarrelers seek to find in one another is character’s higher truth, an abstract idea that readers can comprehend by closely scrutinizing its origins in “Character” (SS 188). 47 By depicting the discovery of someone else’s “pure article” as desirable to independent thinkers, Emerson fundamentally suggests that this detection of another person’s higher truth enriches one’s understanding of the world. More specifically, once the disputants in Emerson’s hypothetical argument realize that they can enhance each other’s knowledge and perspective on certain matters, they will begin to think about “new and vast values” that enrich their minds and influence their behavior (188). In the simplest sense, they will both be improved by their current and future encounters. This notion—a belief that the voluntary social participation of self-reliant individuals will ultimately result in collective improvement—is the essence of democratic individuality. The aforementioned passage’s emphasis on the beneficial nature of argumentation echoes a moment in “Character” that touches on the nature of friendship between two people who possess this moral strength: “I know nothing which life has to offer so satisfying as the profound good understanding which can subsist, after much exchange of good offices, between two virtuous men, each of whom is sure of himself and sure of his friend” (Essays 254). Like his reflection in “Clubs,” Emerson’s cogitation in “Character” highlights the enduring benefit of a proper relationship to another independent individual. The repetition of “sure” indicates that these “virtuous men” are confident in their own convictions and are therefore self-trusting people. Moreover, they discern this self-reliant quality in one another. The implication here is that, like the quarrelers in “Clubs,” these men have arrived at a “good understanding” after many disagreements; they have found “truth” in one another (245). By expressing the beneficial effect of self-reliant individuals’ search for higher truths in their peers through allusions to “Character,” Emerson abstractly illustrates in “Clubs” that a tolerance for disputes can ultimately result in two individuals discovering each other’s possession of character. 48 Though Emerson asserts that a self-reliant person’s recognition of another individual’s character can improve his or her own thinking and behavior, this enhancement does not occur through a mere adoption of the other person’s beliefs; a thoughtless acceptance of another individual’s ideas is an act of conformity, the antithesis of self-reliance. For Emerson, peers’ enrichment of one another is instead a product of competition. By challenging one another to think deeply about certain subjects, self-reliant individuals expand each other’s mental capacities. Emerson addresses this notion in “Clubs” when he says the following about discourse in society: We consider those who are interested in thoughts, their own and other men’s, and who delight in comparing them, who think it the highest compliment they can pay a man, to deal with him as an intellect, to expose to him the grand and cheerful secrets perhaps never opened to their daily companions, to share with him the sphere of freedom and the simplicity of truth. (SS 193) Emerson’s diction demonstrates that this passage is an example of his youth’s abstraction; adjectives such as “highest” and “grand” connote a literal sense of enlargement that indicates his reflection’s vast scope, and his use of “freedom” and “truth,” two intangible concepts, illuminates his statement’s theoretical aim. A closer look at his language also reveals a greater understanding of his thoughts about listening. At first, this passage appears to advise listeners to accept speakers’ profound ideas, or “grand” “secrets,” but the inclusion of “expose” suggests that listeners possess the power to resist speakers’ views. Emerson could have utilized “teach” or “instill” instead of “expose,” but these words would have implied that listeners should merely accept the speakers’ words. 49 Through his employment of “expose,” Emerson ascribes a sense of independence to listeners that mirrors his belief about the appropriate relationship between two self-reliant individuals in a democratic society. Essentially, he feels that self-reliant people should always seek conversations that involve alternative viewpoints. As he asserts in “Friendship,” “[It is] [b]etter [to] be a nettle in the side of your friend than his echo. The condition which high friendship demands is ability to do without it” (Essays 111). In other words, self-reliant individuals should not aspire to have friends who willingly hold the same opinions as them. Instead, they should covet friendships in which both parties are willing to terminate, or “do without,” the relationship at any moment if they deem that it is necessary to retain their own convictions. Similar to his abstract promotion of listeners’ ability to hear but not necessarily embrace speakers’ ideas in the passage from “Clubs,” Emerson affirms in “Friendship” that selfreliant people should pursue friendships but preserve their own views. Due to self-reliant individuals’ constant desire to cling to their beliefs, friendships among these people necessitate “deal[ing] with” each other as “intellect[s]” (SS 193). Exactly how a person can treat another individual as an “intellect” is rather abstract and difficult for the reader to decipher, but this notion parallels another moment in “Friendship” when Emerson says that companionship “treats its object as a god, that it may deify both” (Essays 115). Basically, in order for a relationship between self-reliant individuals to be beneficial for both people, each individual must treat the other with high esteem, either as an “intellect” or a “god” (SS 193; Essays 115). If there is a lack of respect on either side of the relationship, there is at least one party that is no longer benefitting from the friendship; more importantly, the competition between them has ceased. Emerson references this idea earlier in “Clubs” by emphasizing that interactions among friends should expand, or “enlarg[e]” their mental capabilities (SS 184). This 50 intellectual growth can only occur through competition, refuting Christopher Newfield’s contention that “[c]ompetition yields to kinship” in “Clubs” (147). Simply put, Emerson claims that true kinship is competition because it results in collective improvement, the essence of democratic individuality. Throughout “Clubs,” Emerson promotes character and competition, two critical aspects of democratic individuality, through abstract diction that achieves the same intangible quality as his early depictions of the concepts in “Character” and “Friendship.” In “Art,” Emerson’s abstraction arrives within an examination of the differences between the “Useful” and “Fine” arts (SS 39). More specifically, through constant allusions to the Universal Mind via his repeated use of the immaterial “Nature,” Emerson abstractly demonstrates that the creations of both art forms are spiritual endeavors and manifestations of self-reliant thinking (40). For Emerson, all art “aims at use or at beauty,” which is the basis for his distinction between the “Useful” and “Fine” arts (39). The useful arts include “agriculture, building, ...and the construction of all the grand and delicate tools and instruments by which man serves himself” (39). These arts are vital to society; without them, humanity would lack the apparatus for innovation and survival. Emerson appears to stress that the useful arts are subservient to natural forces, asserting that “the omnipotent agent is Nature; all human acts are satellites to her orb” (40). This idea is buoyed by Emerson’s later description of the climate’s effect on the useful arts, including “wind, sun, [and] rain” (40). However, Emerson’s use of “Nature” does not solely underscore the environment’s impact on the useful arts; his characterization of “Nature” as “omnipotent,” a word that people often associate with God, ascribes a sense of divinity to the term. A reference to nature in the “Over-Soul” (1841) further illuminates the word’s spiritual connotation for Emerson: “Let man then learn the revelation of all nature and all thought to his 51 heart; this, namely: that the Highest dwells with him; that the sources of nature are in his own mind” (Essays 155). In this passage, we can treat “Highest” as an allusion to the God-like essence—the Over-Soul or Universal Mind—that resides “with[in]” humanity because the word appears amid a larger examination of religion. The equation of “Highest” and the “sources of nature” in this passage not only reinforces the notion that “Nature” holds a religious meaning for Emerson, but it also indicates that “Nature” embodies the Universal Mind because it is “representative” of this spirit (155; SS 40). Accordingly, Emerson’s depiction of the relationship between the useful arts and “Nature” in “Art” exemplifies his abstraction because he employs an intangible term—“Nature”—to refer to the Universal Mind and to show that the useful arts require a submission to this spiritual essence. Emerson’s use of “Nature” as an allusion to the Universal Mind in his analysis of the useful arts signifies that his portrayal of nature’s influence on the fine arts also possesses a religious connotation. At the outset of his discussion of the fine arts, which are “[m]usic, [e]loquence, [p]oetry, [p]ainting, [s]culpture, [and] [a]rchitecture” (41), Emerson asserts that “[n]ature paints the best part of the picture; carves the best part of the statue; builds the best part of the house; and speaks the best part of the oration” (44). In the context of this essay, this statement might suggest that our understanding of the natural world influences our works of fine art because it informs our perception of “beauty” (39). Conversely, if we treat nature as a reference to the Universal Mind, the passage suggests that a proper adherence to the Mind assists in the production of fine art. Donald L. Gelpi advances this idea when he describes the link between creation and the Universal Mind as follows: “The moment of creativity reveals the divine” (44). Due to our enhanced understanding of nature’s religious meaning for Emerson, we 52 can interpret this moment in “Art” as an abstract investigation of the relationship between people and this spiritual essence, the Universal Mind. My characterization of nature has, up until now, ignored a primary assumption that my view necessitates. By asserting that “Nature” is representative of the Universal Mind and a guiding force of all artwork, I have implied that self-reliant individuals are the only artists because they are the sole members of the Universal Mind. In other words, only self-reliant people’s work can embody the Universal Mind because they are the only individuals who can intuit this spiritual essence. This stance might seem far-fetched, but Emerson affirms this position when he says, “The universal soul is the alone creator of the useful and the beautiful; therefore, to make anything useful or beautiful, the individual must be submitted to the universal mind” (SS 40). Basically, self-reliant individuals are the only people who can create artwork that is either “useful” or “beautiful.” Emerson’s declaration that one must be self-reliant in order to be an artist supports the idea that his use of the Universal Mind conveys the spiritual nature of self-reliant thinkers’ useful and fine artwork. Combined with his advancement of democratic individuality in “Clubs,” this reinforcement of self-reliance’s religious nature in “Art” through the intangible notion of nature illustrates that Emerson still abstractly promotes self-reliance’s dimensions in Society and Solitude. III. Conclusions In this chapter, I have demonstrated that Society and Solitude contains numerous moments of abstraction that allude to various elements of self-reliance. More specifically, I established that Emerson’s abstraction in “Courage” and “Success” allows us to grasp his contention that these traits can exemplify self-trust if they are properly understood. Subsequently, I showed that abstraction illuminates the presence of democratic individuality and 53 religiousness in “Clubs” and “Art.” The purpose of highlighting the intangible in these essays stemmed from the scholarly consensus that Emerson’s later thought abandoned his youth’s “idealistic rhetoric,” a claim that refers to both the stylistic presentation and content of his early ideas (Rowe 24). As I have exposed throughout the chapter, this argument is invalid; there was never a “[p]ost-transcendental Emerson” because he still advances self-reliance, his youth’s most idealistic tenet, in Society and Solitude (Gelpi 151). Thus, the Emerson who we encounter in the book is not, as many scholars would suggest, a darkened, cynical shell of his younger self. Rather, he is a man who believes in the “beauty, truth, and goodness” that “spring eternal in the breast of man,” a hopeful individual who still clings to his faith in the mind’s transcendent capabilities (SS 52). 54 CONCLUSION Over the course of this thesis, I have examined self-reliance’s presence in Society and Solitude, Emerson’s last major work, as a means to refute the scholarly consensus that Emerson renounced his early philosophy in his later work. Though Stephen E. Whicher is the forerunner for this particular strain of scholarship, Harold Bloom provides perhaps the best summation of this group’s assessment of Emerson’s career when he says that Emerson “finds you simmering, brings you to a boil, but does not stay to make coffee” (61). Essentially, Bloom metaphorically asserts that the young Emerson was able to grab readers’ attention and intrigue them with his espousal of idealistic concepts, but he abandoned his supporters by ultimately deserting his early ideas, or “not stay[ing] to make coffee.” Many scholars have adopted this stance because of two primary misunderstandings about the true nature of self-reliance. First, Sacvan Bercovitch and others speculate that Emerson did not account for societal norms and activities in his early thought and that, as a result, his later focus on practical topics signals a departure from his early work (342). On the contrary, and as the first chapter of my work establishes, self-reliance entails democratic individuality, an idea that not only accounts for self-reliant individuals’ social participation but also contends that these people seek to contribute to society (Kateb 1). The other misconception stems from scholars’ belief that Emerson’s later work does not contain his youth’s abstraction, or “idealistic rhetoric” (Rowe 24). In the final chapter of this thesis, I illustrate that abstraction is quite prevalent in Society and Solitude, so the notion that Emerson does not incorporate his early writing’s abstract content and style is also inaccurate. Thus, by showing that Whicher and his followers fail to properly define self-reliance, recognize its practicability, and notice its abstract promotion in Society and Solitude, this thesis demonstrates 55 that Emerson’s later work does not abandon self-reliance and, consequently, does not completely deviate from his early thought. This emphasis on the continuity between Emerson’s early and late depictions of selfreliance resurrects his legacy because it underscores the compelling nature of his later work and indicates that he did not relinquish the concept. In other words, the scholarly consensus that Emerson deserted self-reliance implies that he realized the impracticability of the idea as he grew older, so these scholars regard his constant advancement of self-reliance in his early writings as a manifestation of the “foolish consistency” that Emerson labels the “hobgoblin of little minds” in “Self-Reliance” (S-R 24). This naive idealism is a major cause of his “present decline of reputation” (Whicher 36). Of course, this widespread view is erroneous because Emerson never deemed self-reliance impractical. My thesis therefore restores Emerson’s status as a preeminent thinker for some scholars by stressing that his life’s work represents an unwavering commitment to self-reliance. Even more significantly, Emerson’s consistent portrayal of self-reliance revives his exalted reputation by demonstrating that he did not belong to the group of northern intellectuals who radically changed their philosophies during and after the Civil War. George M. Fredrickson is one of the many scholars who include Emerson in this group of thinkers because he believes that Emerson’s “emphasis on individualism and anarchism disappeared” during the war (177). He expresses this opinion in a more general assessment of Emerson’s post-war demeanor: Emerson thus seemed to accept the fact that many of his old ideals were ideals were without application in the new America foreshadowed by the war experience... . The new Emerson, like the Yankee lad he described in ‘SelfReliance,’ fell on his feet like a cat and ended in harmony with the intellectuals 56 who denied his individualistic, anti-institutional philosophy. The change in American thinking which occurred during the Civil War was perfectly summed up by the changing views of Emerson himself. (180) Fredrickson errs because he rarely cites Emerson’s writing from this period and thus relies on Emerson’s own life experiences, which do not dictate the content of his writing, to inform his claims. Emerson certainly became more involved in political and social affairs during this time, but his increasing activism did not necessarily impact his philosophy. Fredrickson also implies that Americans could no longer fathom Emerson’s idealistic beliefs in a post-war environment that was characterized by the omnipresence of death and suffering. However, the notion that Emerson’s mystical view of the world had no place in this society is purely speculative. Even if some post-war readers of the young Emerson felt that his writing was too optimistic, Society and Solitude illustrates that self-reliance, a bastion of the early Emerson, can manifest itself in the most practical elements of life. Furthermore, the mere espousal of self-reliance in Society and Solitude, which was published five years after the Civil War’s conclusion, demonstrates that Emerson did not desert his “individualistic” constructs. While it could be argued that Society and Solitude is not an adequate representation of Emerson’s post-Civil War thinking because the essays were almost entirely written during his “creative burst in the 1850s,” Emerson still decided to publish the collection after the war had ended, so he likely believed that these works contained ideas that were still relevant to society (Robinson 150). If Emerson had truly felt that his early concepts “were without application” in this post-war environment, he would not have published them (Fredrickson 180). It is apparent that Fredrickson and other scholars include Emerson in the group of radically altered northern intellectuals because they cannot separate his own life’s events from his writing. This conflation 57 is a primary issue with Emersonian scholarship, and one that scholars need to avoid in the future if they want to accurately portray his career. A strict adherence to Emerson’s writing could possibly alter the scholarly consensus regarding his life and lead to more research about Society and Solitude and his other late works. This examination of the elderly Emerson could prove to be particularly fruitful for scholars; after all, “[i]n a world so charged and sparkling with power, a man does not live long and actively without costly additions of experience, which, though not spoken, are recorded in his mind. What to the youth is only a guess or a hope, is in the veteran a digested statute” (SS 263). 58 Works Consulted Bercovitch, Sacvan. The Rites of Assent. London: Routledge, Chapman and Hall, Inc. 1993. Print. Bishop, Jonathan. Emerson on the Soul. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964. Print. 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