Uncovering the United States’ Position in the 1953 Iranian Coup d'état

“ Provided the new [Iranian] government desires American assistance … The U.S. expects to be able to continue to extend a hand ” : helping Uncovering the United States’ Position in the 1953 Iranian Coup d'état & The Lasting Implications on U.S. - Iranian Relations Allison Brown HIST 3220: Modern Middle East Dr. Ward 6 February, 2021 1 “Mounting political and economic tensions there have apparently led the Iranian government people, under the leadership of their Shah, to seek a new government … Provided the new government desires American assistance … The U.S. expects to continue to exte helnpi d ng a hand and to cooperate in building Iran’s strength to resist communist subversi2o co n” nstrued the prepared statement from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) for the U.S. Department of State to read on August 5, 1953. The question of Iran accepting American assistance was no longer an independent choice. Unknown to the Iranians, the U.S. was a key instigator in overthrowing their democratically elected Prime Minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh just days before and propelled their own desired leadership, Fazlollah Zahedi. Four days in August 1953 would become a pivotal moment in the trajectory of Iran as a nation and would later serve as an explanation of the tenuous relationship that has prevailed between the United States and Iran. The U.S. would later claim their involvement was necessary to contain communism’s growth, but as the Representative of the Iranian Institute of the United Nations Foreign Ministry maintains, “ … [communism] was the justification for the coup, but by the coldest reckoning the price was excessi3ve F.”ew upheavals in Middle Eastern history have had such long-lasting aftershocks, causing such Western distrust, and lasting implications for the United States-Iranian relationship than the 1953 Iranian overthrow of Mosaddegh. Regardless of the counter-argument that the U.S. had to intervene to curb communism and secure oil supply for its N.A.T.O. allies, U.S. Intelligence and President Eisenhower acted out of self interest and as a result produced the strained state our two nations presently occupy. In order to understand the precarious situation Americans and Iranians have found themselves in, an understanding of how the U.S.’s C.I.A. successfully overthrew Prime Minister Mosaddegh is necessary. The U.S. became involved in the operation through the United Kingdom, when first elected, Mossadegh nationalised Iran’s oil, angering the British and potentially jeopardizing their inexpensive supply. The U.S. initially worked with the U.K. in promoting peaceful, economic resolutions to the situation. Through different actions and attempts at trade deals, Mossadegh and the Iranians would not reverse their nationalization of the natural resource. Through their discussions a resentment grew, Mossadegh telling U.S. special envoy W. Averell Harriman in 1952, “You do not know how crafty they [the British] are. You do not know how evil they are. You do not know how they sully everything they tou4ch Te.”nsions rose, and the U.K. sought recently elected President Eisenhower for an ally against the potential Soviet power Iran could become without their intervention. An additional attracting factor for U.S. involvement was a victory for newly elected 1 Eisenhower over his predecessor, “... the Truman administration dealt ineffectively with communism, arguing that [the U.S.] … had ‘lost’ China and Eastern Europe, and had become bogged down in a seemingly endless war in Korea.”5 President Eisenhower needed a “win” against communism, Mossadeq was receiving support for the Tudeh Party and caught up with the British at the wrong time, proving an effective target in his endeavours. The C.I.A. and the British M16’s first attempt to incite an Iranian coup came with four objectives primarily carried out by Kermit Roosevelt, who at the time served as chief of the C.I.A.'s Near East and Africa division, in what was covertly known as “Operation Ajax” or the “TPAJAX Project”. Step one, take control of the Iranian press through bribes and utilize its popularity to convince Iranians Mossadegh was a traitor to their state and even Islam. Anti-Mossadegh propaganda had virtually no limits, pieces like “Mossadegh’s Spy 6 Service” argued his laundering of money to spy on supporters of his National Move am nden“tOur National Identity” convincing Iranian’s that their national identity had turned from “ … polite and hospitably” to one of “vulgarity, … destroying our [Iranian] reputation abroa7 du”nder Mossadegh’s government. The demand for anti-Mossadegh propaganda became so high Iranian journalists could not sufficiently supply. C.I.A. operatives stationed in Washington D.C. contributed writings against Mossadegh. Both the C.I.A. and Iranian created propaganda had no limits, claiming Mossadegh was Jewish, a homosexual, a British agent, anything that they thought would outrage Iranians. Swiftly following came the second and third objectives, gaining support for the coup from prominent figures, such as the Islamic clergy or Mullahs, and from the Iranian Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, himself. Kermit Roosevelt made strategic payments to Mullahs in leadership positions for their delivery of sermons denouncing Mossadegh from their bully pulpit as an irreligious and incorrect leader for Iran. Convincing the Shah was a more arduous task, Roosevelt held secret meetings with him nearly every night in a taxi-cab, always parked in different locations throughout Tehran. After a few days, Roosevelt would convince the Shah that Mossadegh was a direct threat to Iran, drawing on examples of the Shah’s past encounters with the Prime Minister attempting to diminish his power, such as Mossadegh’s previous move to name himself Minister of War, a decision at the time that the U.S. neither denounced or publicly supported. Roosevelt insisted that the immediate removal of Mossadegh and the planting of their endorsed leadership, Fazlollah Zahedi, was the best path forward for Iran and the only way to continue an economically prosperous relationship with the United States. The fourth and final step of executing the coup was to inform Mossadegh of his immediate removal endorsed by the Shah, and is exactly where the operation fell apart. C.I.A. operatives failed to cut the phone 2 lines in his residential palace on the night of the planned arrest and the military who was sent had been informed of the plot, and confusion ensued. As British and American intelligence members waited for a successful coup, Mossadeq drafted a speech he would deliver less than an hour later, telling of his victory over the British attempt to illegally remove him from office. Mossadeq though, was entirely unaware as he spoke of Roosevelt’s alternative options for removal. In the days to come, Roosevelt would hire Iranian criminals and gang members to pose as Bolshevik rioters, pillaging Tehran and shouting their support for the “Communist Mossadeq''. When this failed, Roosevelt then hired a second group of Iranians to counter the first violent mob, leading to bloody clashes in the streets. Unbeknownst to Iranians, everybody involved in the battles were being paid to be there, by the same source. The C.I.A. and Roosevelt designed the acts to create confusion and to signal that Mossadeq was the core of violence in the country and was losing control, both of which were becoming true day by day. Violence peaks on the 19th of August, when a crowd of hired mobs arrive at Mossadeq’s residence, throwing stones and insults, which escalate into open fire when Iranian police and military commanders arrive to build on the onslaught towards Mossadeq. He was able to escape out the back onto a plane out of his country, while Fazlollah Zahedi declared himself the rightful leader of Iran with the support of Shah Pahlavi. As soon as the coup succeeded, many of Mosaddegh's former associates and supporters were tried, imprisoned, tortured and executed. Mosaddegh would later face trial himself and be kept under house arrest at his Ahmedabad until his eventual death in 1967, when Iran denied a public funeral and enforced his burial to be at his private residence, despite his request to be buried in the public graveyard, 8 beside the victims of the political violence. The aftershocks of the 1953 Iranian coup d'état had profound impacts at the time of its occurrence, and with an Iranian realization of U.S. involvement, has permanently tarnished the relationship. U.S. involvement is often “... referred to as the original sin where U.S. meddling poisined relations between the two sides and even made the Islamist Revolution of 1979 possib9 lF eo .”rmer Presidents, Clinton and Obama, have publicly expressed regret for the U.S.’s “complicity” in the coup, former Secretary of State Madeline Albright even emphasizing with Iranians who felt aggrieved by the coup before the American-Iranian Council 1i0n. I2ra0n00 for the U.S. marked their first successful use of covert means to overthrow a foreign government, the U.S. in 11 the future would make similar efforts in Egypt and Syr iL ao . oking backward, it is evident that the 1953 Iranian coup had profound consequences in the formation of today’s Middle East and U.S.-Iranian relations. With this hindsight, one can ponder if the infamous 1979 Iranian Revolution was predestined, although it is commonly understood that nothing is “predestined” in history, every decision and revolution has its source, 3 but the source for the Iranian Revolution may have been different, or not existed entirely, without U.S. clandestine intervention and Prime Minister Fazlollah Zahedi. 4