Stationary Development Explanations for Middle Eastern Democracies

“When you support democracy, you take what democracy gives you.” 1 : Theoretical Explanations for Stationary Development in Middle Eastern Democracies & the United States’ Future Role to Promote Democracy in the Region Allison Brown HIST 3320: Modern Middle East Dr. Ward Spring 2021 Author’s Bio Allison is from Lander, Wyoming, and is in her second year in the dual degree program studying International Studies and Modern History with minors in the Honors’ Program and International Relations. This is her second class pertaining to Middle Eastern studies, her past work includes extensive research regarding FGM/C in Muslim women populations both in the Middle East and North America, as well as policy regarding regulation of the practice and health education among refugee populations. This semester, she has researched CIA operations in the Iranian coup of Mohammad Mosaddegh, WikiLeaks concerning the Egyptian Arab Spring, President Clinton and Bush’s Israeli-Palestinian Peace Plans, and the recent hijab ban for women under eighteen in France. Following graduation, Allison intends to either begin a career in the Foreign Service or continue her education with post-graduate work in international relations. Introduction Democracy has a complicated past in the Arab states of the Middle East. The region is defined by authoritarian governmental regimes and international interference that’s contributed to a stagnation in democracy. In this essay, I will analyze three different theoretical approaches to understand the lack of developed democracies and democratic principles in the Arab-Middle East to determine which is the most fitting framework. Additionally, this paper examines the future of the United States’ promotion of democracy in the Middle East under the Biden Administration in relation to the theory of modernization and U.S. policy reflecting democratic principles. For clarification, democracy in this essay will take the definition of the term liberal democracy, with its attributes being that of free and fair elections, protection of rights, and the rule of law. When referring to a state’s development of democracy, this essay will use these 1 characteristics instead of the often undefined and similar terms such as pseudo, weak, and partial democracies. “Cultural Exceptionalism” of Islam Before assessing the role of the Arab Spring protests, it is pertinent to examine how democracy has developed across the region in the past and its reasons for failing to fully manifest in Arab governments. Historically, there can be no doubt that the region has been resistant to democracy and adapting its governments to meet democratic prin2ci Itpliess.also evident when much of the world was experiencing Huntington’s “Third Wa3ve of” democracy in the 1980s, most Arab countries remained unchanged and experienced little to no democratization. An argument made by political scientists and scholars that seek to explain a potential reasoning for the delay and lack of democratization in the Middle East is that of a “cultural exceptionalism”, that Muslims or Arabs are inept to democratization based on their shared religion and cultures. Scholarly speculation on the prospects for democracy in Islamic countries only appeared with the proliferation of independence movements after World War II. Negatively, some argued that democracy was unlikely to develop in these countries because Islam does not allow for the separation of spiritual and temporal autho4ritaynd because, in their opinion, at its core Islam was supportive of tyrannical forms of government. This can corroborate with those advocating for the cultural exceptionalism of Islam that out of the 47 countries in the world with an Islamic majority, only 23% of them have democratically elected governments when compared to out of 2 the 145 countries where Islam is a minority, 76% contain democratically elected governments. However, such evidence does not raise sufficient scholarly debate and leads to a logical fallacy. This generalization doesn’t account for states like Mali, Turkey, and Malaysia where Muslim populations can exist democratically and even as heads of state while promoting elements of democracy successfully. The existence of democratic Muslim states works into the argument of those optimistic about the coexistence of democracy and Islam. According to these scholars, the scriptural basis for theocracy in the Quran is we5a,kand that “… autocratic policies instead stem from structural factors (such as the existence of large minority nationalist movements) which— due to colonial legacies— occur with greater frequency in Islamic countri6es.” Evidence leads to the logical conclusion that Islam itself is not the barrier in the way of democracy for Arab states, and rather the lack of developed democracies and democratic principles can be traced to the lack of the “modernization theory” occurring in Arab states as a result of foreign influence and interference. Lack of the “Modernization Theory” in Arab States Dissimilar to the argument of “cultural exceptionalism” regarding a perceived Islamic value of authoritarian leadership, the modernization theory can more accurately present a reason why the Middle East is lacking in democratic principles and development. In short, the modernization theory “… looks at the internal factors of a country while assuming that with assistance, "traditional" countries can be brought to development in the same manner more 3 developed countries have bee7n Al .” though highly controversial at the surface, given the theory’s inherent view of the “developed world” being superior to the “developing world”, this theory provides a lens to understand the lack of progress in democratic principles in the region. Using this theory to examine the foundation of a democratic government, it is projected that as Arab states cross thresholds in terms of economic development, changes such as increased literacy rates and education availability, in addition to the widening of the middle classes, will result in an increase in democracy. This increase will take place because authoritarian regimes cannot effectively rule over the newly educated and “socially mobilized complex society.”8 Clearly though, this has yet to happen. It is acknowledged that different political theories have their own shortcomings but in this case, Middle Eastern countries have not followed these projected trends no only because they differ from the nations the model was based upon, but, more holistically, because many Arab countries don’t actually meet or exceed the outlined economic thresholds deemed necessary by the theory for democratic progress. An explanation for this lack of economic success is because of international interference in most Arab States economies, particularly with the natural resource of oil. Many states in the Middle East make much of their income from “external rent” from their oil sales. Which does not increase the state or people’s social mobility to the level necessary by modernization theory to overcome authoritarian regime9 s. It is understood by political researchers and academics that 4 natural resources and oil can often be more of a burden than a benefit for “developing nations”, attracting international interest and interference, as was the case of Iran with the U.S.-C.I.A. backed coup in 1953 overthrowing democratically elected Mohammed Mossadegh or the U.S. involvement in Iraq pertaining to its oil interests. The presence of large amounts of oil in Arab states inhibits the development of democracy in the region because of both state and international government expenditure programs that come with little to no taxation of the citizens. Although this spending is aimed to relieve social pressures, because the public does not pay for the program through taxation, perhaps there is less accountability to authoritarian governments for how international aid and money derived from oil is being spe10ntR.esearch uncovered that the development of the oil industry in Qatar and Kuwait resulted in the governments being less accountable to the middle class and societ11y. The modernization theory and the discovery of oil can explain why democracy has seemingly “failed” in Middle Eastern countries. However, following the lack of a development of social mobility due to oil’s economic role, resulted in Arab states’ inability to coincide with the modernization theory, public interest and support for democracy has risen in the region. These notions culminated around the Arab Spring Revolutions in 2011, with different nations staging protests against corruption and the status quo, seemingly a string of movements that would topple authoritarian leaders and promote democracy in the region. 5 At the core of some Arab Spring protests was the perceived role the United States played in Middle Eastern governments, using their international aid and funding as a way to pursue their own regional interests. Centuries of authoritarian governments and the decline of autonomy, leading to the Arab Spring led to, “... a sense of powerlessness [which] fueled burgeoning Arab anger and frustration as well as widespread anti-Americanism. Perceived U.S. bias toward Israel was central, but so too was the general sense that the West had blocked, sometimes purposefully, the natural development of an entire people and reg1i2oT nh .”is notion of United States bias and intervention to “block” either purposefully or accidentally during decades of intervention in the region fits into the modernization theory. U.S. Foreign Influence in Arab States (Bush and Obama Administrations) Ever present in the region, both through military resources on the ground or international aid, is the United States. Interests in the Middle East peaked for the U.S. in the early twentieth century with the region’s untapped natural resources and opportunities, impacting the region’s ability to progress into democratic societies through the modernization theory. Throughout the region's development of democracy or decline into authoritarianism, the U.S. held much influence in governmental structures. In the years leading up to the Arab Spring protests of 2011, Arab leaders often referred to the “American Veto” that the U.S. could play to block democratic and policy decisions that did not align with their objectives in the region. In 2008, Essam El-Erian, a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood voiced, “Even if you come to power through democratic means, you are facing an international community that doesn’t accept the existence 6 of the Islamist representation. This is a problem. I think this will continue to present an obstacle 3 for us until there is a real acknowledgement of the situat1ion.” The United States’ history of backing authoritative and repressive regimes was obvious throughout the region, with leaders like President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt who remained in power and supported (either clandestinely or publicly) by the U.S. until the time of the Arab Spring. The United States’ unwavering support of repressive leaders and regimes and their unwillingness to support pro-democracy movements leads to why the Arab world seemed unable to democratically change. President George W. Bush during his term acknowledged the U.S.’s past in the region declaring in 2003 that, “... a forward strategy for freedom in the Middle East [is necessary] … sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe— because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty.1”4 However, this “forward strategy” was used to rationalize the U.S. invasion of Iraq and removal of dictator Saddam Hussein in 2003. Hamid acknowledges these “dubious” reasons and their unexpected outcomes, “As dubious, cynical and inconsistent as they may have been, Bush’s policies helped produce an otherwise unlikely outcome. The year 2005 saw the largest outpouring of pro-democracy activism the region had ever seen up until then. The Iraq war frightened Arab regimes into thinking that President Bush was serious about his democratizing mission.1”5 7 Following a bout of electoral victories (for democracy) in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Egypt, the Bush Administration took a step back from their strong support of pro-democratic candidates to focus on security threats in the Middle East and Israeli-Palestinian peace plan negotiations. President Obama began his presidential work in the Middle East with a similar promise to that of his predecessor, speaking in Cairo in 2009, “… to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect, and one based upon the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive and need not be in competition. Instead, they overlap, and share common principles -- principles of justice and progress; tolerance and the dignity of all human bein16gD s.u"ring President Obama’s first term, he was in office for 3 years of the Iraq war. The U.S. gradually completed its withdrawal of military personnel in December 2011, and later in 2013 would meet with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki, during which he spoke for a continued partnership but said there would be no public aid without better democratic conditions and acknowledgment of the country’s Sunni population. Obama also encouraged wider political participation and passing an election law. At the start of his second term, the Arab Spring would shape his promotion of democracy in the region. However, hopes for this “new beginning” were quickly diminished. The administration’s early support for democratization and political change in the Middle East was diverted by new regional security challenges and priorities. Libya proved to be a challenge for the administration, coming to a head in March 2011 when the administration was able to intervene effectively with Arab and European powers, to foil 8 Mu'ammar Al-Qadhdhāfī planned attacks in Benghazi in the escalating conflict. However, following the successful maneuver of the conflict, the administration was unable to truly commit to a democratic power in the nation which led to a “… notable absence of leadership in Organizing a concerted international effort to pull Libya out of its downward spiral and set it on a path to political reconstruction1.7” Looking to Tunisia at the time, revered by some as the “... motivating natio18nof … t”he Arab Spring protests, Obama’s administration was able to effectively support their democratic uprising. With parliamentary and democratic presidential elections in process, U.S. influence and support of the democratic regime has shown pro-democratic reform results. However, at the time height of their democratic advances in 2015, the U.S. government “failed” to allocate not only the monetary aid but the “time” according to Alzayat, ... according to the Project on Middle East Democracy, the administration’s 2015 budget request includes $66 million in bilateral assistance, the same level of bilateral funding as of a year ago, making Tunisia only the ninth-largest recipient of U.S. assistance in the region, although it has been described as a “top p19riority.” Under the current Biden administration, the U.S. State Department continues, “... diplomatic relations ... [and] an established partnership characterized by mutual respect and aspirations for a more peaceful and prosperous futur20e.C”urrently, the U.S. is speaking out against the 2020 presidential election for a second five-year term for Tunisian President John Magufuli stating, “... [the] election that was marred by widespread irregularities and was the culmination of years of 9 systematic intimidation and marginalization of opposition parties, civil society organizations and independent media.2”1 Overall when examining Middle Eastern foreign policy for both the Bush and Obama administrations, Hamid analyzes that, “America’s unwillingness to align itself with democratic forces was not, it seemed, a matter of one president over another, but a structural problem inherent in U.S. foreign policy.2”2 It is undeniable the United States has a complicated and dynamic history in the promotion of democratic principles in the Middle East. For decades, the U.S. has supported authoritarian leaders and even overthrown democratically elected leaders to maintain their own regional interests and positioning when American interests seemed threatened. In order for the U.S. and the newly-empowered Biden Administration to effectively promote democracy in the region, it is necessary the U.S. reframes its Middle Eastern foreign policy to not directly interfere in Arab governments but productively support democratic leaders and groups. The Biden Administration’s Democratic Influence in the Middle East - Saudi Arabia As a multitude of foreign policy objectives for President Biden’s Administration in the Middle East, including the withdrawal of U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan, continued conflict in Iraq, and a different approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict than his predecessor President Trump. 10 Looking to Biden’s policy, or lack thereof, towards Saudi Arabia in light of human rights violations, which could be deemed as anti-democratic. It’s no new surprise to the Biden administration that Saudi Arabia is the perpetrator of various human rights concern within their own borders and in proxy conflicts such as Yemen. Saudi Arabia ranks just above North Korea on political rights, civil liberties and other measures of freedom, according to the democracy 23 ratings from Freedom House . The same report ranks both Iran and China ahead of the Saudis. But historically, Saudi Arabia’s strategic location and wealth, as well as its petroleum exports keep the Saudis as a vital U.S. ally. President Obama visited Saudi Arabia more than any other American president (four times in eight years) to discuss various partnerships and regional issues such as Iran. Although Obama frequently rhetorically protested against Saudi Arabian provocations and human rights abuses, there were no direct efforts to curtail their abuses because of their strategic partnership, valuing our own personal position and objectives in the Middle East over democratic principles in the Middle East. During his tenure, Obama oversaw what was at the time the largest-ever U.S. arms sales to the kingdom and supported its war in Yemen, even after 24 numerous high-profile human rights violations came to light. Turning to the current administration, Biden has acknowledged that while he remains committed to Saudi Arabian relations and national defense, he expects the monarchy to mitigate the six-year war in Yemen and stride towards a progressive position on universal human rights. Escalating the need for democratic intervention was intelligence released early in his campaign regarding the Saudi assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018. On the campaign trail, 11 Biden was a strong critic of Saudi Arabia. He said his administration would turn this repressive kingdom, a longtime U.S. ally, into a global “pariah”. In a debate, Biden stated that “[he] would make it very clear we were not going to in fact sell more weapons to them … We were going to in fact make them pay the price, and make them in fact the pariah that the25yBu aret,.”like many of his predecessors on both sides of the political spectrum, Biden has fallen short of these promises on his policy towards Saudi Arabia, confirming Hamid’s statement that the issues with U.S. foreign policy isn’t because of different presidential approaches, but is inherent. Although President Biden has yet to place sanctions, cut some political ties, or make any major policy moves towards Saudi Arabia in his first one hundred days of office, his approach does differ from both the Obama and Trump administrations. By publicly releasing U.S. intelligence linking Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to Khashoggi’s killing, Biden took a confrontational stance towards Saudi Arabia. Similarly, Biden has also indicated he has signaled that the U.S. will no longer support Saudi proxy military endeavors outside its borders. Biden’s commitment to these ideals, combined with the increasingly anti-Saudi sentiment across the other branches of the US government according to Emmons “... suggest[s] the president will have an extensive array of tools to punish the Saudis for their intransigence, should it come to that.” 26 It’s uncertain currently what could or will push President Biden to counter Saudi antidemocratic actions, putting U.S.-Middle Eastern interests at risk, since the assassination of Khashoggi has yet to garner a substantial policy reaction from the U.S. Conclusion 12 The words Secretary of State James Baker voiced in 1991 still provide reasoning for continued U.S. support and intervention in Democratic development across the Middle East, “When you support democracy, you take what democracy gives 27yo Itu’s.”easy for scholars and foreign policy analysis alike to become caught up in today’s imperfections of U.S. productive involvement for democracy, arguing that no major strides have been made. However, this is untrue. As a whole for the promotion of democracy in the Arab-Middle East, the U.S. has been crucial for the promotion of democratic values especially in the past few decades, although its own foreign interests can cloud its objectives. From this paper come four key summarizing understandings: (1) The argument of “cultural exceptionalism” for Muslims or Arabs being unable to build or sustain democratic principles is an unfounded logical fallacy. (2) The lack of democratic development in the Middle East is a result of U.S. (and other international) influence and interference has caused a stagnation in the political processes of the “modernization theory”. (3) Bush and Obama took different approaches to the promotion of democracy in the Middle East, but both fell short in truly reforming U.S. foreign policy in the region, Biden has the opportunity to fundamentally change policy in the Middle East. (4) It’s important to understand how the Middle East has developed regarding the modernization theory and foreign interference to understand how democratic governments and movements exist today. This is a crucial understanding, of developing U.S. policy that is effective in the region and rightly acknowledges the needs of Arabs. These summarizing points understand how the U.S. and the modernization theory have led to the state of Arab democracies currently in the Middle East and provide policymakers and 13 diplomats in the U.S. the roadmap for the way up. President Biden must promote democratic principles in the region and support the long-ignored rights Arab nations have to exercise their own autonomy and self-govern. Only by acknowledging these truths and shifts in the U.S.’s “traditional” power in the Middle East will Arab democracies grow and sustainably exist. 14