The Ethics of Aristotle

The Ethics of Aristotle Three treatises on ethics are included in the body of Aristotle's writings, yet two of these are now largely regarded as being written by his followers. The validity of the third book, the Nicomachean Ethics, is still mostly accepted, however Books V, VI, and VII contain a section that many believe was taken directly from one of the writings of pupils. I will, however, disregard this contentious query and approach the book as Aristotle's in its whole. Aristotle's ethical theories mostly reflect the beliefs of the welleducated and seasoned individuals of his time. They do not embrace such unconventional views regarding property and the family as those found in the Republic, nor are they, like Plato, infused with mystical religion. People who consider themselves to be respectable, well-behaved citizens, neither below nor above the status quo, will find in the Ethics a methodical exposition of the values that they believe should govern their behavior. People who anticipate more will be let down. The book is appealing to the dignified middle-aged, who have been using it, particularly since the seventeenth century, to quell the youthful ardor and zeal. However, it can only be disgusting to a guy with any degree of emotion. Happiness, we are taught, is the good; it is the soul's work. According to Aristotle, Plato was correct to separate the soul into two parts: an irrational and a rational portion. He separates the actual irrational portion into two categories: the vegetative, which is present in all animals, and the appetitive, which is present in even plants. When the commodities that the appetitive portion craves are ones that reason approves of, it may be somewhat reasonable. This is crucial to the explanation of virtue because, according to Aristotle, reason on its own is just contemplative and cannot, on its own, result in any kind of practical action without the aid of desire. The two portions of the soul are represented by the two types of virtues: moral and intellectual. Moral qualities come from habit, but intellectual virtues come from instruction. The legislator's job is to instill virtue in the people through the development of virtue-based behaviors. By acting justly, we become just; the same is true of other virtues. Aristotle believed that we would eventually learn to enjoy doing good deeds because we would be forced to develop virtuous habits. The line "Assume a virtue if you have not" from Hamlet's address to his mother comes to mind. That monster, custom, which all sense eats of habits devil, is angel, but in this, He also gives a frock or livery that is appropriately worn to the use of acts fair and excellent. This brings us to the well-known golden mean theory. Between every extreme that is a vice is a medium that is represented by a virtue. This is demonstrated by analyzing the different virtues. Between cowardice and recklessness, liberality and meanness, suitable pride and humility, buffoonery and boorishness, bashfulness and shamelessness, and modesty and bashfulness, lies the range of courage. Certain characteristics, including sincerity, don't appear to fit within this plan. According to Aristotle (1108a), there is a medium ground between boastfulness and mock-modesty, but this is limited to selftruth. I fail to understand how sincerity in a broader sense fits into this plan. Aristotle's philosophy was once followed by a mayor, who, at the conclusion of his administration, gave a statement in which he claimed to have tried to walk the fine line between impartiality and bias. The idea that telling the truth is a cruel sounds almost as ridiculous. Aristotle consistently holds views on moral issues that were customary in his day. They are different from our times in a few areas, mostly where aristocracy plays a role. We believe that everyone has equal rights, at least according to ethical theory, and that justice entails equality; Aristotle believes that justice entails just balance, which is occasionally equality (113b). Since a slave or son is property and there can never be injustice to one's own property, the justice of a master or parent differs from that of a citizen (1134b). Regarding slaves, however, this philosophy is somewhat modified to address the question of whether a man may be a friend of his slave: "The slave is a living tool; there is nothing in common between the two parties." Therefore, one cannot be friends with a slave. However, as a man, one can; since there appears to be some justice between any man and any other who can participate in a legal system or sign a contract, one can also be friends with him to the extent that he is a man (1161b). If a son is evil, a father can reject him, but a son cannot reject his father since he owes him more than he can ever pay back, most notably his very existence (1163b). Since everyone should be loved according to their value, it is appropriate in unequal relationships for the inferior to love the superior more than the superior loves the inferior. This means that wives, children, and subjects should love their husbands, parents, and kings more than the latter do. "The man rules according to his worth, and in those matters in which a man should rule, but the matters that befit a woman he hands over to her" (1160b) is a description of a happy marriage. He ought not to govern in her territory; much less so, should she govern in his, which occasionally occurs when she is an heiress. Aristotle's idea of the ideal person differs greatly from that of the Christian saint. He ought to be proud of himself and not undervalue his accomplishments. He ought to hate everyone who is deserving of hatred (1124 b). The portrayal of the haughty or generous man* is fascinating because it highlights the distinctions between paganism and Christianity and demonstrates the extent to which Nietzsche was correct in seeing Christianity as a morality befitting a slave. Since he deserves the greatest, the magnanimous guy must be the finest in every manner; for the better man always deserves the greatest. Consequently, a really generous man has to be good. Furthermore, the generous man seems to be exceptional in every attribute. And it would be most unworthy of the generous guy to harm someone or run from danger while flapping his arms at his sides; after all, why would he do such shameful things, he to whom nothing is great? Hence, generosity appears to be the virtues' crown as it enhances them and cannot exist without them. Being really magnanimous is so difficult as it is impossible without grandeur and moral rectitude. The generous man is primarily concerned with honors and dishonors. He will be somewhat pleased to receive great honors bestowed upon him by good people, believing that they are his own or even less than his own. No honor can be worthy of perfect virtue, but he will accept it nonetheless, as they have nothing more honorable to offer him. However, he will abhor honor from unworthy people and on trivial grounds, as it is not something he deserves, and dishonor from such people as well, since it cannot be justifiable in his situation. For the purpose of honor, riches and power are desirable; thus, to the person for whom honor is nothing at all, the other factors must also be little. Therefore, generous guys are seen with contempt. The generous guy does not encounter insignificant risks, but rather, he will encounter significant perils. In such situations, he is selfless, understanding that there are circumstances in which life is not worth living. Additionally, he is the kind of man who bestows advantages but feels guilty about accepting them because one represents a superior and the other an inferior. Additionally, he often bestows larger advantages in return, so that the initial donor not only receives payment but also owes him money. A generous man will ask for little or nothing at all, but will lend a helping hand without hesitation. He will also be dignified toward those in high places but modest toward those in the middle class; for it is hard and lofty to be superior to the former, but easy to be so toward the latter, and having a lofty demeanor toward the former is not a sign of ill-breeding, but among the humble, it is as vulgar as showing strength against the weak. He must also be honest about his hate and love since it is cowardly to hide one's emotions, to care more about what other people think than the truth. With the exception of speaking ironically to the vulgar, he is free to talk since he is disdainful and inclined to reveal the truth. He doesn't even find appreciation easy because nothing is outstanding in his eyes. Furthermore, he is not a gossip since he doesn't care to be complimented or blamed for anything, thus he won't talk about himself or anybody else. He is the one who will own goods that are both beautiful and useless, as opposed to ones that are profitable and beneficial. Moreover, a quiet voice, a level speech, and a languid gait are considered appropriate for the generous guy. Thus, the generous guy is like this; the one who falls short of him is too modest, while the one who surpasses him is conceited (1123b -5 a ). The idea of a conceited guy makes one shiver. Whatever one's opinions about the philanthropic guy, one thing is certain: a community cannot contain very many of him. What I mean is that the qualities of the magnanimous man substantially depend upon his having an extraordinary social position; I do not mean simply that there are not going to be many virtuous persons because virtue is difficult. Aristotle views politics as a field that includes ethics, thus it is not strange that, following his exaltation of pride, he views monarchy as the ideal form of governance and aristocracy as the second best. Aristocrats and monarchs can be "magnanimous," but if common people tried to live up to this standard, they would be laughed at. This raises a dilemma that is somewhat political and partially ethical. Is it ethically acceptable to live in a community that, by definition, limits the greatest things to a small number of people and forces the majority to settle for second best? Yes, according to Plato and Aristotle, and Nietzsche concurs. Christians, democrats, and stoics all say no. However, they differ greatly in how they say no. According to early Christians and stoics, virtue is the greatest good and cannot be hindered by outside forces. As a result, they argue that social injustice only has an impact on trivial issues and that there is no need to create a just social structure. On the other hand, the democrat often maintains that power and property are the most essential things, at least in terms of politics; as a result, he cannot accept a social structure that is unfair in these ways. Since it must maintain that virtue is as attainable for the slave as it is for his master, the stoicChristian perspective necessitates a radically different understanding of virtue than that of Aristotle. Aristotle considered pride to be a virtue, whereas Christian ethics views pride as a sin and humility as a virtue. To allow the impoverished and humble to be just as moral as everyone else, the intellectual virtues that Plato and Aristotle valued above all others must be completely eliminated from the list. A bishop was severely reprimanded by Pope Gregory the Great for teaching grammar. There is a logical connection between the Aristotelian belief that the few possess the highest virtue and the subordination of ethics to politics. It is plausible that a submissive community may be the goal if the good community is the goal instead of the good individual. Although both are essential to the overall brilliance of the symphony, the first violin has greater significance than the oboe. An orchestra cannot be composed on the tenet of providing each member with what is best for himself as a solitary person. Regardless of democracy, the same kind of thing holds true for the administration of a sizable contemporary state. Unlike ancient democracies, a contemporary democracy bestows enormous authority on a select few, such as presidents or prime ministers, and demands of them standards of excellence that are not anticipated of the average citizen. People are prone to believe that a good president should be honored more than a good bricklayer when they are not thinking about religion or political debate. A president in a democracy is supposed to be somewhat different from the typical citizen and to possess some virtues associated with his position, albeit not nearly as generous as Aristotle's man. These unusual qualities might not be regarded as "ethical," but that's only because we define this term more narrowly than Aristotle did. The division between moral and other merits has grown considerably more pronounced than it was in Greek times due to Christian religion. Being a brilliant poet, composer, or painter is a merit in a man, but it is not a moral merit; we do not think him more deserving of paradise or more moral for having such abilities. The only thing that moral worth is concerned with are actions of volition, or making the appropriate decisions among options. * Since I don't know how to compose operas, I am not at fault for not having done so. According to conventional wisdom, choosing the other option when there are two options is sinful since conscience will always tell me which is the correct one. More than anything else, virtue is primarily the avoidance of sin. There's no reason to think that a bright guy is ethically superior to a stupid man, or that an educated man is morally superior to an illiterate man. Several virtues of significant societal value are therefore excluded from the field of ethics. It is unpleasant to be feeble-minded, but not unethical; the adjective "unethical," in current usage, has a far smaller range than the adjective "undesirable." However, this ethical perspective has not been embraced by many contemporary philosophers. They believed that the good should be defined first, and then our behaviors should be such that they tend to actualize the good. This viewpoint is closer to that of Aristotle, who believed that pleasure was the highest good. It is true that only the philosopher may get the utmost happiness, but to him, it is not evidence against the idea. Two categories of ethical theories can be distinguished based on whether they view virtue as a means or an end in itself. Generally speaking, Aristotle holds that virtues are means to a goal—happiness. Since the goal is what we want, the methods are what we consider and decide upon, hence decisions on the means must be made freely and voluntarily. The application of virtues now involves methods (1113b). However, virtue may also be seen in terms of the purposes for which one acts: "Human good is activity of soul in accordance with virtue in a complete life" (1098a). I believe he would contend that whereas practical virtues are only means, intellectual virtues are objectives in and of themselves. Christian moralists maintain that while good deeds often have favorable results, the deeds themselves should be cherished for their own sake rather than for the results they produce. Conversely, individuals who view pleasure as the good only see virtues as tools. The same conclusion will apply to any other definition of the good, with the exception of the definition as virtue: virtues are means to ends other than themselves. As previously stated, Aristotle mostly, but not entirely, concurs with those who believe that defining the good is the primary goal of ethics and that virtue is best described as behavior that tends toward the good. Another significant ethical challenge is raised by the relationship between politics and ethics. Assuming that the goal of moral behavior should be the welfare of the entire society or, eventually, of all people, what is the social good—as something that belongs fundamentally to the whole rather than the parts—in terms of the goods that each person enjoys? We may use the human body as an example to demonstrate the issue. Although we identify pleasures primarily with certain body parts, we nevertheless see them as belonging to the person as a whole. For example, we may find a nice fragrance pleasing, but we are aware that the nose cannot experience it on its own. According to some, there exist excellences that belong to the total but not to any component of a closely knit society. If they are metaphysicians, they could agree with Hegel that the cosmos as a whole possesses all good qualities. However, they will typically counter that it is less incorrect to assign goodness to a State rather than to an individual. The viewpoint makes sense when expressed as follows. A state can have many attributes attached to it, such as being populous, vast, strong, etc., that cannot be assigned to any one of its individual members. According to the perspective we are examining, ethical predicates are only derivedly personal to persons. It is said that a man is only as good as the state he lives in, regardless of how many people live there or how nice the state is. Aristotle did not hold this generally accepted position, with the possible exception that he did not share it entirely in his understanding of justice. The Ethics spends a significant amount of time on friendship, which includes all relationships including affection. It is difficult to have many friends, and perfect friendship is only attainable between the excellent. A person of a higher rank than oneself should not be friends with him unless he possesses a superior virtue that justifies the regard one should give him. As we've seen, the superior in unequal relationships—like those between a father and son or a man and wife—should get greater affection. Because God is unable to love us, friendship with Him is not conceivable. When discussing whether a man may be a friend to himself, Aristotle concludes that a man can only be a friend to himself if he is a decent man; evil persons, he claims, frequently despise themselves. A virtuous man ought to have a noble affection for himself (1169a). While friends can be consoling during difficult times, it is not appropriate to use them by pleading for pity, as some women and womanish men like to do (1171b). Friends are desirable in all circumstances; after all, a happy guy needs friends to share his enjoyment with. "Since man is a political creature and by nature a social being, no one would choose the entire world on condition of being alone" (1169b). Every word that is spoken regarding friendship makes sense, yet none of them transcends common sense. Once more demonstrating his common sense, Aristotle addresses pleasure—a topic that Plato had previously viewed with some asceticism. Aristotle distinguishes between pleasure and happiness, even if pleasure is a prerequisite for happiness. According to him, there are three different perspectives on pleasure: (1) that it is never excellent; (2) that some pleasure is nice but the majority is terrible; and (3) that some pleasure is good but not the best. He disproves the first one on the grounds that since pain is undoubtedly terrible, joy must also be beneficial. He correctly points out that it is absurd to suggest that a man may find happiness by swindling others; happiness requires at least a modicum of outside luck. He also rejects the idea that all joys are corporeal and that everything has a divine component, which gives it the potential to produce greater pleasures. God always has one simple pleasure, and good men experience pleasure until they are unfortunate (1152-4). Later in the book, there is another discussion of pleasure that is not entirely compatible with what has been said thus far. This argument argues that although there are terrible pleasures, they are not pleasant to good people (1173b); that pleasures may vary in sort (ib); and that pleasures are either good or bad depending on whether they are associated with good or bad deeds (1175b). Even if it were enjoyable, no one would be happy to live with a child's brain; there are things that are worth more than pleasure. Every animal has its rightful happiness, and human happiness is related to reason. This brings us to the book's only doctrine, which is more than just common sense. Virtuous action leads to happiness, and contemplative activity is the ideal kind of activity for ultimate bliss. Because contemplation promotes leisure, which is necessary for pleasure, it is superior to war, politics, and any other practical vocation. Practical virtue simply leads to a secondary sort of satisfaction; the highest kind comes from using reason, since reason is what makes a man, above all else. Although man cannot be completely contemplative, he shares in the divine life to the extent that he is. The philosopher is the most godlike of all humans and, therefore, the happiest and best: He who exercises and cultivates reason appears to be in the best state of mind and most dear to the gods. "The activity of God, which surpasses all others in blessedness, must be contemplative." Since the gods are believed to care about human affairs, it makes sense that they would appreciate reason, which is the best and most similar thing to them, and that those who cherish and honor reason the most will be rewarded for taking care of what is important to them and acting honorably. Furthermore, it is obvious that the philosopher is the primary owner of all these qualities. The gods consequently value him the most. In this sense, the philosopher will be happier than anybody else (1179a). And the person who is that will probably also be the happiest. The few words that follow deal with the shift to politics; this passage is essentially the Ethics in its entirety. Now let's attempt to determine our opinions on the virtues and shortcomings of the Ethics. Ethics has not advanced in the sense of proven findings, in contrast to many other topics covered by Greek philosophers; nothing in ethics is understood in a scientific sense. Therefore, there's no reason why a modern book on the subject should be any less valuable than an old one. When Aristotle speaks about astronomy, we may state with certainty that he is mistaken; nevertheless, when he speaks about ethics, we are unable to state with the same certainty that he is correct or incorrect. Regarding Aristotle's or any other philosopher's ethics, in general, we might pose three questions: (1) Is it internally consistent? (2) Does it align with the author's other points of view? (3) Does it provide solutions to moral quandaries that align with our personal moral convictions? The philosopher in issue has made an intellectual mistake if the response to either the first or second question is negative. However, if the response to the third question is negative, then we are simply entitled to state that we find him objectionable and cannot claim that he is erroneous. In light of the ethical framework presented in the Nicomachean Ethics, let's look at each of these three problems in turn. (1) With the exception of a few minor details, the text is coherent overall. The well-reasoned theory holds that happiness is the ultimate good and that contentment stems from productive endeavors. Despite its clever development, the theory that every virtue is a middle between two extremes is less effective since it does not apply to intellectual contemplation—which is said to be the finest activity of all. It is possible to argue, however, that the theory of the middle is only meant to apply to the virtues of the intellect and not the practical ones. Or, to put it another way, the legislator's stance is a little unclear. He is to instill in kids and teenagers the habit of doing good deeds, which will ultimately allow them to enjoy virtue and act morally without the need for legal coercion. It is evident that the lawmaker might just as easily lead the youth to pick up bad habits; if this is to be prevented, he has to possess all the knowledge of a platonic guardian; otherwise, the claim that leading a moral life is enjoyable will fall flat. But this issue may be more of a political than an ethical one. (2) There is never a conflict between Aristotle's ethics and his metaphysics. In fact, an ethical optimism is expressed in his philosophical beliefs itself. His conviction in the significance of ultimate causes in science suggests that he also believes that the universe's evolution is guided by purpose. According to him, the majority of changes represent a rise in organization or "form," and the most morally upright deeds are those that support this tendency. While it is true that much of his practical ethics is not especially philosophical in nature, but rather the outcome of observing human circumstances, this aspect of his theory is not at odds with his metaphysics, even though it may exist independently of it. (3) When comparing Aristotle's ethical preferences with our own, we discover—as was already mentioned—that he accepted inequity, which is inimical to a lot of contemporary opinion. The belief that what is best is fundamentally reserved for the select few—proud men and philosophers—is not only unpopular, but so is the idea that dads and husbands are superior to wives and children. It would appear that the majority of individuals are only tools for producing a select few of kings and sages. It is possible to interpret Kant's assertion that each and every human being is a goal in themselves as a reflection of the perspective that Christianity brought out. Kant's perspective does have a logical flaw, though, in that it provides no way to resolve conflicts between the interests of two persons. If everyone is an end in themselves, how are we going to come up with a rule for who gets to give way? Such a philosophy need to be centered on the society as opposed to the individual. It must be a principle of "justice" in the widest sense of the word. Bentham and the utilitarians define "justice" as "equality": when two men's interests collide, the best course of action is that which results in the greatest amount of happiness overall, regardless of which of the two enjoys it or how it is divided between them. If a better guy receives more than a worse man, this is not because of some fundamental ethical concept that holds that the good deserve more than the bad, but rather because, in the long term, rewarding virtue and punishing vice increases public pleasure. According to this perspective, "justice" is only weighing the degree of enjoyment involved, without favoring any one person or class over another. Different ideas of justice were held by Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, and these ideas are still largely accepted today. They believed—originally on the basis of religious principles—that everything and everyone had a rightful area, and that anything beyond that is "unjust." Some men, by virtue of their character and abilities, had a broader field than others, and it is not unfair if they experience a higher proportion of enjoyment than others. Although Aristotle takes this viewpoint for granted, his works no longer make clear that it was based on the same primordial religion as the early thinkers. What may be considered charity or kindness is almost entirely absent from Aristotle. As far as he is aware of, human suffering does not affect him emotionally; he views it as an evil from an intellectual standpoint, but there is no proof that it makes him unhappy—well, not unless those who suffer are his friends. In general, the Ethics has an emotional dearth that the preceding philosophers did not share. Aristotle's theories on human affairs include an excessive amount of complacency and smugness; anything that inspires mankind to have a strong desire for one another seems to be overlooked. He even gives a mediocre depiction of friendship. He doesn't appear to have experienced any of the things that make it hard to maintain one's sanity; he doesn't seem to understand any of the deeper facets of living a moral life. It may be argued that he ignores the entirety of the human experience that is related to religion. What he has to say will pacify weakpassioned folks; he has nothing to say to those under the influence of a god or devil, or to those driven to despair by external disaster. These factors lead me to believe that, despite its notoriety, his Ethics lacks fundamental value.