Metaphysics Aristotle - Philosophy

Metaphysics Aristotle Understanding any significant philosopher is vital, but understanding Aristotle especially requires studying him through the lenses of both his forebears and his successors. Aristotle has several advantages in the first area, and many disadvantages in the second. But his successors have greater responsibility than he does for his shortcomings. He appeared near the close of Greek thought's creative era, and it took the world two millennia after his passing for another philosopher to emerge who was roughly on par with him. By the conclusion of this protracted era, his authority was virtually as unassailable as that of the Church and posed a significant barrier to advancement in both philosophy and science. Almost every significant intellectual development since the early seventeenth century has involved challenging an Aristotelian doctrine; logically, this is still the case today. However, it may have been just as devastating if any of his predecessors—possibly Democritus—had risen to a position of comparable power. In order to properly honor him, we must first set aside his overwhelming posthumous notoriety and the correspondingly disproportionate posthumous censure that followed. Aristotle was born at Stagyra, Thrace, most likely around 384 B.C. The king of Macedonia had appointed his father as the household physician. Aristotle arrived in Athens at the age of eighteen and studied under Plato for about twenty years, until the latter's death in 348–37 B.C. After that, he traveled for a while and wed either Hermias' sister or her niece. The fact that he was a eunuch refutes the accounts that Scandal claimed she was Hermias' daughter or concubine. In 343 B.C. He started tutoring Alexander when he was thirteen years old, and stayed in that role until Alexander's father declared him to be sixteen years old. At that moment, Alexander was named regent while Philip was away. It is impossible to know all one would like to know about the relationship between Aristotle and Alexander, especially when stories about it were quickly created. There are several letters between them that are thought to be fakes in general. Those who think highly of both men assume that the student was affected by the tutor. According to Hegel, Alexander's career demonstrates the applicability of philosophy in real life. Regarding this, A. According to W. Benn, "It would be regrettable if philosophy had no more impressive reference point than the persona of Alexander. He combined the vices of a Highland chieftain with the ferocity of an Oriental despot; he was conceited, inebriated, cruel, vindictive, and egregiously superstitious. * While I agree with Benn regarding Alexander's character, I still believe that his work was immensely significant and beneficial, as without him, the entire tradition of Hellenic civilization might have been lost. We are allowed to speculate about Aristotle's effect on him based on what makes the most sense to us. As for me, I should assume it's zero. Alexander was a driven and aspirational young man who did not get along well with his father and was probably tired of going to school. Aristotle advocated for the golden mean and believed that no state should have more than 100,000 residents. I find it impossible that his student views him as anything more than a stern old pedant, someone his father put in charge to keep him out of trouble. True, Alexander was somewhat of a snob for Athens' culture, but his dynasty as a whole shared this need to demonstrate that they were not barbarians. It was comparable to how Russian nobility felt about Paris in the eighteenth century. Thus, the impact of Aristotle could not be attributed to this. Furthermore, I don't think Alexander possesses any further traits that may have originated from this source. Even more astonishing is the fact that Alexander had so little effect on Aristotle, whose political conjectures were blatantly unaware that the age of city states had given way to the age of empires. Ultimately, it appears that Aristotle considered him as "that idle and headstrong boy, who never could understand anything of philosophy." Their interactions appear to have been as fruitless as if they had never met. beginning in 335 B.C. up to 323 BC. (the year Alexander passed away) Aristotle resided in Athens. He wrote the majority of his writings and established his school over these twelve years. Following Alexander's murder, the Athenians rose up in rebellion and turned against his allies, including Aristotle, who, unlike Socrates, had escaped punishment after being charged with impiety. The next year, 322 was his death. As a philosopher, Aristotle differs greatly from all of his forebears in several aspects. Being a trained teacher rather than an inspired prophet, he is the first to write like a professor: his treatises are methodical and his debates are broken up into heads. His writing is methodical, cautious, analytical, and devoid of any Bacchic zeal. Where Aristotle is Platonic, one senses that the teachings he has been exposed to have overwhelmed his natural nature. The Orphic parts of Plato are toned down and combined with a healthy dose of common sense. He isn't very devout or fervent in any way. His mistakes are the result of age, which is unable to let go of ingrained preconceptions; the mistakes of his forebears were the magnificent mistakes of youth trying the impossibly difficult things. His strongest areas are critique and detail; he struggles with large-scale building due of its fundamental fire and lack of clarity. It is hard to know where to start when explaining Aristotle's metaphysics, but his critique of the theory of ideas and his own alternative notion of universals are perhaps the best places to start. He makes several strong arguments against the beliefs, the most of which are previously covered in Plato's Parmenides. The best argument is the "third man" theory, which holds that if a guy is a man because he looks like the ideal man, then there must be an even more perfect man who both regular men and the ideal man look like. Once more, Socrates is both a man and an animal. Therefore, it begs the issue of whether the perfect man is also the perfect animal; if so, there must be an equal number of perfect animals for every kind of animal. It is unnecessary to investigate the issue further because Aristotle makes it clear that when several people share a predicate, it cannot be related to something similar to them but rather something more perfect. Aristotle's own doctrine is far from obvious, yet thus much may be considered proven. This ambiguity allowed the medieval debate between realists and nominalists to occur. In general, one may characterize Aristotle's ideas as Plato watered down with common sense. He is challenging because common sense and Plato do not get along well. When one attempts to comprehend him, one believes that he is presenting Platonism with a fresh language half the time and that he is expressing the common opinions of someone who is ignorant of philosophy the other half of the time. It is not advisable to place undue emphasis on any one passage since it may be corrected or modified in a subsequent passage. Generally speaking, laying out the common-sense doctrine that makes up half of his perspective and then taking a closer look at the Platonic modifications he applies to it are the easiest ways to comprehend both his theory of universals and his theory of substance and form. The theory of universals is quite straightforward up until a certain point. Adjectives and proper names are two categories in language. The "things" or "people" to whom the proper names pertain are the only entities to which the names in issue are applicable. There are just a few examples of objects that fit these names: the sun, the moon, France, and Napoleon. However, terms like "cat," "dog," and "man" may refer to a variety of objects. The definitions of these terms as well as adjectives like "white," "hard," "round," and so on are at issue with universals. A substance is a "this," but a universal is a "such"—it indicates the sort of thing, not the actual particular thing. * He states: * "By the term 'universal' I mean that which is of such a nature as to be predicated of many subjects, by 'individual' that which is not thus predicated." What is signified by a proper name is a "substance," while what is signified by an adjective or class-name, such as "human" or "man," is called a "universal." (Plato's heavenly bed would be a "this" to those who could sense it; Aristotle disagrees with Plato on this point.) "It seems impossible that any universal term should be the name of a substance," Aristotle states. A universal is not a substance since it is not a "this." Because each thing's substance is unique to it and does not belong to anything else, while the universal is common because it is that which is called universal that is such as to belong to more than one thing. Up until now, the main idea has been that a universal can only exist in specific things. At a glance, Aristotle's philosophy appears rather simple. If I were to claim, "There is such a thing as the game of football," the majority of people would take my statement as gospel. But I would be rightfully accused of being nuts if I implied that football could function without football players. In a similar vein, it might be argued that redness exists only because red things exist, parenting exists only because there are parents, sweetness exists only because there are sweet things, and so on. Furthermore, it is believed that this reliance is not reciprocal: things that are typically sweet can turn bitter, guys who play football would still exist even if they never played, and my normally red face can turn pale without ever ceasing to be my face. This leads us to the conclusion that an adjective's meaning depends on what a proper name means, but not the other way around. I believe this to be Aristotle's meaning. His theory is a pedantically articulated version of common sense prejudice on this, and many other points. However, providing the theory with precision is not simple. While it is true that football cannot exist without players, it is also possible for football to exist without specific individuals. Even though someone doesn't have to play football to survive, they still need to do something. In the same way that a subject cannot exist without a quality, but can exist without this or that quality, the quality redness cannot exist without some subject, but it can exist without this or that subject. Thus, it appears that the purported basis for the difference between objects and attributes is false. The distinction's actual foundation is linguistic in nature—syntax is its source. Adjectives, relation-words, and proper names are distinguished. For example, in this sentence, "John is taller than James," "James" is an adjective, "wise" and "foolish" are proper names, and "taller" is a relation-word. Since Aristotle, metaphysicians have understood these syntactical distinctions in a philosophical way, according to which wisdom and stupidity are universals and John and James are substances. The use of relation-words was either disregarded or misunderstood.) If metaphysical differences are found to be related to syntactical differences, it might require a lengthy process that also involves the development of a synthetic philosophical language. Additionally, there won't be any names like "John" or "James" or adjectives like "wise" or "foolish" in this language; all of the terms from everyday languages have given in to analysis and have been replaced with words with simpler meanings. It is impossible to have a meaningful conversation on particulars and universals until this labor is completed. And when we finally come to a place where we can have a discussion about it, we will discover that the question we are talking about is very different from what we initially thought it was. Therefore, I contend that if I have not succeeded in making Aristotle's notion of universals obvious, it is because it is unclear. However, it is unquestionably a step forward for the theory of ideas and addresses a real, pressing issue. Another term that is significant to Aristotle and his scholastic adherents is "essence," which is not the same as "universal." Your "essence" is "what you are by your very nature," or, in other words, those aspects of yourself that you cannot lose without losing your identity. An essence exists in both individual things and entire species. A species should only be defined by identifying its essential characteristics. I'll go back to the idea of "essence" in relation to Aristotle's reasoning. For the time being, all I will say is that it appears to be a confused and imprecise activity. The next point in Aristotle's metaphysics is the distinction between "form" and "matter." (Note that "matter" as opposed to "form" is not the same as "matter" as opposed to "mind.") Again, Aristotle's theory is grounded in common sense, but in this instance, more than in the case of universals, the Platonic modifications are crucial. Let's start with a marble statue; in this case, the substance is marble, and the form is the shape the sculptor created. Alternatively, to use Aristotle's analogies, if a man builds a bronze sphere, the matter is bronze and the form is sphericity; meanwhile, if a sea is tranquil, the substance is water and the form is smoothness. It's all easy thus far. He continues by saying that the matter is one distinct entity because of its shape, and this is the item's content. Aristotle's reasoning appears to be straightforward common sense: a "thing" needs to have boundaries, and those boundaries define its shape. A statue is a "thing," and the marble that makes it up is, in a sense, unchanged from what it was as part of a lump or as part of the contents of a quarry. For example, any portion of a volume of water can be marked off from the rest by being enclosed in a vessel, at which point this part becomes a "thing," but so long as the part is in no way marked out from the rest of the homogeneous mass it is not a "thing." Because the atomic theory is so deeply rooted in our minds, we shouldn't automatically claim that substantiality is conferred by form. We now get at a new proposition, which initially appears challenging. Each atom, however, if it is a "thing," is such by virtue of its being separated from other atoms and therefore having, in some sense, a "form." We are informed that the body is the shape of the soul. It is evident from this that "form" does not imply "shape." I will go back to the idea that the soul is the body's form at a later time, but for now, I will just note that in Aristotle's theory, the soul is what unites the body into a single entity with a single purpose and all the traits we associate with the term "organism." An eye's function is to see, but it is blind when detached from its body. Actually, the soul is the one with sight. Thus, it would appear that a portion of matter is united by "form," and that this unity is typically, if not always, teleological. However, "form" turns out to be far more than this, and the greater is exceedingly challenging. We are informed that a thing's fundamental substance and essence are its shape. Universals are not significant; forms are. When a man creates a brazen sphere, he is only bringing together matter and shape that previously existed; he is not creating the form in the same way that he is not creating the brass. Not everything is made of matter; some objects are everlasting and contain no matter at all, with the exception of those that are able to move in space. shape gives things more actuality; substance without shape is only potentiality. The concept that forms are things that exist apart from the matter in which they are typified appears to put Aristotle in danger of being refuted by his own theories regarding Platonic ideas. He intends a form to be substantially distinct from a universal, although sharing many of the same traits. We are informed that form has more actuality than substance; this reminds us of the concepts' absolute reality. It would appear that Aristotle alters Plato's metaphysic less than he portrays it. Zeller adopts this stance on the matter and form debate, stating: * The ultimate reason for Aristotle's lack of clarity on this issue is that, as we shall show, he had only partially freed himself from Plato's propensity to hypostatize concepts. For him, just as the "Ideas" had for Plato, the "Forms" have a metaphysical life apart from molding every particular item. As he closely observed how ideas develop from experience, it is nevertheless true that these concepts ultimately transform from a logical byproduct of human thought into an immediate presentation of a supersensible world, and in that sense, the object of an intellectual intuition. This transformation occurs especially when these concepts are most removed from experience and immediate perception. How Aristotle could have responded to this criticism is beyond me. I can't think of any other response that would dispute the possibility of two objects having the same shape. A man may create two brass spheres, each with a unique sphericity that is both solid and unique. They are examples of the universal "sphericity," but they are not the same as it. The wording used in the sections I cited does not, in my opinion, readily support this view. Furthermore, it would be vulnerable to criticism because, in Aristotle's perspective, the specific sphericity remains unknown, even if it is central to his metaphysics that things eventually become more knowable as there is less matter and more form. This makes sense in light of the rest of his ideas only if the shape can be found in a variety of specific objects. He would need to make quite drastic changes to his philosophy if he were to claim that there are as many forms that are examples of sphericity as there are spherical entities. For example, his belief that a shape is the same as its essence conflicts with the escape already proposed. The contrast between potentiality and reality is related to Aristotle's theory of substance and form. All change is what we should refer to as "evolution," in that the entity in issue now has more form than it had before the change. Bare matter is thought of as a potentiality of form. Since God is pure form and pure reality, there can be no change in Him. That which has greater form is seen as more "actual." This teleological and hopeful theory— which holds that everything in the cosmos is evolving toward something consistently better than what came before—will be revealed. When potentiality is used as a fundamental and irreducible concept, it always hides conceptual confusion. For example, "A block of marble is a potential statue" means "from a block of marble, by suitable acts, a statue is produced." However, when potentiality is used in this way, it is convenient in some connections, provided that we can translate our statements into a form in which the concept is absent. One of the shortcomings of Aristotle's system is the way he employs it. Aristotle's theology is intriguing and interconnected with the rest of his metaphysics; in fact, he refers to what we now call "metaphysics" by the term "theology" (though he did not name the book by that name). He states that there are three types of substances: sensible and perishable, sensible but not perishable, and neither sensible nor perishable. Plants and animals are included in the first class; the celestial bodies, which according to Aristotle, only change in motion, are included in the second; and God and the reasoning mind of man are included in the third. The First Cause serves as the primary defense of God. It holds that motion must begin from something, and that something must be eternal, substantial, and real in order for it to remain motionless. According to Aristotle, this is how motion is caused without the objects of desire and thought themselves being in motion. In other words, God creates motion by being loved, while all other causes of motion function by moving (much like a billiard ball). God is mind itself; for thought is the highest good. "Life also belongs to God, for God is that reality, and life is the actuality of thinking, and God's selfdependent actuality is the most excellent and eternal kind of life. Therefore, we declare that God is a living, everlasting, and benevolent being; so, God is the possessor of continuous, eternal existence (1072b). "Thus, it is evident from what has been said that there exists an everlasting, immobile substance that is distinct from perceptible objects. It has also been demonstrated that this material is indivisible, without parts, and incapable of having any quantity. However, it has also been demonstrated that it is unchangeable and emotionless, since all other modifications follow a change in location (1073a). God lacks the characteristics of a Christian Providence since considering anything other than what is perfect would be an infringement on His perfection. by himself. "Since divine thought is the best thing there is, it must think of itself, and its thinking is a thinking on thinking" (1074b). It follows that God is unaware of the existence of our subterranean realm. Like Spinoza, Aristotle maintains that although God must love men, this cannot happen. Astronomical calculations indicate that there are either forty-seven or fifty-five unmoving movers, proving that God cannot be defined as “the unmoved mover” (1074a). It is unclear how these relate to God; in fact, it seems reasonable to conclude that there are either 47 or 55 gods. Aristotle begins, "We must not ignore the question whether we are to suppose one such substance or more than one," after one of the aforementioned passages on God. At that point, he launches the argument that results in the forty-seven or fifty-five unmoving movers. It's difficult to imagine an unmoving mover. A contemporary mind would appear to believe that if the cosmos were ever completely static, it would stay that way forever and that the source of every change must originate from a prior change. We need to consider Aristotle's remarks on causes in order to get his meaning. He identified four different categories of causes, which he named material, formal, efficient, and final. Let's take the man who is creating the statue once more. The marble serves as the statue's material cause; the essence of the piece to be created serves as its formal cause; the chisel's contact with the marble serves as its efficient cause; and the sculptor's intended outcome serves as its final cause. The term "cause" would only refer to the efficient cause in current parlance. One may consider the unmoved mover to be the ultimate cause since it provides a reason for change, which is ultimately an evolution toward similarity to God. I stated that Aristotle was not a strongly religious person by nature, but this is only partially accurate. One may reasonably understand one part of his religion in this way: God is pure thinking, happiness, and total self-fulfillment, existing forever and without unfulfilled aims. On the other hand, albeit flawed, the sensory world possesses life, desire, imperfect cognition, and ambition. All living creatures are, to varying degrees, aware of God and are inspired to act by his love and adoration. Therefore, the ultimate cause of all action is God. Matter takes on a shape through change, yet in the perceptible world, matter always exists on a substratum. The only being made entirely of form is God. The world is always changing to take on more shape, which makes it resemble God more and more. However, since matter cannot be completely removed, the process cannot be finished. This is a religion of development and evolution as the only thing that can affect the universe in spite of God's immutable perfection is the love that finite creatures have for Him. Their divergent religious views can be explained by the fact that Plato was a mathematician and Aristotle was a biologist. This would be a biased interpretation of Aristotle's religion, though, as he also had the Greek love of static perfection and a penchant for contemplation above action. This part of his philosophy is shown by his idea of the soul. Commentators disagreed on whether or not Aristotle taught immortality in any manner. Averroes, who maintained that he did not, had adherents in the Christian world; the more radical of them were known as Epicureans, and Dante discovered that they were in hell. The truth is that Aristotle's philosophy is convoluted and prone to misinterpretation. He mocks the Pythagorean theory of transmigration in his work On the Soul, believing that the soul and the body are inextricably linked (407b). While the body and soul are related as matter and form, it appears that the soul perishes with the body: "it indubitably follows that the soul is inseparable from its body" (413a); however, he immediately adds, "or at any rate certain parts of it are." The soul must be a substance in the sense of the form of a material body having life potential within it. However, since substance is actuality, a soul is a body's actuality as previously described (412a). The definition of soul is "substance in the sense that it relates to the ultimate formula of a thing's essence." This indicates that it is the "essential whatness" of the recently allocated character's body, or that it has life (412b). The soul is a natural body's initial degree of existence that possesses the possibility for life. The body that has been described is an organized body (412a). Asking if the body and soul are one is same to asking if the wax and the shape that the stamp has given it are one (412b). Plants have no psychic abilities other than self-nourishment (413a). The ultimate cause of the body is the soul (414a). He makes a distinction between "soul" and "mind" in this work, elevating mind above soul and reducing its reliance on the body. He states, "The case of mind is different; it seems to be an independent substance implanted within the soul and to be incapable of being destroyed" (408b) after discussing the relationship between the soul and the body. Once more: "We lack proof about the mind or the ability to think; it appears to be a very distinct form of soul, differentiating between what is ephemeral and what is eternal; it is the only psychic faculty that can exist independently of all other faculties. Despite some claims to the contrary, it is clear from what we have stated that every other aspect of the soul is incapable of existing independently (413b). The mind is the portion of us that comprehends philosophy and mathematics; as its subjects are eternal, it is also said to be eternal. The soul is the agent that moves the body and senses objects; it is defined by self-nourishment, feeling, thinking, and motivation (413b). The mind, on the other hand, performs the higher function of thought, which is independent of the body and the senses. Therefore, while the remainder of the soul cannot be everlasting, the intellect may. What is the commonality between the soul and shape in Aristotle's concept of the soul? The soul is the "form" of the body, and spatial shape is one type of "form." What unites them, I believe, is the way a particular quantity of substance is given unity. The portion of a marble block that eventually turns into a statue is not yet united or split from the other marble in the block; it is not yet a "thing." The statue has unity after the sculptor creates it, which comes from its form. The soul's primary characteristic, which enables it to be the "form" of the body, is that it gives the body an organic whole with purposes of its own. An organ has functions that are external to it; for example, an eye by itself is blind. As a result, there are a lot of things that can be stated about an animal or plant that are not possible to say about any one of its parts. Form, or arrangement, bestows substantiality in this way. Aristotle refers to a plant or animal's "soul" as that which gives it substantiality; yet, a "mind" is something distinct and less closely associated with the body; it may be a component of the soul, but only a tiny percentage of living things possess it (415a). The mind as speculation cannot be the source of motion since it never considers what is realistic or what should be avoided or sought (432b). A somewhat different nomenclature but otherwise identical philosophy is presented in the Nicomachean Ethics. One irrational and one rational element each exist in the soul. The two components of irrationality are the vegetative, which is present in all living things, including plants, and the appetitive, which is present in all animals (1102b). Though it is not entirely achievable, contemplation is the ultimate satisfaction for humans and constitutes the existence of the rational spirit. "A life like this would be too much for man; for it is not in the sense that he is man that he will live thus, but rather in the sense that something divine is present in him; and its activity is superior to that which is the exercise of the other kind of virtue (the practical kind) to the extent that it surpasses our composite nature. If reason is divine, then life lived in accordance with reason is divine in relation to human existence. Therefore, we must resist the urge of those who counsel us to think of human things because we are mortal and think of human things because we are men. Instead, we must do everything within our power to make ourselves immortal and live according to our best selves, which, although small in quantity, far outweighs everything in terms of power and worth (1177b). According to these texts, the rational soul or intellect is divine and impersonal, whereas individuality—what sets one man apart from another—is associated with the body and the irrational soul. A guy may be distinguished from another by his preference for pineapples over oysters. However, if they consider the multiplication table correctly, there is no distinction between them. The reason binds us together, the irrational divides us. Therefore, the immortality of the intellect or reason is a part of God's immortality rather than the personal immortality of distinct men. It doesn't seem that Aristotle accepted the idea of personal immortality as taught by Plato and subsequently by Christianity. All he thought was that men share the immortal divine insofar as they are intelligent beings. Man has the ability to become more divine in nature, and this is the ultimate virtue. However, if he had been entirely successful, he would not have been a distinct individual. I believe this to be the most logical interpretation of Aristotle's comments, albeit it may not be the only one.