Ethiopia’s Long War in Historical Perspective Part 4

Even in cases where neighboring states – like Sudan in 1972 or North Yemen – were reluctant to support Jebha, the inability of these states to control their own borders, as well as private pressure from more committed Arab states, rendered this reluctance inconsequential.81 As previously noted, the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 crippled, at least temporarily, the militaries of Jebha’s most significant benefactors in Damascus and Bagdad. Coupled with the closure of the Red Sea by Israel, Jebha faced a real shortage of arms and equipment, a shortage that coincides nicely with Jebha’s first split. Yet by the end of the 1960’s, the flow of external support resumed, with new additions. A revolution in Libya that brought Muammar Gaddafi to power provided yet another external patron in the region. US intelligence also reported PLO involvement in Eritrea in the early 1970’s, and attributes the rise in urban terrorism, hijackings, and kidnappings during this period to this support. Even the Chinese provided material support to the rebels in Eritrea, including the training of over thirty Jebha cadres in mainland China in 1967.82 After the 1967 war, it does not seem that Jebha incurred any significant loss of external support. Although the commitment of certain external sponsors was idiosyncratic (the Sudanese), and Cold War re-alignments wrought significant changes in external backing (Libya and Yemen in 1976), there were always states in the region who were all too willing to fill the void. In fact, the loss of support from several radical Arab states after the overthrow of the Ethiopian monarchy created new opportunities, bringing a number of conservative Arab states to Jebha’s aid.83 Indeed, by the late 1970’s and 1980’s there was a growing significance of Saudi petro-dollars in the Eritrean field, much 81 Airgram, Sanaa to State, Jan 24, 1973, RG 59, Central Files, “Ethiopia-Yemen: IEG efforts to prevent YARG assistance to Eritrean Liberation Front 82 Future leaders of Shaebia Issayas Afeworki and Ramadan Mohammed Nur, who were part of Jebha at this point, both went to China during this period 83 Telegram, Jidda to State, Feb 24, 1975, RG 59, Central Files, “Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, and the United States”- of it encouraged by Reagan administration. (Lefebvre, Middle East Conflicts and Middle Level Power Intevention in the Horn of Africa 1996). Thus, it is hard to see how a loss of external support could explain Jebha splits in 1975-77 and 1981-82. To drive this point home further, de-classified dispatches from US embassy officials in Khartoum reported interesting information in March of 1975, directly prior to the divisive Jebha Congress of May 1975 that began the organization’s fragmentation: “According to a diplomatic colleague, whose own source is a regional arms dealer, GOS (Government of Sudan) has permitted shipment of substantial quantity of arms to transit Sudan on the way to Eritreans. Specifically, source reported that 51 tons of anti-tank and anti-aircraft rockets and small arms, originating in Syria and Iraq, have recently arrived in Khartoum by air. Packing crates, which arrived labeled ‘vegetables,’ were allegedly relabeled ‘school supplies’ to better account for weight by Sudanese security forces before arms permitted to continue to destination in Eritrea. While story is inconclusive, it echoes earlier reports of same tonnage of arms arriving in early December (1974), and lends weight to Ethiopian conviction that GOS is indeed assisting in supplying arms and ammunition to Eritreans.”84 If this were not evidence enough, the participation of Abu Ala, Iraqi director of the Department of Palestinian Affairs and Liberation Organizations, in the Jebha Congress of 1975, suggests that external support, or lack of it, was not the relevant causal factor in Jebha’s fragmentation at that time. Organizational Structure, Centralization, and Control It is also reasonable to assume that rebel organizations that possess fairly decentralized command and control structures are more likely fragment. Thus shifts in organization towards more 84 Telegram 50, Khartoum to State, March 13, 1975, RG 59, Central Files, “Arms Shipment to Eritrea” decentralized administrative structures could map onto incidences of fragmentation and be driving my results. Since there is no consensus in the literature on how to measure organizational centralization/decentralization, and the concept is often misused in studies of civil war,85 I prefer to outline Jebha’s institutional evolution. When Jebha launched the insurgency in Sept of 1961 in Eritrea’s Barka province, it was led by a selfappointed Provisional Executive Committee of three who were based out of Cairo- Idris Mohammed Adem, Idris Glawdewos, and Osman Saleh Sabbe. While there is little information about Jebha’s early organization, communication between the Cairo triumvirate and fighters in the field was likely limited, and as such, fighters probably operated with a broad degree of autonomy. In 1962, the Provisional Executive Committee was replaced by the Revolutionary Command (RC), which consisted of the Cairo three as well as a twelve member Executive committee comprised of Eritrean exiles from Sudan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. In 1965, the growth of the organization in the field from a small band of fighters to nearly 1000 required a more formal structure. After meetings held in Khartoum in which Adem, Sabbe, and Glawedewos were confirmed as leaders of Jebha, the three moved their operations to Khartoum while also opening a field command in Kassala that oversaw military affairs. The leaders of Jebha decided that the best mode of organization in the field would be zonal structure, largely decentralized, and based on the experience of the AFLN in Algeria. Initially, Jebha consisted of four zones, each of which drew their leadership and rank and file membership from the geographic area in which they operated. The predictable result was that the zonal system tended to reproduce the ethnic, religious, and regional divisions of Eritrean society. In 1966, an increasing influx of Christian’s from the central plateau necessitated a fifth zone, dubbed the “Christian zone.” By virtue of kinship, Adem, Sabbe, and Glawedewos had particularly strong 85 (Johnston 2008) makes a similar point in his discussion of insurgent organizational structure in Liberia and Sierra Leone kinship links with the first, fourth, and second zone respectively, and ties of patronage bound these leaders to each of these zonal commands quite closely. Yet ties of patronage and kinship with the external leadership notwithstanding, the zonal system largely lacked coherence. Zonal leaders treated the areas in which they operated as personal fiefdoms, and operated independently of one another. More importantly, the zonal system created a competitive dynamic, a trend that was only exacerbated by rivalries amongst the external leadership. It was in this context that Jebha fragmented in 1967, and thus organizational decentralization would seem to be a good explanation for cooperation breakdown. However, a discussion of what Jebha’s organization looked like on the eve of the divisive congress of 1975 suggests that this sort of explanation is inadequate in explaining the breakdown of cooperation that ensued. By 1971, Jebha had gone through a major transition, the result of which was a radically different organizational structure based on Leninist principles of democratic-centralism. Recruitment, training, and personnel issues were now centralized. A two tiered leadership was elected by a fighter’s congress, with a Revolutionary Council of 13 and an executive committee of 19. Importantly, the executive organs were now in the field in close proximity to the units they commanded. A Secretary-General was empowered with day to day responsibilities for management while a set of committees in the executive bodies were set up for centralized policy making. Furthermore, Jebha set up a secret internal Marxist party to enforce discipline and ideologically train new members.86 86 This section is drawn from a wide range of sources. See (Markakis 1987) and (Medhanie 1986). Also, author’s interview with Shaebia intelligence officer, August 11, 2009. A fantastic primary source document that details Jebha’s organizational structure is (The Eritrean Revolution: 16 Years of Armed Struggle 1977) Thus Jebha was relatively centralized on the eve of the explosion of factionalism in 1975, a situation that persisted through the factional events of 1982. Thus, a theory of organizational centralization vs. decentralization would not seem to explain much here. Organizational Size and Complexity One of the more compelling competing explanations has to do with organizational size and complexity. Building on Olson’s famous insight that collective action is difficult in groups that are either large, and, or socially differentiated (Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 1965) (Olson, The Rise and Fall of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities 1982), it may be the case that Jebha’s size and social complexity affected its fragmentation. However, Jebha’s aggregate size is a weak explanation for its fragmentation. Figure 14 is a bar chart that illustrates the size of Jebha during its three moments of factionalism and fragmentation.87 One can see that Jebha fragmented when it was both relatively large, and relatively small. Nor was a rapid and dramatic increase in membership, relative to the size of Jebha at a particular point in time, responsible for fragmentation. While the fragmentation of 1967-68 and 1975-77 coincided with rapid increases in membership, the fragmentation of 1982 did not. Finally, while increases in Jebha’s diversity would seem to be central to the story of its fragmentation, Jebha likely became a less diverse organization after the departures of Herui Tedla Bairu and Falool in 1975 and 1977 respectively. How then does one explain the events of 1982? Indeed, the new equilibrium reached after the factional cataclysms of the mid 1970’s was built on a much narrower ethnic, religious, and ideological base. 87 These are best estimates, and a rough average of numbers provided by available non-Jebha sources Figure 14: Jebha’s Membership during Fragmentation Episodes (in Thousands) 20000 18000 16000 14000 12000 10000 Jebha Membership 8000 6000 4000 2000 0 1967-68 1975-77 1982 Absolute Position, Victory and Defeat A final issue to consider is whether processes of factionalism and fragmentation are triggered by where a rebel organization sits in absolute terms, rather than change in position- i.e. significant gains or losses. In particular, it may be that gains and losses are masking the effect of being near victory, or near total defeat. One could well argue that as a rebel organization approaches either of these points, they hit a threshold beyond which cooperation becomes very difficult. In order to get a handle on this issue, I measure Jebha’s annual military position in absolute terms by placing the organization in one of five categories annually: Jebha is given a 1 if it occupies less than 20 percent of the province, a 2 if it occupies 20 to 40 percent, a 3 if 40 to 60 percent, a 4 if 60 to 80 percent, and a 5 if 80 to 100 percent. If Jebha is still in its guerilla phase, I look at effective operational reach, rather than control. Figure 15 is a graph that depicts the trends in Jebha’s territorial position with the numbers that sit on the trend line indicating both the absolute position of Jebha and exactly when fragmentation occurred. Figure 15: Territorial Control and Operational Reach— Jebha 1960-1982 5 4 3 3 2 1 0 1958 1 1963 1 1968 1973 1978 1983 Jebha If absolute military position was the relevant variable causal variable, and gains and losses masked its effect, when we would expect both Jebha to fragment in category 1 and category 5— near defeat and near victory respectively. At the very least, we would not expect to see fragmentation in the middle, category 3. Yet as the graph demonstrates, this is simply not the case. In fact, the only cases of fragmentation that we see are in categories 1-3. Therefore, it is hard to argue that my theory of relative gains and losses masks the effect of being on the brink of victory, or the precipice of defeat.88 88 Of course, this chart does not nail this point very well, since Jebha does not demonstrate the full variation on levels of absolute control. It may be the case that as Jebha passes category three it hits a threshold above which intra-organizational cooperation is difficult. However, the six other cases I use help validate this argument much better. Indeed, not every case can perfectly highlight every nuance of the argument Conclusions It should be noted that the above discussion is not meant to be conclusive with respect to alternative explanations. In the interest of space, I have highlighted those that are most theoretically compelling. However, what this paper has tried to demonstrate is that the occurrence of factional infighting and fragmentation is contingent on organizational performance in unique and novel ways. While the statistical data illustrates a relationship between rebel fragmentation and gains and losses in the context of Ethiopia’s civil wars, careful historical analysis of Jebha – using original interviews with ex-combatants, color coded district level maps and archival sources – highlights the plausibility of the dual causal mechanisms of credible commitment and preference divergence. The counterintuitive conclusion is that stalemate, or periods of slow, marginal battlefield change, promote cohesion and are the only sustainable basis for cooperation in war. I refer to such contexts as “cohesive stalemates.” Obviously, the theory and mechanisms proposed require further testing and evaluation against a larger sample of cases. More precise and accurate measures that capture the full variation in the magnitude of gains and losses would make for a more compelling argument. Furthermore, since this is a ceteris paribus argument, we need to carefully consider variables that may interact with the processes and mechanisms that I have identified in this paper. Many of these issues are taken up in other parts of what is a larger project. Yet these conceptual and empirical difficulties notwithstanding, the broad array of evidence marshaled provides a compelling window into the internal politics of organized rebellion, and demonstrates that while territorial gains and losses create contexts conducive to factional infighting and fragmentation, military stalemates possess unique properties that enhance cooperation. In the final analysis, it is war, its ebb, and its flow, that determine when and how rebels cooperate. Appendix Figure 12: Major Ethiopian Offensives against Jebha 1960-1982 Year 1967 1970 1976 1978-79 Details First major deployment of Ethiopian regulars to Eritrean theater (2nd Division). The offensive largely consisted of a series of sweeps into western provinces of Gash and Barka that were a locus of Jebha activity, as well as aerial bombardment. The Ethiopians also created strategic hamlets to isolate population from the rebels. The offensive created first major dislocations of the war with over 60 thousand fleeing to Sudan. In the short term, the offensive was largely credited with curbing Jebha activities in the western lowlands, although by 1969, Jebha activity was on the increase Took place after the assassination of Major General Teshome Ergetu, commander of the 2nd Division. In a reprise of 1967 attacks, Ethiopian military also declared martial law over the province and replaced the civilian governor-general, Asrate Kassa, with a military man, General Debebe Known as the “Peasant March,” this offensive was put together in a few short months, and consisted of 50 thousands poorly trained peasants between the ages of 16 and 60. Most were actually in their 40’s. The Ethiopian’s largely telegraphed the offensive, and Jebha, Shaebia, and their allies the Woyane, defeated most of the peasant contingents in Tigray before they even entered the province of Eritrea Actually consisted of 5 offensives, the first of which began in June of 1978. The first set of offensives were highly successful, as an Ethiopian army of 100,000 troops launched attacks from rear bases in Tigray, as well as from garrisons in Asmara, Barentu, and Massawa. Jebha and Shaebia gains of 19741978 were reversed, and both groups were relegated to small base area in the Sahel mountains of northern Eritrea. The second set of offensives failed to dislodge Jebha and Shaebia from their base area in the Sahel mountains. Outcome Moderate Success Fragmentation Yes Failure No Failure Yes Moderate Success No