Introduction. What is Social Theory

Modern Social Theory An Introduction Edited by Austin Harrington OXFORD VNTVBRSTTY PRESS Intrc -'--don. What is Social Theory? Austin Harn'ngton fOClCS DISCUSSED IN THIS INTIIODUCTION The rn~anirlgd 'the6y' ~andsaialsdenoe Mehddmedroddogyinsodalmeatch faid thea~yand'rommonse~e* 'Fads', '-,, 4'W ~thewyandather~afthewy ~*~poMkalthcory ~W~psydsloglr W t h e a y a n d t h c ~ Condusibn QUESflOllS FOR DIXWYOII GUrtIUl IWllnlR REAllnG Ik MCIA~THEORV SOURCES HUTHE PUBLIC MEMA WB5IES bdal W r y canbedefined as the study of sdenWc ways ofthinldngabout sodal Uk. It aKompassesideas about how societies change and develop, a b u t methods of explain9 social behavlour, about power and s o d structure, class, gender andethnldty. modernity and 'dvlliratlon', r e v o l u t l ~ a n d utopias, and numerousother conceptsand probierns in soda1 life. This Introduction addresses some of the leadhg questlorn t?lat &se when we start to think about the very idea of a 'science of society'. We begin by &cussing the meaning of the word 'theow and its oarlow implications for 'method' md 'methodology' in social research.We also consider questions about the relationship d s d d theory to 'common sense', about the roIe of 'facts', 'values', and 'obfectivlty'In JociaI research, and about the relation of sociology to other disdplines of the sodal sciencesand the humanities such as political theory, psychology, anthropology,Mstory, .Ddphilosophy. The meaning of 'theory' As a term of art, kocial theory' is a distinctly recent Invention. No such term exists In English or in any other language before the twentieth centuryIand even io the twentieth century it is not common before about the 1940s. Auguste *Comtecoined the term sucioI0gie in France in the 1840s, but 'sociology' too did not gain widespread currency as a term uatll after 1900. However, the two separate words 'socfal*and 'theory' are very ancient in origin. An initial lookat theix etymologieswillglw us somedues to theirmeanlag as a coniolned pair. Our words 'sodal*and 'society' derlve horn the Latin words sodus and sodeta. For Romans, a sociw %a member of aadinj?partnership. Asocius was a merchant coomttnn with other merchants as a oartner, fellow, or 'associatet. A partnershipor 'association' between merchants was a sock&, which is the orinin of our modem U s h word 'company' or 'bushes finn', as well as our keyword society, The commercial meaainqaf soc+dmc is directIy preservedin othermodem European Ianpages such as in the French and It2 his sens w - .. - . ..- ._ .. heancic . ~eant 'contem~lation'.In thewritings of the philosopherM o t l e , &&a referred to contemplation of the cosmos. It contrasted withepm&, from which our word 'pra&eJ derives.Praxisfor the Greeks referred to human -'way of acttng and conductingtheir lives on this earth, in the Immediate everyday wodd. Clearly*this ancient Greek understanding of M a differs horn most common uses of the word 'theory' today. The Greek word thearla had g different set of connotationsfrom e m o d e r n linkages of theory with 'scientific construction'. m y we tend to think of 'a theoryr as belna a 'scientific construct' or a 'scientific model'. In contrast.thfor the Greeks did not itself mean science. -Rather, it meant rePection on science: reffection on the value of saence, as one mode of contem~latin~ thecosmosamongothers-alongside art, myth,reliRfon.and the most general discipline of thinkinp;that the Greeks called 'philoso~hy~, or -of wisdom'. The ancient Greek meaning of Mria might not seem partiadd9 relevant to us io the present day. It might seem to reinforce the rather widespread view that theory lacks relwan= to dailylie. Yet t h i s wouldbe to fail to appreciatethe significance of theidea. 7?wiW for the Greekswas an indispensableaid to maicing senseof their livesin the ordinaryworld of sodety, in the world of the 'city' or what they d l e d thepolis, born which our word 'politics' derives. Theybeueved that people who did not pause to engage in contemplation and reflection had no pointsof orientationfor conductinnt h e i r k s in vractice, in the political world of actions and Interacttons with other people. Thus &&ria for the Greeks remained indispensable to everyone who sought wisdom, happiness,and the good Me inthe realm ofpFaxfs* It can be said that a renrrrent tendency af modern has been for theory to be equated with scientific knowledgeper se and to tation of dE! critical reflective questioning about the and m e d n x of science-in the context of G politics. in thc c o n t c , a n f ~ m o d e of s understandlQ&bnd inthe context of theAnitude and mortalitv of h m The neglect of thetiria in modern times was a partimlarIy important concern for the Jewish-C;erman philosopher Edmund *Husserl, founder of the mwernent of philosophical t houghr known as *p!rmomenoEop. Writing in the 1930s, Husserl armed that unless the scicnces m t l ~ t e their d sources of origination and meanl n for ~ evervdav life, in the "lifeworld' as hecalld it, they would be doomed to extinction t Husscrl 19361.Either the sciences would become wholly abqorbed into the production of technnlogies of mastery over nature or they would dissolve in a wave of revolt against all tattonal thin king totdt roftrt.Unfortunately,the rise of fascism and militarism in Europe in rhe 1930s and 1940s confImed Hussert's fears, and the only remaining role for science in European society in this period remained as an instrument in the production o l machines of war and persecution, In a similar spirit, the Jewish-GermanCmlgre philosopher Hannah "Arendt argued that theory In the modern age comes to be Inaeasinglv suhrdfnated to the search for technolofiical mntrol over physical and social lifc (Arendt 1958). Writing in the 19505, Arendt suggested that where the original virn confmplativn or "contemplative life'oof the ancient Grreks had been intimately hnund up with what the Greeks saw as the vita actiw or 'active life' of public palitical participation, the 'actlve lifekf the modern age no longer has the sense of practice and deliberation informed by contemplativereflection, Instead. modern consciousness the w& becomes inmasinpllv oriented to w o ! and e v l t- v. , where science scrves the develoament of technotop and where t k q ~ d ~ M a n d s o ~ h v scrve a t mast as 'handmaidens' to science. In contrast, Arendt wanted to see a world in which t h ~ o r yand philosophy not only assist science but also remind sdence Q£itsmoral and nolittcal reswnsibilities. in the face of the fraatliy of the earth's resources and the mortality of human lift, Science and social science This ancient context of theilria suggests clrles for ways of thinking about the relationship of soclal theory to science todav. li sndal&the of tthinkmg about society scientifically,we can also sav that it S a way of t h.l n l.u n p o u t how Zar it is possible studv m-1~. We can sav t h a t ? is a thinking about what science and bei in^ 5scl~ntificheanwith respect to the social world, 'The ward ' ~ i e n c cin ' English has close connectionswith the natural sciences and is often used synonymouslywith them. HDW~MI,the natural sciences are not theonlv disciplines of .. human enquirywith a claim to the title of science. -aPeneraI to i s m a g & a m c t h o d ~ m e t h o d s t o d ~ consistently and tranrparently. Usuallv it involves an effort toh. . v between t 5v~tematic;lllv ofthewrsonobserpingthem-whatwecall d a k I or 'cvidcncel--qad d e a m n r c - d by t h e - a s a d p r d e r i n g W W b o b s e r v e s . D e f i n e d in this general sense, it is clear t hat physics, chemistry, or biolop are not the only subjects of enquiry with a claim to the title of k i n g sciences. Other sub@ctsofstudp,such ashistory, archaeolo~,or an criticism, can aIsa be sciences. In French, the subject5 known in English as the 'humanities' are called Ies sciences Aumnines, while in German the humanities are known as the *Gpistenvissmd~ofim-'sciencesof the mlnd', or "sciences of thc works of the human mind'. The particular association between scienceand natural science in English reflccls a series oldeveloprnents in ea~lpmodern European history in which a number of precedents were set by the emergence of physics and astronomy in the seventeenth centurv and the emergence of chemistry and biolo~yin the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. From around L k k A g h t e i e h t e e n t Y l r y . a variety of atternpfi were made t o e thc -a - dd riuplins~ crenceswith d e w m l devotfd i d , ~ h u m a n s o c i a l ~ T l i e r ;~ncluded e economics, phiiolugy and linwistics, history and art history, and notably 'sociology'. iL!&ashdh&LlW& W-P~ were Q& ~ C P if ?t h y copied o~-& sciences.Accordingto Auguste *Comte, who 1s thc originator both of our word 'sociology' and of the concept of *'positive science' or 'positivism, nnlv one f u m h m t a l p r i n c u &science and all p a ~ c u l a rsciences had to be unified undcr this principle. I liis principle was set by the science of physics, which Comtc believed to proceed by QUE h v a n v ~ c o n c t r n r i o n s-tf Vhtually ali social theorists and philo~ophersreject this nineteenth-century positlvist conceptJon of science todav. A l m n r t m l a v . . . s a n M L k h P h~ ~~ f mnf nl f h p n a l sri~lvund-- a sclencesthcmselves.amu w h m w h i c h n ~ w i r a s c i e n c e . - t h e humanities and the social sciences-dy V v a l u p 9 . ji ~f 5 . a n d b Fnclalhphnvinllrantlin-dwa-h These embodied meanings, wlucs, intentions, beliefs, and idcas as kxh aed . . are @rrs nfrnrlt~Kt~ of rntmhnnal 2awu%bt.. . . . mu am^ Therefore e rm ra-lr . . cannat he pf YLulhpflnhvsrcalelemcntsarerrcatcdd Although natural scicntistsalsu, up to a point, deal ~ 7 1 tsymhol~c h conwithtructs that require *Anterprctivc skills of variou~kinds, udaiktk . . . . . . . M Y I l f p r . v h ' " c h P m if~ ~ p p nf . . " m=xiwinidwinlhlPa&ra~ . . a m - p This question of differences between the human sciences and the natunl sciences raises a more general question about t h e role of what is called 'method'and 'methodology' in social research.I t is to this that we n w turn. Method and methodology in social research . I 1s. ta k N c t r m a t l r i a a n l r t * t l i t n f f i w T a b 'mghadrcal mPt to use mmeoarticulartwhniaue or techniques in b v s n m e Lhh& In social science we speak of 'quatitativc methods', such as a programme of interviews, and of 'quantitative methods', such as the use of s t a t i s t i c r . U h a x e a ~ . . mfPllflwafo&& f m a s.kn topic of study. Methodology thus refers to a theoretical principle or principles governing he application of a set of methods. The '-ology'in 'methodoEogyJ refers to a themy of methodical practice. The central issue for any group of researcherswho want to think about the rnethdology gftheir research project concerns the relationshtp between the pieces of evidenceor data at :heir disposal and the theories governing thc way In which they apply methods in order to ?:oduce and analyw this evidence or data. Here the word 'theory' is used in its more mode~ md familiar sense of "scientific model' or 'scientific construction'. TWQ very general ~ ? basic d questions we can ask in this mnnectlon are the Following. What would research 3e like if it consisted only of acts of data collection and no theories? And conversely, what -*~uld research be like if it consisted only of theones find do data collection? Let us look at the second question first. If research consisted mIy of theories, it would Iack ~ 2 r e n c to e the real world. Researchers would have no reason to g o out into the field and rxeniew people or analyse sources. If research consisted only of constructions in the ~ a q i n a t i u n sof researchers, it would be empty of content; and it would be incapabEe of +ng validated or tested in any way. Any piece of speculationwouId have to be deemed as : x d as another. '3ut now let us look at the first question. If research consisted mty of data colldm, it -2uld lack all order and sense.It research conristed only of heaps of information,it would ?e no more than a chaotic bundle of statements, impossible to decipher or evaIuate or to :??I!to any meaningful purpose. It would be useless and pointless. '-1-e can conclude from this that theory is impossfbEe without *empirical obsetvation, 1-d equally that empirical observation i s impossible without theory To paraphrase a '~z~ou statement s in the thought of the cighteenth-centurg +Enlightenmentphilosapher '?manuel *Kant, we can say that theories without data me empty; data withwt theories me r'-.rLi (Kant ortginalEy wrote: 'Concepts without perceptions are empty; perceptions with-2: concepts are blind') (Kant 1781: edition B,pafa. 76). L? reality, it ncvec happens that a researcher's theoretical reflections entirely lack ~ ~ ~ i r icontent c a l or that a researcher's empirical observations entirely Iack thmretical :rnstmctlon, In every aaua! Instance of research, a researcher's theoretical reflections are r ~ r d e dtowards flndlng out some piece of evidence about an object of experience, and 1 r5earchct1s observations of this object are always structured by his w her theoretical ~?ections.We can say that thearies ought not to dictate or dogmatically constrain a -searcher? field of observations; but we have te accept that theoretical thinking of some -.'=altvays underlies the researcher'sobservations. Il?eorbfcal thinking supplies criteria for selections and discriminations of things that :?ocial theory is, and ought tobe, the orga~lic-cutthnclonr)t \ o r ~ n cic.t~ntc\ I I n w l i ~ ~ r.vhr r y nrdlnaryperson has a say and a capacity to contribute-and in the cases where it c c a w to be the organic extension of such debates, it loses touch with Its roots and is not wo~thyof Its name. Gramsd's remark has its origins in the ideas of the nlnetccnth-century German philosopher G,W. F. *Hcgel, who exercised a major influence on the early Karl 'Marx. He~elheld that all phiIosophy develops progressively out af ordinary cvcryday consciousness, by a process of reflection on lived experience. A further source of inspiration for Grarnsci was the elghteenthcentury Italian historical philosopher Giambattlsta *Vim, who argued that all human beings haw a capacity for understanding history because human beings mnke hlstory. Vico held that whereGod made nature, man alonemakes history, and that it Is man's makingot history which gives him his power to undvstand history. In thls sense we can say t h a t li% our act~onand Darticipation in the social world that Is the source pf our Wty to n& knowledge of history and soda1 processes. It can be said that the onlv Important difference between social theory and common sense is that mdaE theory seeks to svsternatl;?~and clarify debate about goals and problems of social life through welldefincd @ and techniques nf analyris. Building on common sense. social thtosv tries tadraw distinoions betwccn different wavs nf reacting msoclal life. I t tries to distinguish emotional and moral wavs of rcacting from Impartial reactions. I t o b s e r v a t i o n s Incontrast to preludices and stereo-es. and It tries to untanalc attitudes of detachment from attl tudes of pa-vested a interest. In this sense, a thesis in social theory tries to do more than the typical lead article or editorial of a tabloid newspaper. Bn the tabloid articlc, information, emotions, moral judgements;,arid prescriptions for change are wrv frequently m i x 4 up together. Similarly. a thesis in social theory tries to distinwish itself from a part).-political manifesto or a state ideology or a nationaIlsl myth or an Interest-group platform, Although its motives of inception are hquently overtly political, social theory differs from poliHcal activism in an important sense. while many schools &mid 7 nnlitlcal .. . . the x h v. l.t v off and1nroblcms:ltlahourtlon 7 environmental destruction, or sexism or racism remains a different activity from the activity of campaigning for policies to abolish them. The two kinds of activity depend on each other in very real and practical ways; but they remain distinct from each other. Social theory is not activism and cannot be turned into activism; it depends on practice and is guided by practice but is not the same as practice. This is at once its strength and its limitation. To appreciate these ways in which social theory entails both an attitude of involvement in social life and an attitude of detachment from social life, we need to turn now to a range of issues bound up with the role of 'facts', 'values,' and 'objectivity' in social science. 'Facts', 'values', and 'objectivity' On one level, all social science is a search for facts, for 'social facts'. The Latin root of our word 'fact' means 'something made' or 'something done', from factum, the participle of the verb facere, 'to make'. In addition, our modern sense of the word 'fact' refers to any state of affairs that is real, definite, and incontrovertible. In these two senses of the word 'fact', it is a fact that six million Jews died in the Holocaust; and it is also a fact that ten thousand Palestinians died in the founding of the state of Israel in 1948. What is important in these two historical facts is less the exact numerical statistic than the fact that something real, definite, and incontrovertible happened and was made to happen by human agency. The Shoah and the Nakba (the evacuation of Palestine) are not legends, myths, or fantasies; they are facts. They did not happen of their own accord or by the agency of supernatural forces or spirits; they were done and made by real human actors acting in definite social-historical conditions which can be documented, observed, analysed, and interpreted. However, the problem of facts for social science is that facts only ever appear to us laden with values. The Shoah and the Nakba are significant to us from the standpoint of moral and political values: they stand out to us precisely because they are an affront to human values. They concern us because they are events involving sufferings and crimes which ought not to have occurred. Here the difference between facts and values can be understood as the difference between the world as it is, or was, and the world as we would like it to be, or not to be. How the world is is one thing; how the world oughtto be, or how it might be made better, is another. One way of responding to the world is 'descriptive'; the other way of responding is 'prescriptive'. But the problem for social science in the real world is that facts cannot be separated from values. If we had no values, if we had no interest in value in the world, we would not be interested in any particular facts. We would not be struck by any particular facts as calling out for attention and demanding investigation. Although we are generally able to distinguish statements that claim to 'describe' how the world is from statements that 'prescribe' how the world ought to be, we cannot extract facts from values in any pure way. We cannot put all our values to one side in order to observe the world purely as a set of facts, undistorted by our frames of perception and feeling about what is right and wrong with the world. Social facts are meaningful to us only insofar they are value-laden, and we only come to be engaged with these facts insofar as we have values about how the world ought to be or ought not to be. This explains why researchlnPfacts b s t always produces a diversity of points of vlew, w h ~ v t e c on r. n w .~ t h one another. Different social parties have different and often conflicting values about how the world should be, and different parties struggle with one another for the most authoritative account of the events and issues of the day. In the case at hand, numerous accounts exist of the causes of the Holocaust, and a broad spectrum of contestedviews reign about the causes and consequences of the founding of the state of Israel. Social science therefore has to consider a diversity of accounts, which very frequently turn out to be backed up by different sets of reasons worthy of consideration in their own right. In conseauence. it is often verv difficult. if not imnossible. to s p e a k any one 'r .l p h t s w e r rn the studv of social affairs, This raises a profound problem. -search is possible only from value-laden points of view. how can r w c h be 'obiective'? How can there be agreement about the accuracv. e research? validitv. or insight of anv articular ~ i e c of There are ways of answering this question which need not lead us to think that value conflict is fatal for the possibility of validity in research. If facts cannot be separated from values. ~tdoes not follow that evldence about social life cannot be collected. analvsed. and reted In -t and methodical ways, The events of the Holocaust and the Nakba are both capable of being submitted to transparent techniques of scrutiny-for example: techniques of analysing documents and statistics, interviewing of witnesses, and the like-and although many different accounts of these events still remain, and are still bound to remain, it does not follow that no valid knowledge can be established about them. Furthermore, & imnossihilitv of sevarating facts from values does not mean that r e s e a r c h e r s o t realisticallv aim to work out ~roceduresbv which disagreements can be d out W n a l l y debated, If I am able to show you m a r i v e at my position, . . reasoaq for & sten ng to vou how I believe t w n s to account b r the matter and if you are able to do the same. we at least have .. which we can develon further through continued crlticd s for discuscommunication.Value conflict neednot therefore entail that any statement by a party to a discussion has to be deemed as good as another, or that no agreement or no mutual critical discussion of any kind is possible. And it certainly does not follow that someone who denies that the Holocaust or the Nakba tookplace maintains as valid a position as someone who demonstrates that they did, by adducing evidence and methodically examining and explaining this evidence. Objectivity therefore remains a realistic and rationally desirable goal for research. But it is important to emphasize that obiectivitv need not be seen as the onlv or ultimate ma1 oy motive of researcLDifferent schools of social theory take differing views about the purpose . . and relative importance of objectivity. Some schools view it m end -while others tend to view it as a means towards other. m e vractical en&-such as social justice and *emancipation, or liberation from oppression. In general, schools that are subordinate obiectivitv to the Dursuit of moral and nolitical ends of social described as havine a *normativeorientation of thoueht. The word 'normative' here refers to attitudes that give priority to the 'ought' above the 'is', to determining how the world 7 . - a should be made better, rather than solely to observing how it Is. W will encounter many examplesof such attitudes in the course of this book. nut it should be stressed that nurner.. wst between the attitude of normative enaaaement on the one ~ I J midwav hand and thhattitude efobjerrtivedetachment on h -11 Pchnrlls-he? *--r -ory t in fact advocate combinations of involvTm'cnt