Restitution Webb v. McGowin COURT AND DATE: Court of Appeals of Alabama (1935) PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Trial Court: entered a judgement of nonsuit against Webb ISSUE: Whether the conferring of a material benefit or undertaking of a detriment by a promisee is sufficient consideration to enforce a promisor’s subsequent promise to pay based on the benefit or detriment. TRIGGER FACTS: Joe Webb (plaintiff) and J. Greeley McGowin were both employed at a lumber mill. On August 3, 1925, Webb was dropping large, pine blocks from the upper floor of the mill to the ground. This was the usual and ordinary method of clearing the mill floor. Just as Webb was about to drop a block, he saw McGowin on the floor below and knew that if the block dropped, it could seriously harm McGowin. Webb chose to fall with the block and thus divert it from striking McGowin. In doing so, however, Webb suffered serious bodily harm that left him unable to perform physical labor for the rest of his life. McGowin recognized that Webb saved his life and agreed to pay Webb $15 every two weeks to sustain him since he could not work. McGowin paid these payments until his death, at which point the executors of his estate, N. Floyd McGowin and Joseph F. McGowin (defendants), refused to continue making payments to Webb. Webb brought suit to recover the unpaid installments accruing from the time payments stopped to the time of the suit. The McGowins demurred. PLAINTIFF’S MAIN ARGUMENTS: DEFENDANT’S MAIN ARGUMENTS: RULE (the law): When a promisee confers upon a deceased promisor a benefit that is material and substantial, and is conveyed upon the person of the promisor and not merely his estate, the promisee is entitled to recognition and compensation from the promisor’s estate either by an executed payment or an executory promise to pay. HOLDING + REASONING : Yes. When a promisor receives a material benefit from a promisee, the promisor is morally bound to compensate the promisee for services rendered. If the promisor subsequently promises to make payment on the basis of that moral obligation, that promise is valid and enforceable. Such moral obligation constitutes valid consideration for a subsequent promise if the promisor received a real pecuniary or material benefit. State ex rel. Bayer v. Funk, 209 P. 113 (1922). In Boothe v. Fitzpatrick, 36 Vt. 681 (1864), a bull owner's subsequent promise to repay the plaintiff for caring for the bull after its escape was held valid and enforceable. Saving a person from death or serious bodily harm is a much more substantial benefit than caring for a bull and is certainly valid consideration for a subsequent promise to pay. In this case, McGowin received a material benefit when Webb saved McGowin from grievous harm, likely serious injury or death. McGowin acknowledged this Restitution benefit, promise to pay Webb for the remainder of his life, and did so until his death eight years later. Webb suffered severe bodily injuries from his actions undertaken to save McGowin’s life. Thus, McGowin’s promise to pay bi-weekly payments to Webb is a valid, enforceable contract and is not barred by the statute of frauds. The judgment of nonsuit is reversed, and the case is remanded. [Editor's Note: The McGowins subsequently petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for certiorari, which as denied.] CONCURRENCE: This is a gray area, and strictly applying the letter of the law might result in the plaintiff being denied recovery. However, as Chief Justice Marshall made clear, the law should not be "separated from justice, where it is at most doubtful." The court reaches the right result.