Proximate Cause

PROXIMATE CAUSE Actual Causation/Lack of Causation overall?  One cannot establish negligence when he cannot show that ∆’s actions caused his injuries (Ford v. Trident Fisheries Co.) o π could not establish that ∆’s actions caused deceased’s death  Even if the boat and oar were available, he couldn’t have been rescued…DD’s negligence wasn’t the cause of injury  If negligence isn’t legal/proximate cause of accident, ∆ is not liable (Lyons v. Midnight Sun Transportation) o Whether ∆ was speeding or not, victim would have died  negligent driving was not the legal cause of death o The standard of care required is that of a reasonably prudent person in same or similar circumstances  A doctor can be held liable when, because of the doctor’s treatment, a patient lost the chance to survive, even if the doctor’s actions were not a substantial factor in causing the death of the patient (Cahoon v. Cummings) o One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other’s person or things, he is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if  His failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk or such harm, OR  The harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the undertaking o Even if one’s conduct was not the cause of the resultant damages, damages are proportional to the increased risk attributable to the DDs negligent act or omission. o Causation = loss of chance of survival Proximate Cause: General    Proximate cause used to sometimes limit ∆’s liability even if 4 other elements of negligence are met Key is foreseeability  ∆ may be liable for the foreseeable, but not the unforeseeable, consequences of negligent conduct o Foreseeability of π as a potential victim of ∆’s negligent conduct OR o Foreseeability of the particular way in which π was injured A defendant is only liable for negligence if he owes a legal duty to π and breaches that duty, and if the resulting harm was reasonably foreseeable (Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.) o Risk reasonably perceived (foreseeable) = duty o Although ∆ possibly negligent to man (in pushing him), his conduct didn’t involve any foreseeable risk of harm or negligence to π, who was far away  there’s no duty to her 34 o Since the ∆’s conduct didn’t involve an unreasonable risk of harm to π, the damage to her wasn’t foreseeable (the fact that the conduct was unjustifiably risky to someone else is irrelevant)  there’s no duty or care due to π o Dissent: duty is to everyone - ∆ bears a burden of due care to protect society from unnecessary danger, not to protect A, B or C alone (+doesn’t have to be foreseeable) o Cardozo’s zone of danger theory   Cardozo’s “Zone of Danger” Theory: person cannot sue for negligence if he or she was not in the “zone of danger” where there was a legitimate threat to their person Andrews Fairness: (Palsgraf dissent) One does not only have a legal duty to protect those in a nearby “zone of danger” from harmful acts, rather, one has a duty to protect society at large. Social protective mechanism. Trigger of unreasonable conduct. Cardozo: 1. Foreseeability 2. Relationship 3. Zone of danger Seavey: 1. Rough justice  Do the solutions do the job in the favor of justice? 2. Consistent w/ theory  Which theory? Traditional? Hand? Cardozo? 3. Ease of application  A defendant’s negligent conduct may be the proximate cause of injuries occurring to a plaintiff after the actual negligent conduct if the risk of those injuries is a foreseeable consequence of the negligent conduct (Marshall v. Nugent) o Establishes “time and place”  There was a “thread of connection” between the events so they are still wrapped together (Injury was within the scope of risk – part of ongoing chain of events caused by negligent act, hence foreseeable) o Establishes that the court determines the duty, and the jury should hear the proximate cause because it is a question of fact Intervening Cause   Intervening cause – a force which takes effect after ∆’s negligence which contributes to that negligence in producing π’s injury Superseding cause – intervening cause that breaks the chain of causation and is sufficient to prevent ∆ from being negligent Intervening Cause: Foreseeability Rule If ∆ should’ve foreseen the possibility that the intervening cause might occur or if the kind of 35 harm suffered by π was foreseeable, ∆’s conduct will nonetheless be the proximate cause But if neither the intervening cause, nor the kind of harm was foreseeable, the intervening cause will be a superseding one, relieving ∆ of liability.    Criminal acts are an efficient intervening cause, which necessarily defeats proof of the essential element of proximate cause One can be held liable in negligence for the criminal actions of a third party that result in injury (Herrera v. Quality Pontiac) o One owes a duty for any injuries that are foreseeable (Pontiac had the keys and possession of the vehicle, so they owed a duty of care) A vehicle manufacturer and/or a tire manufacturer owe no duty to protect a consumer from criminal activity at the scene of a product failure where the product itself does not cause injury to the consumer (Stahlecker v. Ford Motor Company) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (NIED) Intent IIED Extreme or outrageous conduct Actual intent or recklessness Harm Extreme emotional distress Transferred Intent Punitives No Yes Type of Conduct NIED Negligent conduct No intent, but ∆ must be in the “zone of danger” Physical injury or illness required (split authority) Yes No  Pure “liability based on foreseeability” approach to recovery for NIED rejected  There can be no recovery for physical injuries sustained by π as a result of the shock of witnessing another’s danger who is out of the zone of danger or range of ordinary physical peril (Waube v. Warrington) NIED Dillon Test: (Whether ∆ should reasonably foresee the injury to π/ whether ∆ owes π a duty of care) 1. Proximity to accident 2. Emotional Shock 3. Close relationship to victim Test taken from Dillon v. Legg   Proximity to accident in NIED Test ≠ zone of danger Factors in more detail: 1. Whether π was located near the scene of the accident (as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it) 36 2. Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon π from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident (as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence) 3. Whether π and the victim were closely related (as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship) NIED Thing Test: (rigidifies Dillion factors by only allowing π to recover when:) 1. Close relationship to victim 2. Contemporaneous observance 3. Aware that victim is being injury 4. Emotional distress Test taken from Thing v. La Chusa  Since π was not at the scene, she cannot establish a right to recover for the emotional distress she suffered when she subsequently learned of the accident and observed its consequences (Thing v. La Chusa) o Whether π suffers emotional distress beyond that which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness  A mother may recover damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress against a physician who entered into a doctor-patient relationship with her for care during labor and delivery if her child is injured during the course of the delivery because she is a “direct victim” of the physician’s negligent acts (Burgess v. Superior Court) o π doesn’t meet requirements of Thing, but the court creates a direct victim category o Direct victim – when ∆ owed a duty to the victim o Here there’s a professional relationship between π and doctor  they entered into a contract and ∆ didn’t exercise due care  Courts don’t like to give damages for IIED o False claims o Need to live with hard knocks (people all die) o Limitless liability (all who say they saw World Trade Center collapse) Purely Consequential Economic Loss  π may not recover damages for negligently caused, foreseeable financial harm unless it is shown that he suffered some physical injury or otherwise meets some other special circumstance or exception to warrant award of damages (Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru) o Majority have retreated from no-liability rule of Barber but no consensus as to the appropriate rule 37  A contractor may be liable for damages for a tenant’s foreseeable lost profits in failing to use due care to avoid injury to the tenant’s business by not completing construction work within a reasonable time (J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory)  ∆ owes a duty of care to take reasonable measures to avoid the risk of causing purely economic damages to particular πs comprising an identifiable class with respect to whom the ∆ knows or has reason to know are likely to suffer such damages from its conduct (People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp.) 38