Ludwig Wittgengenstein (1889 – 1951)

LUDWIG WITTGENGENSTEIN (1889 – 1951) Ludwig Wittgenstein is considered one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century, and his influence is a significant particui la:ly in analytic philosophy. Wittgenstein was born on April 26, 1889. In Vienna, Austria, it became one of the richest families in Austria. In 1908, Wittgenstein attended the University of Manchester to study aeronautical science, and soon he became very interested in the work of Gottlob Frege and the philosophy of mathematics. From 1911 to 1913, based on Frege's advice, Wittgenstein studied at Cambridge under Bertrand Russell. At Cambridge, Wittgenstein and Frege worked together to understand the basics of logic. Periodically, Wittgenstein traveled to Norway, where he stayed for months, trying to solve the problems they had discussed. At the beginning of World War I in 1914, Wittgenstein joined the Austrian army. In 1917, he was captured and spent time in the war as a prisoner of war during his wartime, Wittgenstein began writing one of his most important philosophical works, Tractatus logico-cus, which was published in German and English after the war. This would eventually become known as "the beginning of Wittgenstein." By 1920, Wittgenstein had stopped pursuing philosophy, believing that his work on the Tractatus had solved all the problems of philosophy. He gave his family's wealth away from his siblings. And over the next nine years, he tried several different professions in Vienna. In 1929, after speaking to members of the Vienna circle about the philosophy of mathematics and science, Wittgenstein decided to return to Cambridge and study philosophy. His return to Cambridge marked a dramatic change in his philosophy, and various lectures, and letters from this time are sometimes referred to as "middle Wittgenstein." It was at this "middle" stage that Wittgenstein rejected dogmatic philosophy (which included not only traditional philosophical works, but also ideas contained in his own books). Wittgenstein spent the 1930s and 1940s leading seminars at Cambridge. During this period (referred to as the "later Wittgenstein"), Wittgenstein developed his most significant work, which included a shift from formal logic to ordinary prohibitions, a skepticism of philosophical pretensions, and a reflection on mathematics and psychology. Although he had planned to incorporate all his ideas into a second book entitled philosophical, in 1945, while preparing the final manuscript, he withdrew the book from publication (but allowed the publication posthumously). Wittgenstein spent the next few years traveling and continued to develop his philosophy until his death in 1951. EARLY WITTGENSTEIN Wittgensteia's early philosophy was based on his book, Tracta tus logico-cus. Wittgenstein quotes from the works of Bertrand Russell and Gottlob Frege, and composes Russell and Frege's universalist view of logic, which is the supreme set of laws and is the foundation of knowledge. There are seven basic propositions in the philosophical Logico Tractatus, as translated by D. F. Pears and B. F. MeGuinness: 1. The world is everything that happens. 2. The fact of this case is the existence of the event. 3. A logical picture of facts is a thought. 4. The mind is a sensible proposition. 5. A proposition is a function of the basic proposition (an) is a function of itself). 6. The general form of the correct function is [p.,N(5). 7. What we should not talk about, we should not talk about. Basically, Wittgenstein argued that logic has no laws, and cannot be a set of laws, because logic is something completely different from science. The assumptions that make logic are the result of logic, but logic, it seems... Logic is purely form and has no content. Meanwhile, logic says nothing is absolute, logic is what determines the structure and form of everything that is talked about. Wittgenstein then dealt with the role of language. According to Wittgenstein, language is only suitable for describing facts in the world. He argued that language is not suitable for talking about things like values, ideas related to something outside the world, or things that discuss the world in the General's entry (therefore stating that most philosophies, including aesthetics, ethics, and metaphysics, cannot be considered dead by using language). For example, a person's ethical outlook is a result of the way he views the world and life. So, how can this be stated in words and declared as a law? Wittgenstein stated that one's ethical views (as well as many philosophies) are something that can only be demonstrated and not stated. He then redefined the purpose of philosophy and stated that philosophy is not a doctrine, and therefore philosophy should not be taught in a dogmatic way. Philosophers, according to Wittgenstein, must use logical analysis to show where the traditional philosophers go wrong (he refers to all proposals as nonsenso) and must correct those who say things that cannot be said. Calling the proposal nonsense, Wittgenstein even admitted that his own book had become almost nonsense. LATER WITTGENSTEIN Wittgensiein's Tractatus philosophy does not have to be close to dogmatic. Wittgenstein realized that his own work was dogmatic. Thus, his later works, and his book of investigation, are best known for their complete rejection of dogmatism. In doing so, he moved away from logic and towards what he believed should be the basis of every philosopher, the ordinary language. In his book, Wittgenstein elaborated on a new way of looking at language and stated that the goal of philosophy should be therapeutic. In discussing the meaning of words, Wittgenstein states that the meaning of words is determined by the way one uses those words, and not by some kind of abstract relationship between reality and language (a drastic change from Wittgenstein's earlier perspective). The meaning of words is not fixed or limited. To support his claim that words are impermanent and have many uses, Wittgenstein introduced what he called "strategy games" and returned to the idea often throughout his books. Although referring to a play on language, Wittgenstein never fully defined the meaning of the term, so the latter time shows the fluidity and diversity of language. While there is no specific or rigid definition, there is no difficulty in understanding the term and using it in the right way. Thus, Wittgenstein proved that ordinary language is sufficient for the present, and that attempts to dig beneath the surface of language will only result in unwarranted generalizations. When we use words like think. The intent, understanding, and meaning, tempted is to believe that this word; So what we are doing now. By examining how these words are used, Wittgenstein concludes that these words do not refer to the mnental state at all: rather, they refer to a person's behavior. Wittgenstein began to understand that language and habits were not established by law but by the use of language in social contexts (which Wittgenstein referred to as "forms of life"). Therefore, everyone learns how to use language, in essence, in a social context, so that we can understand each other. This is also the reason that it is impossible for one to invent owan language to describe an inner sensitist (since there would be no way to know if a word is used appropriately, and thus, the language would be meaningless) Wittgenstein discusses interpretation through the distinction between "seeing that" and "seeing as." Take a look at Wittgenstein's famous example, the "duckrabbit." Figure 183 "Seeing that" is when something is seen in a direct way (for example, we see that it is a duck), and "seeing as" is when someone starts to see certain aspects (for example, we see it as a rabbit). In seeing something as something, we are actually translating. We do not interpret the things we see except when we acknowledge that there is more than one interpretation to have. Although Wittgenstein's early and final work supported an anti-theoretical stance on what philosophy should and should not do, Wittgenstein dramatically moved from using logic to prove the merits of philosophical theory to encouraging philosophical nature therapy.