Cartesian Doubts in Meditation 1

Cartesian Doubts in Meditation 1 I. Background of Descartes and Meditation (i) René Descartes was born 1596, died 1650; he lives in France, the Netherlands, and Sweden. (ii) He wrote about philosophy, but also about optics and mathematics ('Cartesian coordinate system'). (iii) The Meditations on First Philosophy was published (in Latin) in 1641. Meditation is common as a religious genre, but less so for philosophy; Both aim to engage and transform readers: "I do not advise anyone to read these things except those who have the ability and desire to meditate seriously with me, and to draw their minds from the senses as well as from all prejudices." Foreword to the Reader, p. 52 (Hackett 1998 edition, translated by Donald A. Cress). (iv) Who is the thinker/narrator? Not Descartes himself, but a fictional individual who is a naïve and absurd believer. During Meditation 1, the naïve one is in an internal conversation with the skeptic. II. Method (i) "I realized that once in my life, I had to level everything to the ground and start again from its original foundation, if I wanted to build something solid and eternal in science" (59). ['science' here means 'systematic body of knowledge.'] (ii) "I'll suffice to refute all these opinions, if I find in each of them some reason for doubt." (59). • If someone suggested you should question your beliefs about something, did you decide to doubt everything you believed? Why did Descartes undertake this project of systematic doubt? • Descartes thought that the only way to know if his beliefs were trustworthy was to investigate their foundations. If someone suspects that their house is unstable due to rotten wood, the solution is to destroy it, provide a secure foundation, and rebuild it. (In In reply and objection, Descartes used the image of an apple barrel that was starting to rot. To prevent the spoilage from spreading, one takes out all the apples and inspects them, discarding the rotten ones.) (iii) Descartes would not have been able to check every belief, of course. How did he proceed? "Therefore, I also don't need to survey every opinion individually, a never-ending task. Instead, since damaging the foundation would cause anything that had been built on it to collapse on its own, I would directly attack the principles that underpin everything I had ever believed." (60) III. Perception and Illusion Hypothesis: SENSE IS THE SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE. A. Whatever is felt is as it appears to the senses. Problem: the senses have deceived me in the past, for example, optical illusions (the wand looks bent when partially submerged). • Note that the counter example to (A) is an example of an external disturbance in our perception process. It seems that they only happen under unfortunate circumstances. Can we adjust the principle? B. If the circumstances are favorable, then whatever is perceived is as it appears to the senses. Problem: Suppose B is true, but you never know when circumstances are favorable. Then you can't draw the conclusion that things are as they seem. But, the naïve argues, of course we can sometimes say that we are in favorable conditions (e.g., "sit here by the fire, put on my winter dress" (60)). So: C. We can distinguish favorable circumstances from unfavorable circumstances; and if the circumstances are favorable then whatever is perceived is as it appears to the senses. Problem: "Crazy" people can have false beliefs even under ideal conditions. Sometimes individuals hallucinate. • Note that in such cases there are no external disturbances, but there are internal disturbances in the process of one's perception. So we need to put both aside to have a secure foundation. • Descartes refused to consider the possibility that he was crazy: "But such people are crazy, and I would seem no less crazy, if I took their behavior as an example for myself." (60). So we have to adjust the principle: D. We can distinguish favorable circumstances from unfavorable circumstances, and competent perception from incompetent; And if the circumstances are favorable and the perception is competent, then whatever is perceived is as it appears to the senses. Problem: Even competent perceptions sometimes have vivid dreams. And "there are no definite signs to distinguish wakefulness from sleep" (60). How often my night's sleep persuades me about ordinary things like this: that I'm here, wearing my dress, sitting next to the fireplace – when in fact I'm lying naked in bed! (60) Descartes' point was that there is no "definite sign" based on the qualitative experience of dreaming that I am awake and not dreaming. • You might protest: Of course I can tell the difference between a dream and an awakened experience! Dreams have "dream-like qualities". And of course I could tell as soon as I woke up I knew I was dreaming before. • But the claim that dreams have 'dream-like qualities' is pointless against the skeptical argument, if (i) the 'dream-like qualities' are only noticed after you wake up and remember what the dream looks like, or (ii) dreams don't always have 'dream-like qualities'. What is needed is a definite sign, which is a sign that will always be there to tell you that you are dreaming when you are dreaming. IV. Knowledge of the Priori Truth1 Perhaps we cannot find a definite basis for perceptual knowledge, but there are other types of knowledge, for example, the knowledge of very general things (for example, that objects have colors, shapes, quantities, and so on) and things that derive from these (for example, arithmetic, geometry). (61) Hypothesis: REASON IS THE SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE. Problem: Can we reliably judge that we are in a favorable state and are competent reasoning? • God may have caused me to believe all these things wrongly. • But God is not a liar!! The problem is revisited: Maybe there really is no God. Or maybe: ... An evil genius, very strong and clever, who had directed his entire efforts to deceive me. I would consider the sky, the air, the earth, the colors, the shapes, the sounds, and all the external things to be nothing but the confusing deception of my dreams, with which he ensnared for my beliefs. (62-3) Can evil demons not only undermine our belief in the experience of the outside world, but also our trust in our reasoning about common things? It seems so, because naively concludes: But eventually I was forced to admit that none of those things I had ever believed to be true were not allowed to be doubted – and not out of frivolity or lack of forethought, but for valid and considered reasons. (62) Question: 1. Notice that Descartes dismissed madness as a source of error and replaced it with dreaming. Why? One possibility is that crazy people are not only confused about their experiences, but also have flawed reasoning powers. In the case of dreaming, we continue to assume that the agent's reasoning power is still intact. But what about that evil demon? Do evil demons also question the power of our reasoning? If so, then how can we proceed with a rational investigation of doubt at all? 2. Suppose Descartes has established that every given experience may be a dream. Is it right to conclude that all experiences may be dreams? Consider a fair lottery. Any number has the same chance of winning as any other number. It is true that anyone can win the lottery. However, it does not mean that everyone can win the lottery. What is the reason about the lottery analogous to Descartes' reasoning? Should we reject Descartes' conclusions as well?