Handout Lecture 12: Compatibility

Compatibility 1. First and Second Degree Desires and the Will "A wants X" doesn't have much content other than context because it is consistent with (p.7): (a) The prospect of doing X does not elicit any sensation or emotional response in A (b) A believes he doesn't want to do X (c) A believes that he doesn't want X (d) A wants to refrain from X-ing (e) A wants to do Y and believes that it is impossible to do X and Y (f) A doesn't "really" want to do X (g) A would rather die than X So you can't predict much about what someone will do just by knowing that they want X. Frankfurt thinks we have to distinguish between: The first-order desire for X – X refers to an action The second-order desire for X – X refers to the first-order desire Will – the desire or desire that motivates the agent in some action, or the desire with which the agent will or will be motivated (A will is synonymous with one or more first-order desires – it is an effective desire). 2. Second Order Wishes Two types of situations in which A has second-order desires: (1) A has a desire to want X, but also a desire to refrain from X-ing – the desire they want to have is the desire they want to be insatiable. Example: a doctor wants to understand what it feels like to crave an addictive substance. He forms the desire to have that desire (perhaps temporarily) but he doesn't want such a desire to be satisfied. He didn't want the desire to take medication to be his desire (2) A has a desire to want X, and he wants the desire for X to be effective. This means that A already has a desire for X. Example: I want to want to concentrate on my work. This kind of 2nd level desire is called a second level will Frankfurt thought that the will of the 2nd order was very important for personality. Wantuang Nd the desire of the order but there is no will of the 2nd order. Wanton didn't care has 2 about their wishes. Their desire moves them to do something but they don't want to be driven by that desire or prefer to be moved by others. A rogue does not care about his desires. Example: an unwilling addict – has 2 conflicting first-order desires – the desire to take the drug and the desire not to take it, but the desire not to take the drug is what he wants to be his desire. Rogue addicts – also have conflicting first-order desires, but there are no preferences between them. Frankfurt, Harry G. "One's Freedom of Will and Concept." Journal of Philosophy 68, no. 1 (1971): 5–20. © Journal of Philosophy, Inc. All rights reserved. This content is exempt from our Creative Commons license. For more information, see https://ocw.mit.edu/help/faq-fair-use/. 3. Free Will Frankfurt thought that the will of the 2nd order was the key to free will. On one view: an agent acts freely if he does what he wants to do. But Frankfurt thought, even if there was anything true about this as an explanation of what it was to act freely, it did not capture the idea that the will was free. The freedom to act as one wishes is not enough for free will. If freedom of action is roughly the freedom to do what it wants, then freedom of will is roughly the freedom to want what it wants. This means that with respect to first-degree desires, the person is free to make that wish his will, or make another wish in his place. Free will is carried out when an agent brings his will in accordance with the will of the second order. Consequences: The will of the addict who does not want to be free. Whatever the way the addict doesn't want to act, he acts according to his wishes. But his wishes were not what he wanted. • • • There may be a conflict between level 2 desires. If a person fails to identify himself with one of his conflicting first-order desires then he is not human. There may be a 3rd order wish, etc. However, when a person identifies himself or herself Resolute With one of the first order desires that identification "resonates" through all existing levels. A person who is free to do what he wants to do and wants what he wants has all the freedom possible to want or imagine. All the freedoms we want are compatible with determinism. 4. Frankfurt on Moral Responsibility Frankfurt denied a direct link between free will and moral responsibility. Being morally responsible, according to Frankfurt, doesn't mean that you can have whatever you want. o Example : willing addict – an addict who is willing to become an addict. In this case, we can imagine, his will is not free because the desire for medicine will be effective even if he does not want the desire to form his will. But when he took the medicine, he took it freely. Moreover, although his will was out of his control "with a second wish that his desire for the drug should be effective, he had made his will his." (20).  Question: what about unwilling addicts? Frankfurt's view opens up the possibility for an explanation of moral responsibility according to which an agent is morally responsible when he acts freely and the wishes of his first order correspond to the wishes of his high order – in other words, he has "made his will his." Frankfurt (in another work) also refutes the claim that a person is morally responsible for what he does only if he can do otherwise. Frankfurt, Harry G. "One's Freedom of Will and Concept." Journal of Philosophy 68, no. 1 (1971): 5–20. © Journal of Philosophy, Inc. All rights reserved. This content is exempt from our Creative Commons license. For more information, see https://ocw.mit.edu/help/faq-fair-use/. From the Stanford Philosophy Encyclopedia: "Here is an approximation close to the example presented by Frankfurt in his original paper: Jones had decided to shoot Smith. Black had learned of Jones' plan and wanted Jones to shoot Smith. But Black would rather Jones shoot Smith himself. However, it is worried that Jones may have wavered in his determination to shoot Smith, Black secretly arranged things so that, if Jones had to show any signs at all that he would not shoot Smith (something Black had the resources to detect), Black would be able to manipulate Jones in such a way that Jones would shoot Smith. As things happened, Jones followed through on his plan and shot Smith for his own reasons. No one else in any way threatened or coerced Jones, offered a bribe to Jones, or even suggested that he shoot Smith. Jones shot Smith under his own power. Black never intervened. In this example, Jones shot Smith himself, and did it without any burden — doing it freely. But, given Black's presence in the scenario, Jones could have done nothing but shoot Smith." So in response to van Inwagen, it is possible to agree that: "If determinism is correct, the agent is unlikely to act otherwise" while still claiming that: (a) The agent acts freely (in the sense that he does what he wants to do) (b) The agent acts on his own will (in the sense that the will that the agent uses is the will he wants to have, the first and second wishes coincide). (c) Agents are morally responsible (probably because of (a) and (b)).