Hobbes: Psychological Egoism and the State of Nature

Hobbes: Psychological Egoism and the State of Nature Background Leviathan (1651): Integrates human desires for freedom and security in a ‘social contract’ - Breaks with classical world, marks beginning of modernity Seems to reject classical notion of social liberty Defends individualistic freedom One of the first to portray human beings in a lawless state (‘a state of nature’) in order to justify the need to create a political authority. ‘The Elements of Law’ – pre-curser to Leviathan - Attempted to argue there was a logical movement from studying human body to human nature and finally to understanding formation of the state Thought there was a mechanistic motion from what we don’t like to what we do 1642: Outbreak of Civil War Instability of Civil War motivates the argument for authoritarian political order in Leviathan. - Hobbes left for Paris during the war – controversial ideas in book made him fear for his life His ideas appears pro-royalist, but defends any gvt so long as it keeps peace Appeared to deny God as the strongest justification for political authority Affirms the capacity of individuals to create the political state Outcome of CW: The King rules only with the assent of Parliament - Hobbes decided that any gvt, however tyrannical, would be better than strife during CW. Social contract would be one where power is not divided. Hobbes was influenced by the materialist account of the world popular at the time - Facts about physical body explain what we know and what we do - Our knowledge arises from experience We move towards things that cause us pleasure and away from that which causes us pain - Appetites and aversions When we speak of good/moral/just = that towards which we move, causes us pleasure Psychological egoism - Arises because we have a diversity of passions which we call good. Bring us into conflict. But the basic, universal desire in humans is to preserve life. We pursue anything for this end. Whatever is in our self-interest we call good and just. There is no finis ultimus (utmost aim) nor summum bonum (greatest good) We have desire for power after power – due to need to preserve life What about altruism? - Hobbes gave charity to the beggar to “ease his own distress” Hobbes was in pain to consider the beggar’s miserable condition, so giving him relief eased his own condition. Compassion is possible Grief for the calamity of another arises from imagination that the calamity may befall himself. What is/was the ‘state of nature’? 1. Partly, Hobbes’ state of nature is an empirical claim. a. America: no gvt, ‘men live in that brutish manner’ b. The ancestors of the inhabitants of Germany c. The English know of such an awful condition from Civil War 2. Also partly a theoretical hypothesis, or a damatic/rhetorical thought experiment a. Reminds selfish human beings why it is rational to submit to an absolute ruler Equality and conflict in the State of Nature - Conflict arising from natural equality between us – in terms of fundamental psychology They therefore come into conflict over goods that they pursue in their own interest: - Fame by conquest / Ease and sensual pleasure / Recognition for skill There is a continual threat if war – we know the other will have a disposition to fight us Human life is thus ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’ - We are naturally equal in hope to attain diverse goods. - Nobody is consistently more powerful – no obvious ruler in state of nature - Being subservient to another person is hateful to us - Where there is no authority or common power to rule over men, there is no law. Where there is no law, there can be no commonly understood idea of justice. Justice / injustice are not faculties of body or mind – they relate to men in society (not solitude) Why wouldn’t a life of want-satisfaction be fair enough? 1. It can be mortally dangerous. We constantly fear death. 2. We lack the good things in life – e.g. pleasure and beauty of life and commodious living - Industry, agriculture, navigation, fine architecture, scientific knowledge, arts and literature When a law forbids the doing of X, I have no right to do it. - In SoN = no law. Therefore, “every man has a right to everything, even to another’s body”. Exercising our right to everything causes conflict and death There is a precept or general rule that it is right to seek peace - “every man ought to endeavour peace… and when he cannot obtain it, that he may… use all helps and advantages of war” (i.e. act upon the right to everything) 1st Law of Nature - 2nd Law of Nature Seek peace and follow it. If you cannot, use all methods to defend yourself - - You should, so long as others do too, give up your natural right to everything Be content with as much freedom as you would allow others 3rd Law of Nature - Keep your promises and covenants Hobbes and the Fool The Fool (Chapter 15): - The only reason to perform an action is that it will promote your own interest If you can benefit from breaking a contract or covenant, you ought to do it Hobbes thinks that the Fool is wrong: a. The Fool can get away with breaking his agreements only if others would be tricked. In SoN, people are equal – therefore unlikely other would always be tricked. b. If the Fool gets found out, he wouldn’t be able to build trust – he’d be easily destroyed c. The risk of getting caught is high – not rational to take this risk d. So, you should try to keep your promises and aim for peace. This is in your self-interest. Would the state of nature really be a state of war? - What about community, fraternity, fellow-feeling? Hobbes: the laws of honour might stop us killing each other sometimes. But SoN is not a community or society as such. Therefore, laws of honour don’t always apply. Isolated individuals in SoN will be at disadvantage if they do not exercise natural rights. Interpretation 1 – conflict caused by passion - We can’t achieve peace in SoN because our reason is overcome by passion There passions make SoN a dangerous place. You can’t predict what others will do. Prevalence of vainglorious passion might increase chances of promise-keeping Therefore, State of War is not necessarily inevitable Interpretation 2 – conflict through rational self-interest - It would only be rational to fight in a zero-sum game a. The personal stakes are very high b. We view each deal with another person as the one and only encounter we will have with them, which we must win. a. Possible in SoN. b. Not obvious. May be rational to co-operate. Educate people into keeping contracts = better results. Interpretation 3 – Conflict caused by short-sightedness - The problem may be that we are short-termist or short-sighted We mistake what is in out self-interest because we assess it in the wrong time-frame. Once we’re aware of others’ short-termism, a cycle of violence begins and war = inevitable. Thus, difficult it not psychological egoism as such, but our short-sightedness The problem is that natural law cannot be enforced in the state of nature If there is no ‘terror of some power’ which ‘will hold us all in awe’, every person will rely on his / her natural right. In spite of the existence of natural law, submission to an absolute power is rational and necessary. Hobbes: Absolute Sovereignty and the Social Contract 3 problems/causes of conflict in SoN: competition, diffidence, vain glory Hobbes and the Prisoner’s Dilemma Why must we leave the State of Nature? Life in SoN is a high-risk ‘game’ - We need to lower risks of dying brutally Rational solution: simultaneous transformation of power - To agree to an absolute sovereign or ruler, with apparently limitless power The existence of a super power changes our preference for war to one for peace Hobbes’ problem: promise-keeping - When you play a very high risk game, at some point the probability of pain is higher than the possibility of pleasure, power or glory. Rational person would give up gamble and try to negotiate a limited truce Problem: once made, it would be irrational for anyone to keep the promise It would be more rational to pretend to promise and then do whatever you want (free riding) Always going to be tempting to break the rules in the SoN. A ‘free rider’: 1. Enjoys the benefits of social cooperation 2. Relies on the fact everyone is cooperating 3. Breaks the rules anyway when it suits them The Prisoner’s Dilemma Arises when rational actions of individuals lead inevitably to conflict under conditions of uncertainty. - Agents with preferences of individual reasoners will always find it rational to attack and fight, no matter what the other decides to do (e.g. attack even though other keep the truce). Clyde: stay silent Clyde: betray - Bonnie: stay silent Both serve 6 months Bonnie: 10 years / Clyde: free Bonnie: Betray Clyde: 10 years / Bonnie: free Both serve two years Individual rationality holds B should not count on C remaining silent. Reverse also true. Neither can cooperate because they cannot trust the other. This is in spite of the fact that cooperative outcome would be better for them (as a collective). Sartre considers a group of peasants who each farm their own plot on a steep hillside. - The rational action for each would be to increase their usable land by cutting down the trees. But if each person cuts down all their trees, there will be an environmental disaster. a. The collectively rational decision differs from the individually rational one. b. The cooperative outcome is collectively best. Hobbes’ solution: The Social Contract How can we achieve peace and security? We agree mutually to submit to a common sovereign who has: 1. Absolute authority to resolve all contentious issues 2. Absolute power to enforce all the laws, using force if necessary Self-interested agreements and salient incentives If it is irrational to keep promises in SoN, how is the contract to form gvt rational? - I have a salient incentive (i.e. it is in my rational interest) to accept the rule of a sovereign to govern disputes, if, in SoN: a. He seems to be strong; and b. He already has the support of others The existence of this ‘salient’ incentive changes my preferences: - I know I would be at a disadvantage in the state of nature without this person’s protection Alienating freedom and authorising government We agree mutually to lay down (alienate) our natural rights - This is a covenant of every man with every man - Give up my right of governing myself to this man 1. Contract of simultaneous performance – which overcomes mistrust 2. ‘as if every man should say to every man’ – hypothetical analysis of birth of modern state - Assumption we will consent giving up our natural right, on condition that everyone else would The birth of a ‘Mortal God’ Human beings are therefore rational to create an absolute power to rule over them - “This is the generation of the great Leviathan, or rather of that Mortal God” Fear and consent in forming the contract If you are motivated by fear, is the contract voluntary? - Force vs. consent The sovereign can come to power: a. By acquisition (conquest) b. By institution (an explicit agreement) For Hobbes, both contracts by institution and by acquisition are ‘voluntary’ - It is in your interest to obey a powerful invader Seems to be equating voluntariness with rational self-interest - No possibility of fully differentiating these Once the sovereign has power, by whatever means, we cannot, in the normal case, disobey the law. Bodin’s absolutism – argued you cannot divide power, sovereignty must by absolute The sovereign has almost unlimited power: - The ends justify the means The end is peace To secure this goal, the sovereign can use (almost) any amount of force against subjects - Except murder or command self-incrimination o Retain the right of self-defence The sovereign decides on society’s morals and religious beliefs ‘Liberty consisteth in the silence of the laws’ - Pre-empts disagreement Obedience to a gvt, however tyrannical, is better than returning to SoN Form of the state doesn’t matter, theoretically: democracy = as legitimate as absolute monarchy The ‘Shortsightedness’ defence of Absolute sovereignty If sovereign power is so extensive, is it really rational to submit to it? Yes. 1. Hobbes reminds us of the chaos of war: “sovereign power is not so hurtful as the want of it” 2. We are short-sighted and fail to appreciate what would happen without a strong ruler. Objection 1 – not more secure than the state of nature - Power is not absolute under the contract – we can disobey. Therefore, situation is potentially as bas as the state of nature. We can re-assert our natural rights in 2 extreme cases: 1. If the ruler commands us to kill, wound or main ourselves 2. If the ruler doesn’t keep the peace Endless controversies over whether the ruler is causing ‘harm’ could mark return to the SoN Objection 2 – the sovereign is not accountable - - Impossible to hold absolute sovereigns accountable for their actions or policies o None of his actions can be declared illegal o Not party to the initial agreement to transfer power o The contract involves a common agreement between us to alienate our freedom to the sovereign The contract may license rulers to violate rights o Violation of property rights o Deny religious freedom o Waste public money, causing financial crises Objection 3 – human fallibility and political wisdom - The sovereign rules by force of circumstance, not owing to political skill, virtue or wisdom What if the sovereign misjudges the means to peace? “the end of obedience is protection” – but the sovereign is still human The sovereign may be as short-sighted as us If we have an ultimate right to protect our lives, but have no more knowledge as to how to secure our life than the sovereign, what good is Hobbes’ ‘social contract’? Hobbes’ social contract dilemma: can the state act in the name of our liberty, rights and security?