To evaluate whether the concept of ‘total war’ can be applied to describing World War I, it is first important to provide a clear definition as to what we mean by the ‘total war’ concept.
A similar concept, ‘absolute war’, was first proposed by the Prussian General Carl Von Clausewitz. Absolute war was the concept whereby each side would aim the overthrow the other completely (Clausewitz, Paret, & Howard, 1984), and that ‘absolute war’ will escalate without pause for the simple reason that in order to prevail each combatant must come to war with the firm intent of applying maximum destructive force to their opponent (Honig, 2012) or in other words applying anything and everything at their deposal in order to overcome an opponent. Clausewitz's theory states that failure to do so by one party would offer the adversary an irresistible opportunity to overwhelm him by employing more force. (Clausewitz C. V., 1832).
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The idea of applying maximum force to destroy an opponent was discussed further in the early 20th century; very much moving away from matters that included just military action though. For instance, in the 1933 pamphlet, ‘The Total State’, Ernst Forstoff (Forsthoff, 1933) claimed that only a state which expanded its control to every element of society could assure the survival of the nation. This mimicked Jünger, who in 1930 argued that if WWI held one lesson for the future, it was that ‘war requires an arming to the core, to the innermost nerve’ (Honig, 2012).
In 1916, The French journalist Léon Daudet wrote these lines, 'The war that Germany waged is a total war, a war of all Germans in and out of their country against the Allied nations;' this was the first conception of the phrase ‘total war’ (Neitzel, 2014).
However, based on his experience in directing Germany’s war effort in World War I (WWI), German General, Erich Ludendorff then branched a gap between the idea of total state and total mobilization. He advanced the concept of absolute war to that of the ‘total war’ concept (in his book of the same name). He envisaged total mobilization of manpower and resources for war. The country at war would be led by a supreme military commander, and strategy would dictate policy (Ludendorff, 1935).
This total war concept became particularly more relevant in the 20th century; advances in technology and industry gave way to differing ways and means of warfare that often resulted in stalemates on the battlefield. When no noticeable advantage could be claimed by nations through military tactics, it led to the expansion of methods of waging war to gain an advantage. Mobilizing large armies required large domestic support structures. While nation-states provided an effective vehicle for organizing mass mobilization, the involvement of so many elements in society in support of the war effort created vulnerabilities. Whereas soldiers were selected and trained to endure the rigors of combat, the civilians on the ‘home front’ came unprepared. If they could be attacked in some way, a nation might collapse without suffering defeat in a front-line battle (Honig, 2012).
By 1916, during WWI, both the allied and central powers had torn down barriers that had preserved the rights of non-combatants. The distinction between a nation’s armed forces and its people became less defined; this led to a change in wartime tactics that moved away from traditional operational strategy towards the destruction of the enemy’s capacity to maintain their armed forces (Howard, 2010). Subsequently, the idea of ‘total war’, where “the whole population and all resources of the combatants are committed to complete victory and thus become legitimate targets” was born (Bicheno, 2001).
Since its conception, total war has become a term used by historians and other academics to cover a wide array of elements when looking at wars of the past. By the definitions already explored, real total war was and is impossible. However, elements of total war have been identified and can serve as a useful tool for further evaluation. Förster & Gessler (1999) provide a helpful framework for assessing the utility of the concept. They focus on four main aspects of ‘total war’: Total Aim, Total Method, Total Control, and Total Mobilisation, and together, these create the opportunity to test the ‘total war’ concept. This essay will therefore evaluate whether the concept of ‘total war’ can be applied to describing WWI using the four aspects aforementioned.
The aim, when war is total, is to completely defeat the enemy. Through having the goal of achieving the unconditional surrender of an enemy; this struggle to unconditional surrender could in extreme cases mean the physical extermination of the enemy. To aid this physical extermination the aim may also be to destroy the other contender’s resources so that they are unable to continue to wage war. This might include targeting major infrastructure and blocking access to water, or imports (often through blockades). These aims also combined to destroy the will of an enemy’s people. These total aims are mainly characterized by the lack of distinction between fighting lawful combatants and civilians. At the start of WWI, the German General staff warned against a prolonged campaign that could involve millions of men. Even though they tried to avoid it they failed, and both they and their adversaries adopted an attrition strategy directed at the morale of the ‘enemy people’ not just against the enemy armed forces; this was total war in intention if not by name (Howard, 2010).
With both sides unable to conceive any operational means to solve the deadlock that developed on the Western front, they both worked on the principle that the enemy could be demoralized rather than disarmed – the intention was the move closer to victory by destroying the morale of their enemy’s people through the losses of their armies. Therefore, on The Somme success was counted in terms of casualties inflicted rather than any territory gained (Krause, 2015). The war of attrition soon forced either side to search for objectives that aimed to destroy their enemy’s entire social and economic structure that allowed their enemy to fight in the war. The Blockade of Germany which occurred from 1914 to 1919, was a prolonged naval operation conducted by the Allied Powers to restrict the maritime supply of goods to the Central Powers, which included Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey. The intention was cripple Germany economically and starve the nation of the resources it needed to wage war and its population to live. Germany's civilians began to suffer malnourishment from the winter of 1916 onwards, while the food situation in Austria caused riots and, eventually, actual starvation in some areas. (Watson, 2014). A wish to retaliate and to break Britain’s command of the seas motivated Germany to launch its campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917; an outcome that was insofar ‘total’.
Away from the land and sea warfare, the collateral damage from air bombing campaigns soon became a legitimate contribution to the enemy’s demoralization. These actions led to either side demonizing the other – justifying any extreme measures of retaliation that followed.
The original political aims of both sides in WWI were initially moderate and defensive; they didn’t go to war to exterminate each other. However, they soon evolved to become total methods of annihilation and the destruction of the enemy’s regime. As the war progressed each side came to see in the other an ‘evil’ to be destroyed (Howard, 2010); Germany’s leaders had ideas of expansion, whilst the German people believed that they were heroically defending their unique cultural heritage. Analogously, the British believed that they were fighting a brutal foe whose aggressive military and expansion ambitions could only be tamed by a ‘regime change’.
The second of the Förster and Gessler elements of the ‘total war’ concept is a total method. To be victorious in the highly militarized WWI everything became permissible as it served only to aid the total aims; the difference between combatants and non-combatants, fighters and civilians, became increasingly blurred, and the civilian population became more and more the actual target of the war.
During WWI the deadlocks on the Western Front saw both sides unable to devise any operational strategy to end the stalemate. As previously mentioned, battlefield successes were measured in terms of casualties inflicted rather than any territory either side gained; this was particularly relevant for the Germans in the 1916 campaign of Verdun and the Allies at The Somme and Flanders (Howard, 2010). The mass casualties inflicted were used to deliberately try and demoralize rather than disarm the enemy – ‘to destroy the morale of their people’. When a conflict reaches the point that the ultimate objective is the defeat of the morale of the enemy people, rather than the destruction of its armies by operational strategy, then the conflict has evolved into ‘total war’.
When the British initiated the five-year Blockade of Germany it served to starve its citizens and soldiers alike and debilitate the nation’s access to resources (Vincent, 1985). The allies removed the barrier of the LOAC principle of distinction, which preserves the right of non-combatants, to openly ruin enemy civilians – it was seen as a necessary concomitant of victory. A wish to retaliate and to break Britain’s command of the seas motivated Germany to launch its campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917; the practice used submarines to attack and sink all forms of enemy shipping, whether they are military or civilian, a total method itself. BOMBING RAIDS
Through total control, Britain initiated total war from the outset. Only a week after their declaration of war, Westminster passed the Defence of the Realm Act. The legislation gave the government executive powers to suppress published criticism, imprison without trial, and commandeer economic resources for the war effort i.e. the government could requisition any factories and land to produce the huge amount of munitions and weapons that were needed to win the war (UK Parliament, 2019). It was amended six times during the course of the war: Daylight saving was introduced to provide more working hours in the day. Alcohol consumption was restricted, opening hours of pubs were cut back and beer was watered down to reduce its strength. It became illegal to light bonfires or fly kites, both of which might attract enemy airships (Defence of the Realm Act, 1914).
The idea of daylight saving resurfaced during World War One when the need to conserve coal made the suggestion of daylight saving more pertinent. Coal power was king, so people really did save energy (and thus contribute to the war effort) by changing their clocks. Germany had already introduced a similar scheme when the Summertime Act was finally passed in the UK on 17th May 1916. It sparked a trend that soon spread across Europe. Within weeks, several countries had started using DST—among them France, Italy, Russia, and even Australia (Blakemore, 2018).
The British government’s control of the economy increased dramatically in 1915, in the wake of the ‘Shell Crisis’ (a shortage of artillery shells that contributed to British military failures on the Western Front); such was the need for total control to contribute to the total war, this shortage brought about a political crisis sought to force Parliament to adopt a national munitions policy with a strong leader at the head (French, 1979).
The new munitions policy saw new factories constructed and existing ones nationalized and retooled for the production of artillery shells; production increased by more than 1000 percent.
Along with the seizure of unused land for farming, including parks, rationing effectively provided total control over food; a much sought-after resource during WWI. The nation waging total war also impacted its own citizens through a mandatory draft. Similar controls were seen by the French. Essentially total control - of all social sectors by the states was implanted to ensure total mobilization.
Total control in Germany was implemented in part due to the shortages suffered due to the Allied naval blockade. By 1916 production levels were falling and the resources needed were severely depleted. The Oberster Kriegsamt, or Supreme War Office, was subsequently formed to control and coordinate all aspects of wartime production, labor, industry, and transport (Watson, 2014).
When we talk about total mobilization, it is to consider that mobilization does not just cover the military but the mobilization of civilians for total war also. The nations in World War I mobilized their own civilians for the war effort through forced conscription, military propaganda, and rationing; people who had not consented were made to sacrifice food, supplies, time, and money to aid the war. All aspects of total war.
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