A fundamental prerequisite for conviction in criminal law is blameworthiness, meaning that a defendant must have sufficient capacity to be held criminally responsible for their actions. While men's rea accredits blameworthiness to the actus reus, there can occasionally be barriers to criminal responsibility that may make a defendant less culpable for their actions, an example being, intoxication. In this sense, blameworthiness calls into question the principle of fair labeling, which should 'represent fairly the nature and magnitude of the law-breaking', in that argument, a person should not carry the stigma of being labeled a 'criminal' if they cannot carry culpability and are therefore less deserving of punishment. Ultimately, this begs the question of the extent to which blameworthiness should affect punishment.
Men's rea, meaning 'guilty mind', refers to 'the element of a criminal offense that relates to the defendant's mental state'. A defendant needs to satisfy both the actus reus ('guilty act') and the men's rea of an offense to be convicted of a said offense and punished accordingly. For instance, to criminalize a person within the common law offense of theft, it is not enough for the defendant to have 'appropriate[d] property belonging to another', it must also be proven that they satisfied the men's rea of theft which is 'dishonest[y]' and 'the intention of permanently depriving the other of [the property].' In this sense, it can be argued that the role of mens rea is pivotal in ensuring that punishment is only served to blameworthy individuals. Despite this, a defendant's state of mind cannot be solely relied upon when determining blameworthiness as they may have fulfilled the mens rea of an offence but in terms of morality, we may be less likely to consider them blameworthy, an example being, a mercy killing. However, for the Privy Council in Yip Chiu-Cheung v Queen , in which a police officer was charged with conspiracy to traffic dangerous drugs as part of an undercover operation aiming to identify both the suppliers and recipients of the drugs, the defendant still expressed intention to commit that offence and thus, his motive was irrelevant. While this judgement highlights the courts' stringent approach to the relationship between mens rea and blameworthiness, it fails to acknowledge the morality of the defendant's behavior, therefore opposing the principle of fair-labelling.
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Mens rea can be assessed both objectively, meaning that a defendant's conduct is judged by an external standard of reasonableness, or subjectively, in which a mens rea requirement looks internally into the mind of the defendant, for instance intention or recklessness. The subjective mens rea approach supports the 'belief principle', in that a defendant's liability should not be based on facts that were unknown to them or what a 'reasonable individual' would have done, but instead on what a defendant believed they were doing. This was reaffirmed in R v G , in which two young boys were charged with arson after setting fire to a newspaper which subsequently spread to a shop, resulting in £1 million worth of damage, despite not foreseeing this consequence. R v G drew attention to a subjective test, focussing on 'the circumstances known to [the defendant]', and shifted away from the objective test established in R v Caldwell , in which emphasis was placed on foreseeability from a reasonable person's perspective as opposed to the particular defendant. The inequitable nature of this objective test is reflected in Elliot v C , concerning an act of arson by a 14-year-old girl with learning difficulties which, when Caldwell was applied, resulted in conviction. This outcome is exceptionally unjust due to the defendant's incapability of foreseeing or understanding the potential risk, as a result of factors that a 'reasonable person' may not experience. Accordingly, it can be contended that blameworthiness can only be assessed fully and effectively by using the subjective approach, taking into account all factors which may affect the defendant's actions and consequently, the level of culpability we attach to them.
An example of these defendant-specific factors that need to be taken into account is intoxication. In many instances, the intoxication has weakened the defendant's restraints which would usually govern their conduct, potentially causing them to be more risk-taking. Both forms of intoxication; voluntary and involuntary, require a lack of mens rea formed by the defendant, that is that they did not foresee a consequence that would have been foreseen but for the consumption of an alcoholic substance or drug. In this sense, the defendant's state of intoxication may act as an aggravating factor, made clear by the court's approach to voluntary intoxication, or 'may mitigate the gravity of the offense' in relation to involuntary intoxication. Here, a question can be raised as to the extent of which intoxication should act as a mitigating factor towards the blameworthiness attached to an offence.
Involuntary intoxication primarily involves intoxication which is induced by a third party, an example being, DPP v O'Connor, in which the defendant and five others were convicted of drink driving offences but were not disqualified from driving altogether, due to their drinks being laced with an alcoholic substance unbeknown to them. As highlighted by this case, while involuntary intoxication may mitigate the punishment served to a defendant, it is not wholly a defence in itself. Despite this, 'the law takes a more liberal view' towards involuntary intoxication as opposed to self-induced as, intrinsically, an individual cannot be said to be responsible for their state of inebriation. With this in mind, it is arguable that involuntary intoxication should be a defence, and therefore should not be punished as, if an individual cannot be blamed for their state of intoxication then how can they be blameworthy for consequences that occur after that? Notwithstanding, the courts have been presented with circumstances which sought to blur the line between what constitutes involuntary and voluntary intoxication. For instance, in the case of R v Coley it was held that, although medically prescribed drugs would constitute involuntary intoxication, the defendant's knowledge of the effects of mixing said medication with alcohol would be considered self-induced. A further, perhaps more feeble, example can be seen in R v Allen in which it was for the court to determine whether a defendant's voluntary consumption, but underestimation of the strength of alcohol, constituted involuntary intoxication. Rightfully, it was held to be voluntary intoxication as the defendant was aware of their consumption of alcohol and thus, could be held responsible for their inebriated state, whether the extent of which was expected or not. Both these cases highlight the level of blameworthiness - even mere knowledge of an outcome - that is attributable to voluntary intoxication as opposed to involuntary. Ultimately, this reinforces the argument that involuntary intoxication should not constitute blameworthy conduct and therefore, should not be punished by the law.
Voluntary intoxication, where a defendant is aware of their consumption of an alcoholic substance or drug, is a more complex issue, particularly with regards to its relationship with blameworthiness. Reason being, if an individual can be held responsible for their state of intoxication then, arguably, they can carry blameworthiness for any criminal activity that ensues. The courts reflect this argument in taking a stricter approach to voluntary intoxication and splitting offences up into those with 'specific intent' and those which require 'basic intent'. This distinction, albeit not adequately explained by the courts, is of 'profound importance' as it separates offences of which the mens rea is primarily that of recklessness or negligence (basic intent) and those of intention or knowledge in which the 'mens rea goes beyond the immediate actus reuse (specific intent). DPP v Majewski , in which the defendant was convicted of three counts of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and sought to rely on his state of intoxication as a defence, provides the leading interpretation of the two categories. The House of Lords held that a defendant's inebriated state provided no defence against crimes of 'basic intent' as the fact that the defendant got themselves into said state, potentially risking loss of awareness, solely constitutes the mens rea of recklessness required. Nonetheless, the courts make a presumption here that an individual who gets voluntarily intoxicated is 'aware that the intoxication will or might cause misbehaviour. ' In terms of 'specific intent', it was held that if the prosecution proved that the defendant had the required intent for the offence in question, the defendant would be found guilty, articulating that 'a drunken intent is still an intent . Although Majewski reaffirmed the outlook taken in DPP v Beard , the judgement was arguably problematic as the distinction was unclear, leading to inconsistencies in application. An example being R v Heard involving an act of sexual assault while voluntarily intoxicated, which suggested that public policy considerations may also contribute to deciding whether an offence is of 'basic' or 'specific' intent. It can be argued that this public policy point is reflected throughout voluntary intoxication, in that 'the law should not protect misbehaving intoxicated people'.
This argument is further insinuated in Majewski by Lord Salmon: 'If there were to be no penal sanction for any injury unlawfully inflicted under the complete mastery of drink or drugs, voluntarily taken, the social consequence could be appalling.' Lord Salmon presents a compelling argument, in that it seems wholly unjust to allow a law-breaking individual to cause harm and remain unpunished as a result of voluntarily being under the influence of a substance which may distort their sense of awareness. However, there are some difficulties in supporting Lord Salmon's view, as it is arguable that risk-awareness of the effects of intoxicating substances (a central concept for the courts) 'ought to be an issue of fact, not law.' Despite this, further to the social standpoint, the allowance of voluntary intoxication to mitigate blameworthiness may even encourage individuals to be more 'reckless' in their consumption of alcohol or drugs by providing a safety net against criminal responsibility, potentially undermining criminal law. In this sense, it is arguably fair to consider voluntary intoxication blameworthy conduct which should be punished. Fundamentally, this suggests that societal expectations should have influence on the way in and extent to which we label individuals as blameworthy.
Nevertheless, there is an argument that the law should only punish blameworthy conduct as it may reassure individuals that they are only criminally liable, and therefore subject to punishment by the state, if they act recklessly or intentionally and so on. This argument supports the rule of law and principle of legality, in that individuals in society need to be aware of what conduct is considered to be law-breaking. However, the concept of blameworthiness goes far beyond what is set in stone as 'legal' or 'illegal', as morality is instrumental in societal views on what is right or wrong and what should be punished.
With this in mind, it is difficult to purely label intoxication as 'blameworthy' but equally, it should not be considered a barrier to culpability or an evader of punishment altogether. While the law rightfully does not allow individuals to diminish full responsibility for their actions as a result of intoxication, is it just to group both voluntary and involuntary intoxication under the same label of 'criminal'? This raises the fundamental, yet elusive question of 'why does fair labelling matter so much?' One would be inclined to view self-induced intoxication as more blameworthy than involuntary intoxication, which is why deciding whether the criminal law should only punish blameworthy conduct is not simple. Ultimately, while it is arguable that certain factors may limit the amount of responsibility that a defendant can carry, the level of blameworthiness we attach to certain conduct should not influence the punishment served by criminal law.
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