There is no ultimate valuable outcome, nor should outcomes be in competition with one another to create the most value. Providing we strive to create good for everyone and treat others as rational autonomous individuals with an equal amount of respect for one another, friendship (entailing both the love for family and friends) is the most loving thing. Here, love is not measured, but simply recognized and the negation of what love or friendship is not, which is malice and harm, is unethical.
Following this, I would like to introduce Aristoteles' notion of friendship found in Nichomachean Ethics (Ross 1959). Book VIII and IX on Friendship includes the reciprocal force that friendship has on justice; namely how we learn reciprocity, fairness, and political friendship. Friendship holds a tripartite distinction within the text, defined through Utility friendships, Pleasure friendships, and Companionship friendships. Friendship itself is a “good” desired in its own right for the end goal of Eudaimonia as it rewards and satisfies the individual and the community. It also enables the practice of certain virtues, such as beneficence and sympathy in the case of Charity, thus enlarging both our consciousness and our happiness. The right kind of friends keeps us on track for the pursuit of Eudaimonia, aiding one another in the process. To be and to have the right kind of friend(s), a mutual involvement and knowledge of goodwill must apply in a Kantian sense, where you should not treat people as a means to an end. I must not use someone to achieve my own Eudaimonia and disregard their path to the same target. Companionship is the highest of the friendships, its duration and shared being results in individuals engaging in projects cooperatively. They care for each other the same way they wish to be treated themselves, as seen in the bible, “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself” (Matt.22 Verses 34-40). This kind of friendship allows the shaping and knowledge of each other to better themselves and the one which should be highlighted within situation ethics.
In both Kantian ethics and Utilitarianism, we see an emphasis on self-sustaining desire either negatively or positively, which on the subjective level is problematic and/or egoistic. However, desire may play a role if communally applied, where nobody is treated as a means to an end. Desires stem from a lack. The lack is fundamental and we must recognize that we are not perfect human beings. We are needful creatures and this should perpetuate the acknowledgment that our own desires apply to other beings. If we acknowledge that the other human is a subject much like myself, then we can attribute our own subjective desires to them. Therefore the act and outcome of my actions must be analysed to attain communal neighbourly love. To control our desires, so that we do not morally compromise ourselves, we must take inspiration from Mills' “Competent Judge” and Smith's “Impartial Spectator”. Here, beneficent actions can further our individual and communal flourishing through both an analysis of what we individually desire and practicing a non-biased perspective. If the impartial spectator provides insufficient answers it can be taken a step further to the level of Mills competent judge. Here, society itself can aid our perspective on what is the most beneficent act and outcome and if ‘necessary evils’ are ethical provided they don’t negatively impact individuals. As Smith says “morality is not something we have to calculate. It is natural and built into us as social beings”(Smith 1759 pg.78). This individual and communal focus on our natural empathetic nature is precisely what an ethics of charity requires.