To What Extent Was Hitler a 'Weak Dictator'?

The discussion as to if Hitler was a ‘weak dictator’ or ‘Master of the Third Reich’ is one that has been held by historians fascinated by Nazi Germany for many years and is central to the intentionalist - structuralist debate. On one side, historians such as Bullock, Bracher, Jackal and Hildebrand consider Hitler’s personality, ideology and strong mind to be the driving force of the Third Reich. However, others such as Broszat, Mason and Mommsen argue that the regime involved institutional anarchy, as a result of Hitler’s ‘weak’ leadership. The most convincing standpoint however, is the combination of the two views, which acknowledges both Hitler’s centrality in explaining the essence of Nazi rule, but also the external forces that had an impact on Hitler’s decision making. In this light, Hitler was not a weak dictator as he held supreme authority but as Kershaw maintains, neither was he the ‘Master of the Third Reich’ because he did not exercise unrestricted power.

Within Nazi government, Hitler behaved as the absolute source of authority, which serves as strong evidence against the idea that Hitler was ‘weak’. Having consolidated power by 1934 Hitler was, at least in theory, omnipotent through his being chancellor, head of state and ‘supreme judge of the nation’. However, the notion that Nazi government systematically followed the clear objectives of the Fuhrer is challenged by the actuality of Nazi government structure. It has been generally accepted by historians that the Nazi State was a messy collection of rival power groups. Mommsen’s explanation that this was the product of Hitler’s apathy towards government affairs appears to be the most convincing. Hitler’s failure to direct government led to his subordinates taking their own initiative and making decisions based on their interpretation of the Fuhrer’s will. Nevertheless, the fragmentary structure of the Nazi party does not provide sufficient evidence to conclude that Hitler was weak. As Kershaw argues, there is no evidence to suggest Hitler sought a different structure or that he was “prevented from attaining it”. Hitler was “content” with disputes between his subordinates and on occasion, “actively furthered rather than tried to hinder governmental chaos”. Bracher is correct in arguing, “institutional antagonism was resolved by the key position of the Fuhrer”. Through distancing himself from arguments, Hitler transcended governmental chaos and emerged as the ultimate decisive force. Rival agencies competed with each other to win Hitler's favor: the only source of political legitimacy. Furthermore, although leading Nazi figures were given considerable autonomy in creating policy, they were required to work within the framework of Hitler’s ideology and to remain loyal to him. As Overy continues to state, power should not be confused with responsibility; although responsibilities were delegated to individuals, there were “no other power centers separate from the will of the central figure”. Hitler dealt ruthlessly with any threat to his position. Rohm, the commander of the SA, was executed in 1934, whilst Goering was sentenced to death by Hitler in the final days of the war, for suggesting that he should take over government. Although, Hitler distanced himself from daily administration, this stemmed not from an inability to do so, as Broszat implies, but from a lack of interest in administrative affairs. Numerous examples prove the ultimate executive power of the Fuhrer. Within the domestic sphere, he pushed through the Sterilization Law of July 1933, despite the voiced objections of the Catholic body. It was also Hitler’s decision to reintroduce conscription in 1935 and to go to war in 1939, against the advice of high-ranking Nazis and the army. Essentially, it must be remembered that there has been no evidence of Hitler’s directives being ignored by others, which demonstrates that rather than being ‘weak’ he possessed significant power.

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Structuralist historians are correct in highlighting the role of social, economic and political agencies of change in shaping the Third Reich. Indeed, the notion that one man, Hitler, solely determined events in the regime is highly unrealistic. However, that Hitler’s scope of action was limited by factors outside of his control does not imply that he was ‘weak’. Politically, Hitler was particularly restricted in the earlier years of his dictatorship. He had risen to power not through a state of complete revolution but legally and the Nazi Party therefore had to co-exist with old institutions of the State, which undermined the regime’s efficiency. Several examples show the compromises Hitler was forced to take in order to avoid alienating the conservative elites. Intense pressure from the army and the conservative elites can largely explain the Night of the Long Knives which pushed Hitler to eradicate the most radical elements of the Nazi movement. Similarly, in October 1934, Hitler dropped a decree enhancing the authority of the Labor Front, for fear of antagonizing Schacht and the industrial leadership. However, as Kershaw maintains, these examples are only signs of Hitler’s ‘weakness’ when measured against a wholly idealistic concept of ‘total power’. Overy credibly argues that “the role of the dictators was to try to remove restrictions on the exercise of power from a position where their power was far from absolute”. Here, Hitler was successful. By 1936, his personal political position had been much strengthened and was unrelentingly supported by Himmler’s SS political system. These developments enabled Hitler to pursue his aims more vigorously. The dismissal of Schacht as Economic Ministers and the introduction of the Four-Year Plan under Goering in 1936, personified the transition from a policy dictated by conservative interests to one geared towards large-scale rearmament, as intended by Hitler. The army was subordinated in 1938, when Hitler made himself commander of the armed forces, prompted by the military leadership’s apathy towards a more active and violent foreign policy. Hitler’s dictatorship was characterized by a gradual accumulation of power, where the coalition with conservatives was replaced with a political establishment consisting of leading Nazi figures, with Hitler at its apex.

The subservience of citizens to the regime is a key determinant of the strength of a dictatorship and in Hitler’s Germany, the lack of organized resistance provides evidence that, whether through consent or coercion, the German people were successfully subordinated. Several historians point to the massive support the Nazi regime enjoyed among the German population and Kershaw’s ‘Hitler Myth’ provides the most convincing reason for this. According to Kershaw, Hitler’s highly personalized ‘charismatic leadership’ formed the basis of national unity. His perceived leadership offered a welcome contrast to the fragmented and impotent Weimar administration. Although this image of Hitler was largely the product of Nazi propaganda, Hitler was personally responsible for its development to a great extent. His ability to engage large crowds through his rhetorical skills was a vital feature of his image. Hitler also showed incredible political astuteness in presenting himself as a moderate politician rather than a radical, which was crucial in securing extensive support. However, the ‘Hitler Myth’ could only be sustained by ever recurring successes. Until the latter part of the war, successes came and Nazi propaganda ensured that they were attributed to the Fuhrer. He was accepted as the architect of Germany’s economic miracle of the 1930s, eliminating mass unemployment. Early successes in the realms of foreign policy also earned the regime legitimacy. There was however growing disillusionment with the regime during the war, especially after the defeat at Stalingrad and allied bombing of German cities. This exposes that individuals lacked a deep affiliation with the regime and highlights Hitler’s failure to create a Volksgemeinschaft in which citizens were wholly devoted to him. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that Hitler relied on the maintenance of ‘social peace’, which on occasions impeded Nazi ideals from being manifested. For example, during consumer problems and industrial tensions in 1935-6, he was willing to temporarily forego imports for armament production, in order to prevent food rationing. The regime also delayed its plans of labor mobilization in the early years of the war after worker protests at the impact on wages. However, this returns the debate to the point that ‘total dictatorial power’, without any restrictions, is a figment of political fantasy. As Overy succinctly argues: “The bond between population and leader was a complicit one; neither Hitler (nor Stalin) simply exercised naked power in defiance of any popular interests”. It is also important to note that when the Fuhrer myth was losing its potency, dissidence was silenced by terror. If one method of keeping the masses on side did not work, the Nazi regime simply deployed another.

Hitler was a strong dictator in terms of having unquestionable authority over foreign policy within the Third Reich and achieved military successes in the first phase of the war. However, his growing sense of infallibility led him into making a series of irrational decisions, which dragged Germany to destruction, and in this sense, Hitler was a weak dictator. That Hitler was responsible for the majority of decision making in wartime is undisputed. Hitler exercised a high degree of autonomy and control over foreign policy and his decision to invade Poland in 1939 and France in 1940, against the advice of party members, the army and foreign statesmen, demonstrates this. According to General Jodl, Hitler allowed little influence and “resented any form of counsel regarding the major decisions of the war”. Similarly, General von Manstein claimed that Hitler put the power of his own will above that the strategic advice of his generals. In the early stages of war, Hitler did achieve successes through the tactic of Blitzkrieg, although many of these were based on huge risks, which can be seen as irresponsible. Furthermore, Hitler’s judgement did not always prove successful. He made a series of errors in the latter phase of the war, such as invading Russia and declaring war on the USA in 1941, thus provoking two superpowers against Germany. As Germany’s military situation worsened, Hitler proved incapable of making rational decisions because of his growing sense of infallibility and hatred of military retreat. This is evidenced by his refusal to let Paulus pull out of Stalingrad and by his determination to hold all German outposts in France against the advancing Allied forces. As military leader, Hitler was strong in terms being the ultimate source of authority but his refusal to listen to his generals’ advice and his sense of invincibility led him into making a series of errors that resulted in Germany’s demise.

The Nazi State was very much Hitler's state and since he possessed supreme authority, it would be wrong to conclude that he was weak. However, it is possible to place the central role of Hitler within the framework of the wider structure of Germany, through the synthesis of the intentionalist and structuralist schools, in order to explain how the Third Reich developed. It was shaped both by Hitler as an individual but also, as structuralists argue, by political, economic and social pressures that influenced Hitler’s decisions and prevented him from exercising naked power. Within government, although Hitler was largely detached from the minutiae of domestic policy, it is impossible to pinpoint any major domestic development that was contrary to Hitler’s wishes. Thus, Kershaw’s ‘working towards the Fuhrer’ principle is the most convincing explanation for how the Nazi administration functioned. There were restrictions on Hitler’s leadership from the old institutions of the State in the earlier years of his dictatorship, but as Noakes and Pridham maintain, state authorities were progressively “eaten away” by “the new organization under individuals appointed by Hitler”. The German populace was successfully subordinated through a combination of the ‘Hitler Myth’ and terror, which were two indispensable sides of the same coin. Foreign and military policy was determined by Hitler, which exemplifies the extent of Hitler’s authority. However, his irrational decision making in the latter stages of war, which ultimately led to Nazi Germany’s downfall, supports the notion that Hitler was ‘weak’. Nevertheless, Hitler’s military failures can be paradoxically explained by the amount of unrestricted power he possessed in foreign policy, which allowed him to enforce his will, even when it was wholly irrational.

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