Introduction
As many as 220,000 people may have been killed in the Allied nuclear attacks upon the Japanese cities of Kiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of the Second World War. With such a tremendous loss of life, it is right to question whether or not it was a necessary act, given the general success the allies were having in the months leading up to the atomic attacks. This essay will not explore whether or not the atomic bombings were morally justified acts, but whether or not they were the most suitable course of action to achieve the goal of victory against the Japanese, and peace in the Pacific.
The Atomic Attacks as a Pursuit of Unconditional Surrender
It is clear from primary sources that it was certainly the ambition of the development of the atomic weapons to end the war more quickly, and with fewer American lives lost. One memorandum for the US Secretary of War reads:
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The successful development of the Atomic Fission Bomb will provide the United States with a weapon of tremendous power which should be a decisive factor in winning the present war more quickly with a saving in American lives and treasure.
The quotation clearly shows that it was the opinion of the writer, a General L.R. Groves, that the bomb would end the war earlier than would otherwise be possible, thereby bringing peace at an earlier date, and that it would save the lives of many American soldiers. However, the language of the source also makes it clear that General L.R. Grove considers the use of the bombs as an ultimately unnecessary act. His phrasing, winning the present war more quickly, shows that he doesn't think the bombs will be a key factor in winning the war; rather, they would be a factor in winning it earlier. The mindset shown here is that the war is already won, it is simply a question of winning it as quickly as possible, with as few American casualties as possible. It is noticeable that the deaths of as few Japanese civilians as possible does not factor into this logic.
This source can be considered in the light of historical debate. Sadao Asada writes of how even within Japan, the peace movement saw the war as already lost. However, to the martial mindset which was so prominent within Japan at the time, surrender, particularly unconditional surrender, was a grave dishonour. As such, the government was firmly set against the idea of surrender. Asada writes that:
In August 1945 Japan's peace party made the maximum political use of the atomic bomb to end the war. To them the bomb was 'a gift from Heaven,' 'a golden opportunity,' and 'a psychological moment' to end the war; they saw the bomb as 'assisting' their peace efforts and as a means for the military to save face.
We can see from this that the war situation as displayed within Grave's memorandum was shared by many within Japan. A war the allies were winning, and were going to win. However, despite sharing the view on the current state of the war as Groves, the voices of the peace movement were not being heard. Asada takes the position that in the end, Japan needed 'external pressure' in the form of the atomic bombs for its government to decide to surrender. From this historical perspective, it appears apparent that while the decision of the United States may have been proposed upon the basis of ending the war quicker, and with fewer American loses, it may have had the additional effect of strengthening the Japanese peace movement, and as such, saving the lives of Japanese people who may have died if the struggle had continued on for months or even years.
Wilson Miscamble writes of the decision to drop the bombs as one that was necessary to prevent massive loss of life amongst both US servicemen, as well as many Japanese soldiers and civilians. His perspective shows an attempt to assess the bombings both in terms of military viability, and seperately as moral acts. He acknowledges the act as morally grey perhaps even an evil act. He describes the act as ââ Abhorrent, â for sure, but it must be understood, the least abhorrent as well so as to bring the bloodshed to an end.â This was certainly the perspective at the time. Truman wrote to Roman Bohnen in 1946, stating that:
The Japanese in their conduct of the war had been vicious and cruel savages and I came to the conclusion that if two hundred and fifty thousand young Americans could be saved from slaughter the bomb should be dropped, and it was.
After Hiroshima (August 6), the Soviet declaration of war against Japan (August 8), and Nagasaki (August 9), the Japanese still offered only a conditional surrender (August 10).
With these primary and secondary sources, we can come to some cautious conclusions. At the time of the bombing, it was the clear view of the US Government that deploying the atomic bombs would shorten the war and save the lives of Americans. Additionally, with historical perspectives working with hindsight, it does appear unlikely that the Japanese would have accepted unconditional surrender without the pressure that the weapons provided. When the goal was the unconditional surrender of the Japanese nation, the deployment of the Atomic bombs appears to have been the best military approach; it is highly likely the alternatives may have cost more lives.
The Possibilities of A Conditional Surrender
It does appear as though only the threat of the atom bomb could have forced the Japanese to accept unconditional surrender. During discussions over the surrender, the Emperor Hirohito stated that Thinking about the world situation and the internal Japanese situation, to continue the war means nothing but the destruction of the whole nation. It had taken that level of threat, the complete destruction of the Japanese people, to get the Japanese government to accept the surrender. It seems all too likely that face with only conventional military threat, the Japanese might not have accepted an unconditional surrender, while there was still hope that their cities and people might survive the war.
Yet to consider viable alternatives to the use of the atomic bombs, we must start to assess the conflict through different historical perspectives. Gar Alperovitz writes from a perspective mindful of the many people who lost their lives in the bombing of the two cities. In this, he refers to another historian, John Hersey, who emphasises the importance of viewing the attack through the perspective of individuals, rather than simply regarding it as a perspective. He states:
John Hersey got it right in his book Hiroshima: The atomic bomb was first of all an intimate, personal, highly individual experience. To walk the streets of Hiroshima today is to be forced to recognize the obvious: A young housewife passes, walking arm in arm with an elderly woman, perhaps her mother-in-law; three school children, maybe nine years old, scamper up the road; a tired, aged garbage collector makes his rounds. Such people today remind us that such people then, individuals, were the ones who felt the experience of Hiroshima; and it was a very, very direct one indeed.
As such, we should make sure to fully consider the potential impacts laid out before the Allies before the bombings. While the preservation of civilian life may not have been a primary concern of the Allied powers, it was certainly a concern for the residents in those cities. While the action may have saved American lives, it could have killed as many or more Japanese lives. With this new perspective, we must consider the idea that the Allies deliberately avoided considering options that could have potentially save the lives of many Japanese. If the US had agreed to Japan signing a condition surrender, then many lives could have been saved; although whether or not that would have been an appropriately moral option after the devastation caused by World War Two is a question to be considered outside of this essay.
We must also consider the idea that Western motives may not have been solely based upon the ultimate goal of bringing peace to the region, but may instead have been influenced by a primary desire to fulfil their geopolitical ambitions and reestablish themselves as the foremost power in the region.Alperovitz also considers the historical considerations of Feis:
Feis had been a consultant to three Secretaries of War and had unusual access to the official documents and individuals involved.
His initial position on the relationship of the atomic bomb to diplomacy had been:
It may be also but this is only conjecture hat Churchill and Tru- man and some of their colleagues conceived that besides bringing the war to a quick end, it would improve the chances of arranging a satisfactory peace. For would not the same dramatic proof of West-ern power that shocked Japan into surrender impress the Russians also?
In his revised edition in 1966, Feis concluded:
It is likely that Churchill, and probably also Truman, conceived that besides bringing the war to a quick end, it would improve the chances of arranging a satisfactory peace both in Europe and in the Far East. Stimson and Byrnes certainly had that thought in mind. For would not the same dramatic proof of Western power that shocked Japan into surrender impress the Russians also?
This perspective encourages an idea that the war goals of the allies may have been influenced primarily with political concerns, as opposed to their stated military aims. As such, when making an assessment of the viability of alternatives to the use of atomic weaponry, we should be careful to consider the idea that while certain alternatives might not fulfil some criteria of the Allied declarations; such as unconditional surrender, and the intimidation of the USSR, they might fulfill others, such as the reintroduction of peace across the Pacific and Asia.
With this consideration, we should also consider the idea that the viability of alternatives that did not cover all the intended criteria might have been downplayed, as well as threats elaborated upon. For example, the figures that have been used by many historical perspectives in this essay, with regards to casualties in the event of a conventional US invasion of the Japanese mainland only appear in sources after the two bombings.
Bernstein wrote, No scholar has been able to and any high-level supporting archival documents from the Truman months before Hiroshima that, in unalloyed form, provides even an explicit estimate of 500,000 casualties, let alone a million or more.
While those figures seem plausible with hindsight, it is important to consider that the choice of alternative options may not have been as clear for those making them at the time, with imperfect knowledge.
To properly assess the viability of the idea of mercy and conditional surrender, we must look at how the American government itself considered such an idea. Luckily, we have primary sources considering such a proposal:
It public declaration demanding unconditional surrender] should be hard and firm in the nature of an ultimatum and must not be phrased as to invite negotiation. Otherwise, there is the danger of seriously impairing the will to war of the people of the United States with consequent damaging of our war effort, prolongation of the war and unnecessarily increased cost in human livesâ¦â
We can see from this source that while the American government may or may not have considered the position of unconditional surrender a moral one, or one to guarantee future security, they did see it as a necessary position in order to keep the war effort at home high in morale, and to prevent any slowdown that might prolong the war and claim lives. In this we can see how the offer of conditional surrender might have been a bad alternative to the atomic attacks; if the Japanese had refused, it might have prolonged the war and ended up costing more lives. Although, there is something to be said as to how the source considers the impact of such a political position upon the American mindset as the primary consideration in their discussions, as evidenced by it being the first thing mentioned. The idea of Japan accepting the surrender appears as an almost distant consideration.
Concluding Thoughts
Looking over the evidence of the primary and secondary sources used within this essay, the general assessment is that the use of the atomic bomb against Japanese cities was justified through its comparatively light death toll when compared with the alternatives suggested at the time. However, many of these arguments are based around the concrete idea of the need for an unconditional surrender of Japan. This excludes the viability of a conditional surrender. Even when assessed at the time, it was regarded as impractical due to its effects upon the mindset of the American people, disregarding the possibility of saving the lives of Japanese civilians. While this essay has made no concentrated effort to assess the morality of such a decision, to disregard such a possibility entirely would appear to go against the idea of the war being fought to achieve peace. As such, it appears as though while the Atomic bombings may appear to have been a more practical course than alternatives offered at the time, there remains a question as to whether alternatives disregarded for their conflict with the stated war goals of the United States, such as a negotiated ceasefire, might have held greater or equivalent viability.
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