Analysis of Difference between 'History' and 'Historiography'

With “history” being an incredibly personal term, it’s incorrect to assume that there is a clear-cut difference between “history” and “historiography”. Ford’s maxim that ‘history is bunk’ (Ford, 1916), juxtaposed with Porter’s aphorism viewing history as an important process (Porter, 1975), highlights that defining “history” cannot be abridged to an orderly solution. Schinkel offers “historiography” as the process of writing “history” (Schinkel, 2004), and can therefore be seen as a more subjective concept than “history”; this implies “history” is objective. It is therefore difficult to clearly distinguish a difference between “history” and “historiography”, with this being an exceedingly open-ended theme to grapple with.

The inference that “historiography” must be a subjective concept, with “history” playing an objective role, immediately distinguishes between the two terms. “Historiography” as historical interpretation, the writing of history after its events, can easily be misconstrued or constructed towards bias. Whereas, “history” as facts, leaves little room for the potential of such opinion. St Augustine stated that “the historian does not himself produce the sequence of events which he narrates,” (St Augustine, 1997), which lends understanding to the notion that “history” remains a static concept, where it cannot be changed, compared with “historiography” that can be written subjectively by every historian in their own essence. This is corroborated by Elton’s view that “[history’s] objective reality is guaranteed; it is beyond being altered for any purpose whatsoever” (Elton, 1967). “History” remains objective, where its facts and events cannot be changed or distorted by any means, and cannot be touched. Despite its fragmentation, it remains a hybrid discipline, a cultural subject (Cobb, 1975), whose purpose is to increase one’s understanding of and over one’s environment (Carr, 1961). This, therefore, denotes meaning to the awareness of “history” remaining a constant as a symptom of its objectiveness. This is in contrast to “historiography”, which relies on the approach of the historian in their writing of “history” and its events. Reliance to the historian’s approach and writing generates a multitude of views, attitudes, and opinions that interpret the events and periods of “history” in endless ways. This is why “historiography” is a subjective term, as it allows for “history” to be written and rewritten according to the historian’s approach, view, and personal agenda. Perhaps why such subjective and objective differences are clear, is that “history” denotes its meaning to people, places, and events in the past, as opposed to “historiography” which stresses the work of historians across a time scale. There is an emphasis on “history” as the ‘what’, compared to “historiography” as the ‘how’ (Schinkel, 2004), and despite historians not unanimously agreeing with this dissimilarity, the acknowledgment of such a distinction is central to this debate.

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Arguing between the past and present is part of the distinguished difference between the two terms, that historians are far from united over: it feeds into the overarching difference between objectivity and subjectivity. Empiricists, such as Ranke, argue that “history” should be written exactly how it was at the time, implying that the past is comprehensible but permanent. Therefore, “historiography” should not be susceptible to interpretation as historians must simply write events for how they actually happened. This empirical approach argues that “historiography” naturally has a bias, however, empiricists emphasize that such bias could and should be overcome. The empiricism of this argument fundamentally centers around “history” as the objective past (Schinkel, 2004), and therefore implies that the “historiography” for the permanent past opens up possibilities for susceptibility to subjectivity. The historians who foster the skeptical approach, profoundly argue that the past cannot be accessed as it is too vast to be understood (Schinkel, 2004). However, through the acknowledgment that the past is able to exist in the present, the “historiography” produced by skeptics is largely based upon the remnants and remains available from the past in the present, for example, through primary sources. Hence, the distinction between “history” and “historiography” is clearly evidenced here through perceptions of the past and present in their relation to their objectivity and subjectivity. Another approach to identifying in highlighting this difference between the two terms is the pragmatic approach. This approach maintains that the past is real, but although it is inaccessible in the present, historians are able to distinguish its truth. Most historians are likely to fall into this more ‘moderate’ category, who view interpretations and such “historiography” as wholly subjective as such interpretations derive from subjects (Schinkel, 2004). “History” is therefore centered around the past and its concrete facts, giving it its label of objectivity, whereas “historiography” is open to interpretation in the past and present, and is, therefore, able to be more subjective. Its subjectivity arises from a debate centering around the notion of “importance” (Schinkel, 2004), with historians subjectively deciding which elements and aspects of “history” deserve the most attention. It’s this idea that lends understanding to the marked difference that can arise from this: if historians subjectively choose their information and sources from their perception of importance, this creates a vast scope amongst historians for the “historiography” they produce. Fundamentally, “history” remains an objective constant in the past, contrasted with the endless scope for “historiography” which sustains its subjective nature.

It’s therefore important to distinguish and identify the difference between “history” and “historiography”, as there are various approaches employed by both terms that add to the fragmentation of the debate; both terms are vastly different despite a strong correlation between the two. “Historiography” as a subjective term, existing in both the past and present, is the reason why “history” can be read and interpreted in boundless ways. Haskell’s assertion that “the writing of history and the writing of fiction are kindred activities” (Haskell, 1990), is interesting within the context of this debate, as it creates and strengthens the assumption that “history” comprises genuine facts, whereas “historiography” as the writing of history, is a fictional process that detracts value from the facts. The difference between “history” and “historiography” matters because it demonstrates how “history” comprises the permanent past, that cannot be changed, whereas “historiography” is something that is constantly occurring, allowing us to experience and face alternatives to live that we may not have previously encountered. “Historiography” provides ever-changing accounts and writings for ‘how’ things happened in the “history” of the past (Tosh, 2010), and can only be understood through acknowledging the distinction between the two terms. Those who deny that “history” provides us without any lessons are in some respect correct, as are those who affirm that history offers a sign of human destiny (Tosh, 2010): as such open-ended concepts, all responses can be argued. However, it’s the way in which “history” is interpreted and presented to us through “historiography” that the latter can provide us with lessons in response to questions and concerns experienced in the present. “History”’s objective nature of the past is therefore distinct from “historiography”’s subjective offering which allows for limitless opportunities in which we can view the past and its associated events.