Post-conflict development is imperative to rebuild violence-ravaged states, but the degree of success in post-conflict reconstruction programs varies widely, with some efforts leading to further state insecurity and greater conflicts. Development is not as simple as a linear process, and what works in one state could be detrimental to another. For the purpose of this essay, post-conflict development will be redefined as peacebuilding efforts. The main lesson that has been learnt is that peacebuilding requires a deep understanding of three components: comprehension of the root cause of conflict, a willingness by the international community to shape peacebuilding efforts around the local context rather than imposing expectations from a Western standpoint, and a patience to modify international efforts based on the success of the chosen course of action. The case studies of Haiti, Timor-Leste and Rwanda will demonstrate the international community’s actions through liberal, hybrid and illiberal peacebuilding efforts respectively, identifying where an agenda was imposed rather than allowing contribution from the local population to assist in their own development and providing potential courses of action that can guide future efforts irrespective of the type of peacebuilding.
International actors, including the United Nations (UN) and the majority of Western governments, have been guided by the concept of liberal peacebuilding; that is, that ‘liberalism was inherently attractive and offered the most likely path to peace and prosperity” (Wallis, 2018, p. 83). This initiative is hinged off the idea that development cannot occur unless there is security, and state stability is only possible through international intervention and conflict prevention. Liberal peacebuilding aims to emphasise “security, democracy and good governance” (Hauge et al, 2015, p. 267) over socio-economic objectives, and Smith advises that a way to determine the right peace-building activities is to “divide them into four main pillars: security, political, socio-economic and reconciliation” (Hauge et al, 2015, p. 272). If the issues experienced by a fragile state are predominately security and political, then liberal peacebuilding could be an appropriate avenue for international actors to pursue, but the main priority that should be taken is to ensure that the peacebuilding efforts are targeted at the root cause of conflict, that is, that security measures will assist rather than hinder development. When Haiti experienced an increase in violence after President Aristide was removed from power, the UN Stabilisation Mission (MINUSTAH) was created to enforce security and stop conflict (Hauge et al, 2015, p. 263). However, in cases such as Haiti, where the socio-economic circumstances were the root cause for conflict, MINUSTAH’s aim to support the new government in establishing a secure political environment tampered with the internal settlements found in the slums of Port-Au-Prince, where they had “developed their own systems of security and governance” (Hauge et al, 2015, p. 264).
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Local models of conflict management in Haiti were heavily based on trust and keeping discipline at the lowest level, whether through mediation with community elders, Haitian national police or within community established local commissions (Hauge et al, 2015, p. 271). The local community worked to empower each other and the emphasis on trust had resulted in lessened crime and violence. However, the prevalence of “hunger, poverty and unemployment” (Hauge et al, 2015, p. 272) eventually superseded the morals of the community, leading to crime and violence to source subsistence. Thus, MINUSTAH’s actions to stop riots that protested against “risking food prices and lack of access to food” (Hauge et al, 2015, p. 273) did not bother to consider the local context, but rather enforced their agenda of liberal peace-building. Failing to understand the environment that peacebuilding efforts are deployed in is a critical error; by not targeting the root cause of conflict and ignoring the potential of local communities to handle conflict themselves, international actors will hinder the capability of state reconstruction, and potentially lead to greater levels of conflict. The key lesson to learn is that international actors must understand the indigenous population and environment before they intervene in post-conflict peacebuilding; understand what the key motivators are on a family, community and state level, and what it takes to establish trust so that there can be cohesion and support between international and local actors (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005, p. 453). Situations like Haiti have led to a targeted focus on human security, where the emphasis on security shifted from “security of territory from external aggression” to “a much greater stress on people’s security” (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005, p. 456). It meant that rather than focusing on the protection of the state, the wellbeing of its people was just as important, and in ensuring the security of the people, international actors needed to identify and address where the vulnerabilities of the population lay as part of their peacebuilding agenda. The success of incorporating human security initiatives will be addressed later in this essay.
The lessons learnt by failures in considering the root cause of conflict before acting have seen an emergence in hybrid peacebuilding as a method of seeking development through socio-political methods. It acknowledges that security is imperative for development, but the definition of security draws from both an international and local standpoint. Hybrid peacebuilding “seeks to negotiate elements of the liberal peace in a local context by advocating an intersubjective mediation between local and international [spheres], depending on both power and legitimacy” (Wallis, 2018, p. 85). While giving the affected state a belief in the peacebuilding initiatives undertaken, it also allows the international community to influence development through aid efforts, restructuring of economic and political systems and conflict prevention. However, in amalgamating local and international practices, policy-makers are to be careful in what systems are adopted; local customs may have their roots in objectionable practices and thus should not be used in reform. It is important to note that this form of peacebuilding has drawn from identifying the root cause of conflict but requires the commitment of international aid to use the identified issue to shape development efforts. Hybrid peacebuilding was used by the UN in Timor-Leste, where after political unrest, widespread violence and civil destabilisation, they initially focused on “building highly centralised institutions, limiting public expenditure, creating financial liberalisation and reducing the role for the state” (Wallis, 2018, p. 88). While these actions initially did not include the majority of the Timorese people rural population, the Timor-Leste Government “began to engage with local practices and institutions” (Wallis, 2018, p. 89) to understand how they could establish decentralisation, rather than force rural populations to follow their centralised practices. In 2004, “limited administrative and political decentralisation” (Wallis, 2018, p. 89) was established, with the power given to community leaders. The initiative had limited success, with concerning reports claiming that “some local leaders displayed “authoritarian characteristics” (Wallis, 2018, p. 90) rather than assisting their communities in moving forward.
While developmental benefits were dispensed through the local government positions, giving communities opportunities to take control themselves, the quality of the output has differed due to “variable local capacity, poor planning and project choice” (Wallis, 2018, p. 91) amongst overridden priorities identified by local leaders. Rather than encouraging joint involvement in state reconstruction, there is a prevalent dissonance between standards of centralised and decentralised governance, with a perception that decentralisation has been used in hybrid peacebuilding as a “strategy to execute the budget, so it can report that it executed well, even though there have been no outcomes” (Wallis, 2018, p. 92). The Timor-Leste case study infers that hybrid peacebuilding in theory is an outcome from the lesson of understanding and incorporating local practices into liberal peacebuilding, but it realistically requires accountability and a clear framework to avoid inequality. Hybrid peacebuilding is not necessarily impractical, but it needs reshaping to avoid injustices and exclusions, through determining what proportions of liberal and local principles are incorporated in the way the government is established (Wallis, 2018, p. 97), with regular renegotiation to ensure that the governance reflects the climate and culture. If we revisit human security, hybrid peacebuilding aims to incorporate exactly what the people of a state needs by giving them a voice to shape how they are governed. Human security aims to give the population “freedom from fear” (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005, p. 457), and if they do not feel oppressed and able to have a level of influence on how they peacebuild in a post-conflict climate, then the theory of hybrid peacebuilding has some merit and can be drawn upon when future peacebuilding initiatives are required.
Alternatively, post-conflict development has found relative success in illiberal peacebuilding. Illiberal peacebuilding is “a process of post-war reconstruction managed by local elites in defiance of liberal peace precepts on civil liberties...with a view to constructing a hegemonic order and an elite stranglehold over the political economy” (De Oliveira, 2011, p. 287). Rather than predominately seeking international aid to resolve post-conflict struggles, the state leans on itself to tackle reconstruction. This approach is particularly prevalent in post-conflict environments where the conflict was caused by polarisation or ethnic segregation (Herath, 2018), and reconciliation is required for the state to prevent recurrence of conflict. In Rwanda, after the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, social reconciliation was imperative for the country to be able to rebuild, and it could not be led by international actors as it was a deep-seated issue that would not have been solved by enhanced security or forced political systems. Kumar (1999) highlights that to be able to promote development, broken relationships must be healed through social reconciliation; by “uncovering the past, promoting dialog, promoting understanding through media, developing grass-roots structures for peace, and engaging in collaborative activities” (Kumar, 1999, p. 1-3). Rwanda took ownership for the genocide, utilising initiatives including the Ndi umunyarwanda program to talk about the crimes imposed on both their and the other ethnic group, repurposing a day a month to repair and restore buildings affected by the Rwandan conflict, and other programs to encourage cohesion and unity (Herath, 2018). To directly address the crimes committed in the 1994 genocide, Rwanda has taken a local justice approach through Gacaca courts. Perpetrators faced victims, where “public confession was a cornerstone of the crimes” (Nyseth Brehm et al., 2014, p. 337) to fulfil participatory duties; refusal to admit guilt was seen as failing to support reconciliation and had greater punishments, with the potential to lead to a lifetime in prison. Those who confessed before trial were given lesser sentences, with “community service, fines, and other restoration-based reparations” (Nyseth Brehm et al., 2014, p. 337).
Allowing the Rwandan local population to serve justice to their people rather than forcing liberalised models gave the Rwandan people ownership of reconciliation when addressing the root cause of conflict rather than liberal intervention, which would not have had as profound an effect. Lessons learnt from the Rwandan post-conflict social reconciliation efforts are that immediate international or Westernised peacebuilding initiatives may not be the best method to encourage development; illiberal or local peacebuilding initiatives can produce dividends in development provided their intentions are in line with restoration rather than exploitation. Illiberal peacebuilding does have a place for the international community to assist in development, but they are not the orchestrators, instead merely aids of reconstruction or monitors to ensure that the local efforts are ethical and productive. The international community helped fund “100 justice-related projects” (Uvin, 2001, p. 182) to assist Rwanda with trialling their people, and their donation involvement gives them a say in monitoring the quality of the local justice system, but the dynamics are controlled by the local population. Therefore, illiberal peacebuilding has potential to see great strides in development, but it is important that corruption does not occur within local development strategies, as conflict may arise again, requiring alternate peacebuilding methods which the international community may again get wrong. Development is not a one-size fits all process, and one initiative may need to be shaped over time to enact permanent change, but the overarching priority is for the international population must listen to the local community, otherwise any misinformed efforts will be detrimental, irrespective of the intentions.
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