Throughout this essay it will be determined that the likelihood of Vietnam shifting towards a more democratic system in the next three years is nominal. The prospect of either a complete or partial transition to democracy in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam can be effectively ruled out within this timeframe. Throughout this report, the current autocratic setup of the rapidly growing country will be examined, with various potential causes for a transition to democracy scrutinized. Furthermore, the country’s turbulent history will be studied and the significance of this in regards to prospective democratization will be proved to be crucial. This report will firstly outline the socialist state’s current political structure, before assessing the potentiality of any democratization efforts. All through the report it will be maintained that the country’s contemporary politics and historical circumstances produce a Vietnam in which the likelihood of increased democracy in three years is minimal.
Vietnam’s political setup can principally be characterized as a dominant-party dictatorship, under the leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). The CPV has held a firm grip on power since the reunification of Vietnam in 1975. In its current form, the Vietnamese regime is far from a democracy. The database Varieties of Democracy Conceptualization (V-Dem) scores Vietnam a 0.11 on its Liberal Democracy Index for 2020, with 1 being complete democracy. Evidently, according to V-Dem, Vietnam is significantly dictatorial, and a long way from a liberal democracy. V-Dem utilizes a proceduralist approach to measuring democracy, analyzing the political composition itself rather than the outcomes produced. Yet the outcomes produced are equally as un-democratic, as proven by the substantive measurement of the Freedom House Project. The database categorizes Vietnam as ‘not free’, and grades Vietnamese freedom at just 19100 for 2021. This in itself, is a decrease of one point from the calculation a year previous. Vietnam holds elections, yet the one-party system in place ensures these cannot be democratic. Theoretically, independent candidates are able to contest in these, but ‘most are banned in practice’. The practice of restricting election candidates is certainly not the only authoritarian measure in place in Vietnam. Constraints on political freedoms are accompanied by constraints on civil freedoms and exceptional media freedoms. As Robert Vaagan notes, following measures taken by the CPV in 2011, there is ‘no doubt that the government remains in full control of all aspects of the media’. It is therefore evident that both the proceduralist and substantive view of Vietnam’s level of democracy are warranted, and the country is indeed a well-established dictatorship.
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It is tempting to assume that any dictatorship is automatically unstable, or that stability equates to democracy. The case with Vietnam is renders this false however, and in its current state, Vietnam operates with considerable stability. The Fragile States Index (FSI) ranks Vietnam as the 110th most fragile state in the world in 2020, (up from 70th in 2006) proving considerable and increasing stability. Part of this must be attributed to the classification of the Vietnamese government as a dominant-party dictatorship. Jason Brownlee explains that when compared to personalistic and military dictatorships, it has been found that one-party dictatorships are the ‘least likely’ to ‘lose power in a given year’. This fact alone does not automatically make Vietnam as stable country as FSI believes however. Another crucial element is the life within Vietnam, and the experiences of Vietnamese residents. It is difficult to effectively measure ‘happiness’, but the Happy Planet Index (HPI) grades countries based on how well nations are achieving ‘long, happy, sustainable lives’, by measuring elements such as wellbeing and life expectancy. Vietnam, on the index, ranks 5th of the 140 nations assessed, referencing high levels of school enrolment (98% in 2012) and substantial poverty reductions. Vietnam’s combatting of poverty has been truly ‘remarkable’, with the country’s poverty figures falling by an average of 2.9 percent each year, between the years 1993 and 2008. Figures such as this begin to explain the ‘happiness’ and stability recorded within Vietnam, and also lead to the conclusion that democratization is unlikely in the near future.
This period of stability in Vietnam is welcome, and long overdue, following decades of colonialism, war, and vulnerability. This dates back as early as the 1880s, when France began to colonize Vietnam and the surrounding area. The collapse of French colonialism in so-called ‘Indochina’ - a result of World War II - culminated in nearly 30 years of continuous warfare for Vietnam. The war began in late 1946, and ‘would not end until Saigon fell in April 1975’. Whilst many may deem the Vietnam War as the most significant event in Vietnamese history, Vietnam had in fact been struggling with Western powers for decades previous. For Vietnam then, the years from 1975 onwards, represent its most stable period in almost a century. This gives insight into the levels of happiness that HPI records in Vietnam, despite the oppressive tendencies of the CPV. As a result, by understanding this, it leads to the conclusion that any political change in Vietnam in the next three years is likely to be minimal, if existent at all. The Vietnamese people, despite restrictions to freedom, are content with the stability found in their country. Similarly, the troubled history of Vietnam undoubtedly puts pro-democracy Western nations off any intervention. Whilst these nations may fundamentally disagree with the current setup, and desire a democratic Vietnam, they too are conscious of Vietnam’s newfound stability. Accordingly, post-war Vietnam has found ‘deep integration with the global economy’, and it is unlikely that foreign intervention will lead to democratization.
Alongside increasing stability and global integration, post-1975 Vietnam has economically developed and grown strikingly. The immense growth has rebuilt ‘what was then one of the world’s poorest nations into a lower-middle income nation’. This advancement has unquestionably contributed to the increased stability in the country, and shows no signs of stopping. One of the most notable features of Vietnam’s development is that, as Valerie Kozel notes, the ‘historical growth patterns have been remarkably pro-poor’. This can be seen in the tackling of poverty mentioned previously, and deepens understanding of the levels of life satisfaction within Vietnam. The case of Vietnam’s substantial growth directly contradicts an influential theory of democratization - modernization theory. The theory, as Adam Przeworski et al. sum up, argues that ‘as a country develops new group emerge and organize, they rise up against the dictatorial regime, and it falls’. However as shown, Vietnam has developed substantially, yet there has been no rising against the dictatorial regime. In fact, as proven, the growth has increased stability, rather than hinder it. Whilst it would be incorrect to suggest that the growth alone has resulted in the country’s present stability, it has failed to threaten the dictatorial regime’s hold on power. It can then be concluded that, if modernization theory were to be accurate, that democratization in Vietnam would have already (at least partially) occurred. The theory implies that less-developed nations will eventually mimic western, capitalist society. These societies, which the theory foresees as being replicated, consistently create and expand wealth inequalities, where wealth is ‘concentrated in the hands of a small minority’. Perhaps then, the theory assumes that economic growth simply cannot occur as ‘pro-poor’ as Vietnam has achieved. With that in mind, for the case of Vietnam the theory can be disregarded, and it can be maintained that the dominant-party dictatorship will comfortably survive the next three years.
Whilst economic development has failed to produce a democratic uprising, and the country is experiencing stability and content, the potentiality of a bottom-up democratic transition in Vietnam must not be dismissed. A bottom-up transition is a democratic transition ‘in which the people rise up to overthrow an authoritarian regime’. A pivotal example of a bottom-up transition, is the fall of the German Democratic Republic, following mass protests in 1989. The protests arose from a crisis in which East Germans were leaving for the West (via Hungary) in alarming numbers. What is important however for the case of Vietnam, was the spontaneity of the uprisings. Prior to the crisis, ‘East Germany looked far from the brink of collapse’, and the regime ‘had proved to be remarkably stable’. What happened in East Germany proves that Vietnamese stability must not be taken for granted by the CPV, and that a major crisis could result in an uprising. Having said that, the party - along with the rest of the world - has faced an unprecedented crisis in the Covid-19 pandemic. The pandemic provides the opportunity for increased governmental scrutiny across the world, and has the capacity to quickly eliminate any stability. A crisis like this, if handled incorrectly, could undeniably lead to a popular uprising and provide cause for a bottom-up democratic transition. The CPV has shown its durability however, and ‘adopted one of the world’s most effective strategies against the Covid-19 pandemic’. Vietnam was one of very few countries to have an increased GDP in 2020, testament to the extent of the CPV’s success. The actualities in Vietnam, when compared to the possibilities, will have once again improved the regime’s stability. Similarly, the impressive response to monumental crisis prompts the determination that a spontaneous bottom-up is highly unlikely, and democratization is not a feasibility in the next three years.
To conclude, having considered the political setup and historical context of Vietnam, this report has determined that the likelihood of a democratic shift in the next three years is negligible. The country is sustaining prolonged stability after a tumultuous past, something even a global pandemic is unable to falter, which is appreciated domestically and internationally. Though the CPV retains a firm grip on power, and frequently suppresses citizens’ freedoms, there is little chance of an uprising against them. The party has proved its ability to handle crises, and survives in a ‘happy’ Vietnam. Furthermore, the extensive ‘pro-poor’ economic growth - which shows no sign of slowing - reinforces and expands the regime’s permanence, whilst failing to produce an uprising against it. Overall, it must be asserted that it is highly unlikely any shift towards democracy will take place in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in the next three years.
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