When the Bush administration launched the invasion of Iraq in 2003, many news media outlets at the time portrayed the invasion as a response to 9/11. However, evidence suggests that a different motive was the primary reason for invasion, and that 9/11 among other reasons such as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and oil fields, were nothing more than excuses to justify the invasion. This essay will argue that the Bush Administration invaded Iraq in 2003 in order to strengthen America’s national security by expanding American-led hegemony as well as liberal democracy in the Middle East.
Contrary to popular belief, the invasion of Iraq was already pre-planned by the U.S. before the turn of the century. Echoing Lyndon B. Johnson's involvement in the Vietnam War, Bush believed that world stability rests on the shoulders of American-led hegemony and its dominance over world politics and that potential threats can only be engaged with strident policies and the disposition to act unilaterally when required. Some of these beliefs would later become what is now known as the Bush doctrine, which would define the hallmark of the Bush administration. Through the doctrine, Robert Jervis explains that America is intent on shaping itself as the defender of the world and promoter of democracy. America believes that it must take tough measures so that countries in the Middle East would be more willing to embrace democracy once Saddam is overthrown, thus stabilizing the region. Bush asserted that a democratic reform in the Middle East will progress should Iraq be liberated, which at the time, even analysts skeptical of the ordeal believed that the impact of an Iraqi regime change can be large and beneficial. Donald Rumsfeld messaged Condoleezza Rice saying “If Sadam’s regime were ousted, we would have a much-improved position in the region and elsewhere”, which indicates that America’s mission to spread democracy has always been a long-term goal. This supports the view that America desires to establish hegemony using the invasion as a means to do so.
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Before the events of 9/11 the Bush administration was already driven by a sense of vulnerability and fear, in the likelihood that rogue states will rise up to challenge American-led hegemony. The administration considered the option of a preventive war in Iraq to ensure American dominance, in fear of reports of Saddam’s regime developing a WMD program. The Bush Doctrine insinuated that predicting future threats are not too difficult, because the domestic political system is often shaped by the state’s foreign policy. This is likely due to America’s experiences with the World Wars, which has led to the belief that the costs of inaction are grossly high, while taking the initiative is the optimum choice. America’s fear-fueled belief, however, has led the administration to overestimate the actual extent of the threat posed by the Iraqi regime. In a CIA report in 2003, the Iraqi regime was found to be defying UN resolutions and restrictions by engaging with its WMD program. The report claims that Iraq is deceiving the U.S. by denying engagement with WMD, and outlines Saddam’s intentions on acquiring nuclear weapons despite the absence of solid evidence. The CIA further assumed, with good confidence, that should Iraq receive the necessary materials to create nuclear weapons, then the regime will have one completed within less than a year, and 5 to 7 years without proper materials. However, the report also indicated some doubts from the CIA, partly from their moderate to low-level confidence of Iraq actually having nuclear weapons, and having the necessary components to build one, and when would they use WMD. This document suggests America’s desire to find, or create, a justifiable reason to launch an invasion of Iraq. This makes America seemed like it desires the Iraqi regime to harbor WMD to further America’s goals of maintaining itself as a global hegemon. A meeting between Rumsfeld and Franks in 2001, revealed that policy makers were already searching for reasons to justify an Iraq invasion. That being said, the Bush administration’s interest in asserting WMD as the main reason for invading Iraq was politically convenient as well. By declaring Iraq to possess WMD the U.S. has an excuse to invade Iraq that was deemed acceptable to everyone, which supports the idea that the U.S. is responding in a climate of fear.
The Bush administration’s obsession with securing national security out of fear of terrorism and threats of WMD goes back before the events of 9/11, as the Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and the Taliban were the main focus of chief Richard Clarke’s counterterrorism efforts, five months prior. Relating to the previous point of threat overestimation, the CIA endorsed the opinion of an analyst, who was not a nuclear weapons expert, who believed that Iraq acquired material needed to manufacture nuclear weapons, which was eventually passed on to President Bush. The administrations high interest in the materials, after gaining direct access, has led the CIA to notify Congress without prior arrangements with the State Department. This supports America’s fears of Iraq as a growing threat, revealed from America’s uncoordinated and reactionary responses to developments concerning the materials. After a report by the New York Times was released claiming that American officials believed that the materials were meant for nuclear weapons, White officials made attempts to draw attention to the report, where Condoleezza Rice was famously quoted for saying “we don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud”. On this note, the expanding relative power of the U.S. amplifies its fear of national security. As major threats like the USSR disappeared in the late 90’s, the U.S. has come to elevate threats that were previously perceived to be manageable. Waltz noted that “the interest of the country in security came to be identified with the maintenance of a certain world order”, leading America’s desire to reshape global politics influenced by a combination of power, fear and perceived opportunity.
When Al Qaeda struck the twin towers in New York City, the Bush administration to saw the attack as an opportunity and justification for an invasion, where the president himself immediately presumed Saddam’s regime was involved. This sentiment was shared by Rumsfeld where he directed Pentagon Lawyer Jim Haynes and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to search for evidence and establish a connection between Saddam and Bin Laden. The opportunity to establish American-led hegemony in the Middle East was reflected in Bush’s statement to one of his advisers saying “We have an opportunity to restructure the world toward freedom, and we have to get it right”. Bush later expanded on the idea during a speech marking the half-year anniversary of the attack, proclaiming “When the terrorists are disrupted and scattered and discredited, we will see that the old and serious disputes can be settled within the bounds of reason, and goodwill, and mutual security. I see a peaceful world beyond the war on terror, and with courage and unity, we are building that world together”. Bush’s direct statements support the argument that the U.S. is determined to establish a world hegemony, using the invasion of Iraq as a stepping stone towards that goal.
However, as the U.S. attempted to establish a link between Saddam’s regime and Al-Qaeda, they found little evidence to support the suggested link. According to Richard Clarke, when Bush was informed that there was no real evidence, apart from Al-Qaeda, of Iraq being directly responsible for 9/11, Bush appeared to be irritated by the news. As a result, during an NSC meeting on September 13, Bush requested the CIA once more to search for a potential Iraqi involvement. And when Clarke’s office returned to report its analysis, they found a large ideological difference between Iraq and Al-Qaeda’s leadership, concluding that only flawed anecdotal evidence connected the two. The lack of convincing evidence linking Iraq to Al-Qaeda was finally concluded in September 21 when the CIA’s intelligence community claimed that it had no clear evidence linking the events of 9/11 to Iraq.
Nevertheless, during Bush’s national address on 17 March 2003, he often made statements that were contradictory to evidence presented by the CIA. Statements such as “the regime has a history of reckless aggression in the Middle East. it has a deep hatred of America and our friends. And it has aided, trained and harbored terrorists, including operatives of Al-Qaeda”, claimed that there is a link between Iraq and the terrorist group. Though flawed, Bush was likely using the statements as a means to gather support from the American people, drawing from recent memories of 9/11. This turned out to be successful as the ‘war on terror’ efforts gave the reason that the Bush administration needed to launch an invasion of Iraq.
In that same address, Bush made clear statements that relates back to the Bush Doctrine, emphasizing the need to secure American-led hegemony and uphold liberal democracy. Not only Bush justified America’s obligation to strip Iraq of, a possibly non-existent, WMD, but he also made optimistic-sounding messages of an Iraq under American military occupation where he stated: “As our coalition takes away their power, we will deliver the food and medicine you need. We will tear down the apparatus of terror and we will help you build a new Iraq that is prosperous and free”. In this context, Bush shaped and consolidated the hegemonic role of America, as well as propagating the principle that liberal democracy is the ideological white knight of Iraq, stating that “in a free Iraq, there will be no more wars of aggression against your neighbors. The tyrant will soon be gone. The day of your liberation is near”.
Through the address, Bush portrayed the Iraqi regime as the antithesis of American values, thus subtly progressing American ambitions to spread liberal democracy in the Middle East and maintain national security through Iraq’s liberation. Bush’s address was convincing enough to have members of the American public to put faith in the administration's decision, believing that engaging with the Iraqi regime will encourage political reforms throughout the Middle East as well as protective measures against Al-Qaeda from regional governments. According to John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, Bush’s frequent claims that Iraq is an ominous looming threat is baseless, and argues that it should be regarded as a transparent endeavor to frighten the American public into supporting the war effort. But for many Americans, the threat felt real and largely owed to the events of 9/11 and the possibility that the Iraqi regime was cooperating with Al-Qaeda.
Among the reasons for the Bush administrations invasion of Iraq, the subject of Iraqi oil supplies is often raised as a key motivator of the invasion. However, similar to 9/11, I argue that controlling supplies of oil was not the primary motivator of the invasion, but was a key influence on the administration’s decision to take the initiative to invade instead. In the late 90’s Saddam’s regime was faced with international sanctions which led him to accept a UNSC resolution to create an Oil-for-Food program. The program resulted in oil revenues surging from $4.2 billion to $17.87 billion within three years, enabling Saddam to have more control over revenue distributions. The increased oil revenues likely influenced the Bush administration over its decision to invade Iraq, because at a September 17 NSC meeting, Bush administered plans to occupy Iraq that involves the seizure of their oil fields and revenues. To further support this argument, the occupation of Iraq’s oil supplies was also used as a form of leverage in case Iraq acted against American interests.
The Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq in 2003 suggests a strong link between American hegemony and its interests of national security. Bush’s fear that Saddam’s regime poses a threat to American interests not only reveals America’s anxieties over diminishing influence, but also America’s expansive interest in being a world hegemony by promoting liberal democracy. The U.S. was already on its way to war with Iraq before 9/11 had occurred, determined to find a justifiable reason to carry out its ambitions, which the U.S. vaguely argued for Iraq’s possession of nuclear weapons. This determination resulted in the CIA to abrasively pass on reports to Congress and President Bush without proper analysis and review. America’s desire to liberate Iraq in order to fulfill its goals was observed by the covert Iraq Operations Group in April 2002 where a ‘regime change’ in Iraq was already in Bush’s plans. Therefore, the events of 9/11 and Iraq’s oil fields were not the main reasons of the administration’s decision to invade Iraq, as much as they are additional motivating factors that pushed the administration in that direction. The events of 9/11 potentially had the public associating terrorists with the Iraqi regime through Bush’s national address on March 17 2003, while occupying Iraqi oil fields will only bolster America’s already large presence on the world stage, legitimizing its hegemonic power. For these reasons, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was the result of the Bush administration’s desire to secure America’s national security through promoting liberal democracy in the Middle East and becoming a world hegemon that no country dares to challenge.
Bibliography
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