Introduction
This essay is set to question the adequacy of Williamson’s claim that evidence equals knowledge hence the E=K Principle. According to Williamson, when you have evidence of a given fact, you have knowledge; and that knowledge is a mental state. The aim of this essay is to that argue there should be a reliable criterion for a knowledge claim, which Williamson did not give, hence we will hold that evidence does not equate to knowledge. Given the reality that evidential status is for the most part a matter of degree, the reality that we frequently talk of a person’s evidence when showing their subjective reasons, for believing and accepting for basic cognitive process what she will, and therefore the indisputable fact that what counts as evidence varies with context (Joyce, 2004). This will argue in terms of how evidence can equate knowledge considering the different factors that appear in the process of our evidence acquisition. Maybe if there is a criterion to determine what count as evidence, in the time of forgotten memory we can say that there is knowledge of our claim.
For Williamson, evidence cannot be understood independently of knowledge. He analyses evidence in terms of knowledge, hence he defended the E=K principle that only knowledge constitutes evidence. S’s evidence [is] S’s knowledge, for every individual or community S in any possible situation” (Williamson, 2002: 185). Prior to Williamson, knowledge requires justification as justification requires having evidence for one’s belief which is assumed that evidence can be understood independently of knowledge. E=K does seize a few aspects of our concept of evidence, but it also comes up short in that it fails to secure some others. Williamson characterizes austere evidence that leaves out many core capabilities of our cognitive practices and social practices. Williamson recognized the role of evidence and its ability to elucidate core options of our evidential practices. Williamson addresses both issues of a proposition to both serve as evidence for a hypothesis h and of its evidential status, the kind of creditable standing that e must have (Williamson, 2000: 186).
In setting out the claim that evidence does not equate to knowledge, I will first, give the approach to give what counts as evidence, the criterion for evidence to count as knowledge, and question the reliability of our evidential claim. First, this essay will question Williamson’s criterion for a knowledge claim as can be seen he tried to avoid the traditional criterion for knowledge (Greenough and Pritchard, 2009). In Williamson's aim to avoid the traditional definition of knowledge, which I think is quite needed in the process of philosophical inquiry, Williamson fails to make known the criterion for knowledge, for a proposition to count as knowledge, and the criterion for evidence. Evidence is an external factor and thus we should know when and how we can achieve evidence for a knowledge claim. Secondly, we will argue in the line of inferred beliefs. which involves cases where the evidence base contains false beliefs. And lastly, we will talk about the state of forgotten evidence and limited evidence. Our argument will show instances where a subject has prior evidence of a knowledge claim, and then later forgets the evidence or how the evidence came about of the knowledge he has. We will question if in such a situation the knowledge changes since the evidence is already forgotten, or the knowledge ceases to exist given Williamson’s E=K Principle. This essay will conclude with the view that there should be a reliable way for our beliefs to be justified.
Our first approach is to understand the general overview of knowledge and evidence, and also see how Williamson views knowledge and evidence.
Knowledge
People know things at different stages of life. It is not enough to say we know such and such, what is important is how we come to know the things we claim to know. The traditional way is that you know a thing if your belief that that thing is true, and you are justified in believing that it is true, then you have knowledge of that certain thing. Though through different fields and environments, we have different ways of knowing and different knowledge claims we make, for the purpose of this essay, we are looking at propositional knowledge. This is the knowledge that is either true or false. When you make a knowledge claim, it is either true or false. This is commonly expressed as S knows P.
Propositional knowledge is the knowledge that shows something to be as it is. ‘’propositional knowledge is just knowing that something is the case, for instance, the earth is flat, etc’’ (Pritchard, 2018: 3). But to state a given proposition as a knowledge claim, it must fulfill certain requirements, and these are that the proposition must be True and believed to be True (Truth and belief). These are essentials for a knowledge claim. Propositional knowledge removes the knowledge that comes from lucky guesses or correct wishful thinking. It ‘’requires that one have an adequate indication that a known proposition is true’’. (Pritchard, 2018: 5). when we say a subject claims to know a given proposition to be true, what he/she knows must meet up with what qualifies as knowledge and this can be done through adequate evidence possessed by the knower. The knower must have evidence for a claim proposition. That is a justified True Belief. The traditional criterion of knowledge faced a lot of problems most especially from the Gettier cases, where it is argued that a subject might have false beliefs.
Williamson on knowledge and evidence
Williamson argues for the E=K Principle, where ‘E’ stands for evidence and ‘K’ for knowledge, E=K. He argues for the following which implies E=K:
- All evidence is propositional.
- All propositional evidence is knowledge.
- All knowledge is evidence. (Williamson, 2000: 193)
To Williamson Evidence is that which justifies belief. This means that evidence is that which proves our belief to be true or false. Williamson holds that evidence is propositional; only propositions are reasons for beliefs. Evidence is the kind of thing that a hypothesis explains (Williamson, 2002: 187). And the kind of thing which the hypothesis explain is propositional. Thus, evidence is propositional. To Williamson, the totality of proposition one knows is one’s evidence. This sets to explain whatever one holds to be true or false is based on the evidence the individual has as to the given claim.
For us to have a better understanding of the E=K principle, it is important to start with what Williamson does not consider the evidence. According to Williamson, a bloody knife is not evidence. Only propositions can be reasons for beliefs and He put forward considerations aimed to show that ‘’what functions as evidence are propositions one can grasp’’ (Williamson, 2000: 195). We may seek to explain a given proposition, but only one we can grasp can function as our evidence. When a hypothesis explains one’s evidence, what is explained are propositions that state the true or false state of things. Williamson tends to rule out hypotheses by seeking roles played by evidence that is filled by propositions only. But this strategy is also with alternative roles played by evidence, consistent, and non-propositional. Suppose that S's belief that P is justified by his evidence e. Williamson holds that e must be a proposition in order to play that evidential role. At initial, Williamson says nothing concerning whether s should further believe e, but he concludes that s must grasp proposition e. This thus seems to be a very plausible view to hold unto that e can function as S's evidence for believing P only if S also believes e. we might want to ask that If e is merely a proposition that S grasps but does not believe, and perhaps disbelieves, then why would e count as part of S's evidence? Williamson does eventually bring belief into the picture. It is “granted” by him that knowledge entails belief. (Williamson, 2000: 202) Since he maintains E=K, his overall position has the consequence, which he notes, that S believes e: e's evidential status for S entails that S knows e and that in turn entails that S believes e.
Criterion of Justification
The starting point of our claim about Williamson’s principle is that Williamson did not give a criterion for knowledge, hence he holds that knowledge is prime. Knowledge is prime means that knowledge does not constitute smaller components like the traditional definition of knowledge that entails justified truth belief [JTB]. To Williamson, evidence equals knowledge, but the criterion for knowledge is not stated. Knowledge is a mental state for Williamson (2000: 21). This means that Williamson's account of mental state is a precise internal state, and in the mental state, beliefs are justified only by things internal to the individual. With this claim, there cannot say to be a unified criterion for justification or knowledge claim. Williamson did not set to give us what constitutes evidence. Going with Brueckner, Williamson did not state what evidence that generates knowledge for us to have a knowledge claim; or how propositions come to be part of our evidence and attain the status of knowledge (Greenough and Pritchard, 2009).
Justification is epistemically valuable as it increases our knowledge and aid in avoiding errors.
Let’s take an example put forward by Anthony Bruechner: ‘I am justified in believing that my cup is red in virtue of, or because of, my knowledge that my cup is red. How exactly is this supposed to work? Suppose that I have not yet looked at my cup. So, I do not yet know c (the proposition that my cup is red). So, c is not yet a part of my total evidence and so cannot be used to justify any beliefs. I need to gain some evidence that will serve to justify a belief of c on my part if I am to come to know c and thus enable c to become part of my total evidence. I look at the cup and come to believe c. if I am to be justified in now believing c and thus be in a position to know c, I must have some evidence that serves to justify the belief’ (Greenough and Pritchard, 2009: 8). I tend to agree with Buechner, to say that Williamson seems to be missing a step in saying that it is because of a subjects’ knowledge of C, that he is justified in believing C. but what is the evidence that generated the knowledge of C, enabling that knowledge to serve as the evidential justifier for the subject’s belief of c? (Greenough and Pritchard, 2009:8) C must have gotten into my total evidence as a result of my coming justifiably to believe it on the basis of some evidence. But what evidence? What criteria should something be counted as evidence to be able to justify my belief? This brings us to the challenge of inferred beliefs and limited knowledge.
Inferred beliefs.
There are cases of inferred beliefs where a person’s evidence base contains beliefs that are false. In such aspects, it is possible to hold a belief that P is justified if and only if one properly bases this belief on evidence that one possesses in favor of that P.
The cases that will involve our consideration include inferred beliefs that are justified since there is evidence for them. Let’s take into account a popular version, consider the following ‘’I believe that nobody can enter my office (O for now) because I hold the belief that I have just locked the door (LD for now). Let us assume that I have inferred (O) from (LD). I pushed the lock-in and gave it a quick twist to the left, which usually does the trick; however, my lock is damaged and does not work. Hence, (LD) is false. If Williamson’s proposal that (E = K) is correct, then (LD) cannot serve as an evidential ground for (O). This seems to generate issues for (E = K)’’ (Rizzer, 2009).
The first difficulty is that it is exceptionally conceivable that (LD) does partially constitute my evidence for (O). After all, I am justified in believing (LD), (LD) supports (O), and an explicit inference from (LD) is my most immediate premise or ground for (O). I have other indirect grounds for (O) as well. For example, whatever my evidence for (LD) is, is also evidence for (O). Why should my indirect grounds for (O), count as evidence for (O) when (LD) does not? Obviously, Williamson’s answer is going to be, ‘‘because (LD) is false but the beliefs that provide evidence for (LD) and ultimately (O) as well are true.’’ (Rizzer, 2009)
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Let's look at another case of inferred belief. molly arrives at home at 5:30 and knows that her mother does not get off work until 6. Molly also sees that the lights are off in their house. Molly can infer that her mother is not yet home and is said to have the knowledge that her mother is not home going with the E=K principle. With the E=K principle, Molly has knowledge that her mother is not home, based on her previous experiences and the line of events. Assuming that Molly’s mother closes early from her workplace and went home but didn’t turn on the light as usual which makes Molly assumes that her mother is not back from work. With the E=K principle, molly’s knowledge claim is therefore false. Molly’s previous evidence that gives her knowledge of her mother’s presence in the house is true, while knowledge is false. In this instance, one will argue against Williamson’s claim that evidence does not equate to knowledge. Evidence is that which justifies belief, molly’s belief that her mother is still at work is justified by the darkness of the house by virtue of the lights being off. So, we can claim that there are instances where we can have evidence for our beliefs but not knowledge.
Imagine I happen to meet someone for the first time who I heard called Fredico from his friends. I am justified in believing that is his name, for the reason that he is called Fredico and he in turn answers to the name. I, therefore, say to others that his name is Frederico, assuming that I have not seen his real name either from his documents or even asked him for his name.
What I tend to prove by this example is that we might hold the wrong evidence concerning a belief or evidence concerning a false belief that is justified by different means available to us. Our evidence might prove true but what its claim is, is wrong. I might hold a belief that I have evidence for but my knowledge claim is wrong. Consider that I later found out that Fredico’s real name is Fred from someone else, but I see him responding to Fredico, how do I know what to believe? My guess is to go with my evidence. This will lead to the question of testimony in the knowledge claim, but I don’t intend to go that route.
Williamson ought to give a criterion for justification and not merely state that my belief that Fred’s name is Fredico is justified by virtue of (or because of) my belief that his name is Frederico. My evidence in this case obviously won’t give me knowledge of my claim or make it true.
Another question to ask with regard to the above cases is whether evidence is a necessary and sufficient condition for knowledge. In a Necessary condition, If P is necessary for Q, then Q cannot be true unless P is true. Put another way, Q is true only if P is true. In a Sufficient condition, if P is sufficient for Q, then P’s being true is enough to make Q true. If p is true, then q is true. From this, evidence is a necessary condition but not a sufficient condition for knowledge. This implies that for evidence being true, is not a sufficient condition for knowledge. That I believe and my evidence that he answers Fredico is True is not a sufficient condition to say that his name is Fredico. Thus E=K principle is questionable. Williamson should therefore provide additional conditions or criteria for the knowledge claim.
Forgotten evidence and limited evidence
For most theories that explicitly analyze rationality, the puzzle about evidence possessed arises for them, mostly in terms of the evidence possessed. One such view is evidentialism, which is believing P is rational for a person provided believing P fits the evidence the person has (Feldman, 2004). Believing is an important factor for knowledge but what counts as evidence for which the person believes affects this view. Theories that believe that something is justified provide a person has a reason for believing as being greatly affected by what counts as evidence, especially since they analyze justification in terms of prima facie reasons. This shows that believing is justified for a subject provided that the subject has good reasons for what he or she believed. When it comes to evidence, a lot of theories about epistemic justification appeal to its notion that persons do have evidence at different times of their lives in terms of what they believe, but little has been written about the condition for which a person is said to have something as evidence. It varies how this concept is being interpreted and the challenges we face with evidence that a subject possesses at a time. Most especially with cases of forgotten evidence. When someone knows something, that is, has knowledge of a given fact but forgets where he got that information from, will it still hold that he has knowledge of the fact or information? If the individual never remembers that evidence, then he/she never knows that fact, but it is proven to be true.
We, therefore, know certain things for which we have forgotten the original evidence. One problem is if I assume that my original evidence cannot be recovered or gained, and is not part of any stored justification that I might have. That is, let us assume that I currently entertain my belief about Abraham Lincoln that he was born in 1809(Feldman, 2004: 219), but I seem to have forgotten how that knowledge came about, and that the original source of the belief is not part of my justification of it. It might be argued and questioned how my belief is then justified. One way to answer is to bring up my qualities of recollection. But it is only what is conscious that can count and justify a belief. If I lack any supporting information or lack trust in my memory, then my belief is really not justified. That I am in my office or at home and I could no longer call to mind my conviction that I locked the door or that I kept the key. It is not true that I now have zero evidence since what I hold is a justified inferred belief and I have forgotten my original source. With the E=K principle, it seems I now have false or zero evidence for my belief. And it is not possible that one can have evidence that they no longer have access to. What does it mean to have evidence that you don’t have access to? This might mean that one has memory loss or that whatever information I had is completely lost to me. It is difficult to say that relevant evidence is limited to what one actually believes just as it is to figure out if things stored or buried in one’s memory are among what one believes and to tell whether they are part of one’s evidence. Thus, facts about the sources of my beliefs in time past are hard to decide if they are among my beliefs as it is to decide if they are included in my evidence. This posits a problem for the E=K principle. If the evidence one is exposed to is limited, then it means knowledge is limited. There lies another challenge in the principle. Internalism will require justification which might face the problem of reliance on memory. We depend a great on memory although memory doesn’t seem to be trustworthy. Whether we can trust our memory depends on how reliable it is. We will question the internalism state of knowledge and see if it can answer the question of empirical knowledge or knowledge gotten from testimony. This led to the problem from skeptics, but I am not going that route.
Williamson’s view entails that justification entails evidence. He can say that a subject who once had evidence for a belief is justified if his rational degree of confidence is maintained in the belief that reflected his original evidence base (Rizzer, 2009). Our degree of confidence does not prove our evidence to be true when faced with the issue of forgotten evidence. There is not much room for the E=K principle to escape this. Since the evidence is forgotten, our degree of confidence is already affected by not being about to provide adequate evidence for our knowledge claim. People sometimes entertain beliefs that were initially on the basis of evidence that they cannot recall. It is unclear whether such evidence counts as part of the evidence they have. But I will agree that this will depend on how it can be recalled.
There is also the question: Does knowledge change as evidence changes? Also, in situations where evidence changes, does knowledge change with it, if so, then knowledge is not absolute. Yes, it is important to note that as we acquire evidence, we are forming our knowledge basis. Once we say that we have evidence, with the E=K principle, we already have knowledge. But when our evidence changes as to the particular knowledge claim just like in the above case of my friend who I thought his name to be Fredico but instead his name is Fred, it is given that our knowledge will change. Then knowledge is not certain. If I am not sure of my knowledge claim being that it might change from time to time or due to circumstances, then I am not sure if I can know anything for certain.
The whole challenge rest on the criterion for evidential justification. So, at what point can one say with this given evidence, I have knowledge? There is a need for just criteria even when evidence and knowledge become relative, to the individual subject or to the community
In order to overcome the challenges of inferred belief and the problem of the criterion for evidential justification, there is a need for a reliable source of evidential justification. The focus here is on evidence. I agree with Goldman to say that an ideal mode for justification should be a hybrid view of the two-component theories of justification. Goldman incorporated the evidential element emphasized by evidentialism (Goldman, 2012).
Reliabilism as an approach in the nature of knowledge and of justified belief holds in its simplest form that a belief is justified if and only if produces by a reliable psychological process, meaning a process that produces a high proportion of true beliefs (SEP 2015). Reliabilism has invoked mental states, both doxastic and non-doxastic states, in its set of resources (Goldman, 1979, 1986). But mental states have usually been treated as mere inputs and outputs of processes. No relatedness between target belief and these have featured in the formulation of reliabilism. This two-fold combines the strength of reliabilism and evidentialism. This provides a sufficient condition by which belief can be justified by a reliable process. But going to our earlier example of inferred belief in the case of Fred, this seems to me to be a reliable process. A reliable process of name calling (by friends) and name answering (by Fred). One will say because I called James and he answered and it's true that his name is James, so is it for Fred.
To respond to this challenge, it is important to note that in a reliabilist account for knowledge, two further conditions are added. First, is that the target belief must be true, and, second, its mode of acquisition must rule out all serious or ‘relevant’ alternatives in which the belief would be false (Goldman, 2012). This means that an accurate visual identification of James does not constitute knowledge unless it is acute enough to exclude the possibility that it is his twin brother John instead (Goldman, 2012). So, for reliabilism, knowledge is necessary for knowing a belief. A justified belief may be false, but its mode of acquisition must be a kind that yields truths. This can be to respond to challenges raise with regards reliability process of the knowledge of Fred’s name. reliabilism will exclude the possibility that his name is Frederico.
It is also important to note that Reliablism can also help stand the threats of skepticism which is one problem we mentioned earlier in the essay but didn’t delve into. So, one advantage of reliabilism is that it seems to have a way of handling challenging issues which proves straightforward treatment for justification.
Conclusion
Conclusively, this essay has been able to show the challenges that lie between having evidence and regarding it as a knowledge claim. This was shown in the fact that the E=K principle allows instances where one can infer belief and claim to have a knowledge base. But we have seen that in cases of inferred beliefs and forgotten or limited evidence, we are faced with challenges with the E=K principle. Hence, we stated that evidence does not equate to knowledge. It was also noted that with the E=K principle, there was no criterion for evidential justification, that is what we count for evidence to be true. There should be a process and what forms our evidence claim. This led us to the reliabilism theory posited by Goldman. This served as a composition of both evidence and reliable process. Though the reliabilism theory might face some challenges, it nevertheless gives us the advantage of having a reliable process of justification.
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