As noted previously, no simple explanation exists to define the cause and effect of illicit drugs and violence. For many centuries throughout time, certain drugs, even when prohibited or illegal, did not lead to significant violence. Only over the last half-century has there been a marked increase in violence connected to illegal drugs. Goin (2012), Reuter (2009) and Thoumi (2009) all suggest the illicit drug trade is generally nonviolent outside of certain markets. While Columbia and Mexico have experienced significant amounts of violence related to the illegal drug trade, this has not been true elsewhere. In the Netherlands, where there is also a high rate of illicit drug production, trafficking, and use, the rates of violence over the last 40 years are extraordinarily low; around 1 murder per 100,000 citizens (Goin, 2012). Comparatively, the U.S., Mexico, and Columbia, have shown mid-to-high rates of drug-related homicides fluctuating between 10-20 murders per 100,000 citizens per year. Mexico specifically has exceeded the 20 per capita mark every year since the mid-2000s (Goin, 2012). Afghanistan is at the heart of the opium and heroin trade globally, and over a third of its GDP comes from its illegal cultivation and trafficking. Despite these gaudy financial gains from illicit commodities, there is comparatively little violence connected to illegal narcotics in this market (Thoumi, 2009). In contrast, Mexico is the primary supplier or trafficking route for the vast majority of all illicit drugs entering a single market, the United States, which is also the single largest demand market for these illegal goods (Beittel, 2011; Calderon, et al., 2015).
Only where there is a convergence of certain geographical, cultural, socioeconomic, and state suppressive elements does violence appear to amplify in specific markets (Goin, 2012; Reuter, 2009). The traditional means of addressing the illegal drug trade is based on government suppression and law enforcement interdiction. Drugs are deemed illegal by law, and enforcement bodies focus primarily on the apprehension of criminal actors involved in violating these laws. This system does not address the root causes that created these illegal markets to begin with.
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Density Intensity
Criminal enterprise density plays a role in the level and frequency of violence in certain markets. Law enforcement and government interventions tend to incite and exacerbate violence in territories that are represented by a larger number of criminal groups (Beittel, 2012; Osario, 2015). Mexico currently has the largest number of criminal actors engaged in the illicit drug trades as it serves as producers, traffickers, and enforcers. While the violence and illegal drug trade have infested every state in Mexico to some degree, certain states, in particular those that border the U.S., there is a high density of criminal actors tied to the illicit drug trade (Beittel, 2012; Osario, 2015). As an example, of the 16, 414 murders committed by MDTOs in 2011, 6505 of these killings occurred in the four states of Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nueva Leon, and Tamaulipas which all border Texas (Beittel, 2011). Chihuahua, which also borders New Mexico, accounted for nearly 3000 of them. Two other states, Sinaloa, which is run by the Sinaloa cartel Mexico’s largest, and Guerrero, accounted for another 3,294 of the killings. Both states are along the outer Western coast. The remaining deaths are spread throughout the nation, primarily in exterior states of the north, but more frequently MDTOs are moving into interior states (Beittel, 2011). Only the three states at the Southern most tip of Mexico, Yucatan, Quintana Roo, and Campeche, have been relatively untouched, but still accounted for 77 murders (Beittel, 2012).
Macho Man – The Impact of Latin Machismo
While it may sound like stereotyping, the reality of machismo is entrenched in Latin cultures. Gender roles in Latin communities are clearly defined, with the men tasked as protectors/providers. Challenges to these culturally identified roles frequently turn to violence, and a need to assert male dominance. Not surprisingly, Latin countries, including Mexico and Columbia, have high rates of domestic violence and femicide, which is the murder of women because they are female (Whelan, 2019). The problem of machismo and violence against women is so prevalent in Latin American countries, that the average rate of criminal prosecution for femicide and crimes against women is less than 10% (Kahn, 2017). An average of six women a day are victims of femicide in Mexico (Watson, 2016), and the indifference by law enforcement and the government increases the sense of impunity among the male population (Kahn, 2017; Watson, 2016, Whelan, 2019).
This sense of machismo can readily be extrapolated to the area of drug cartels and criminal violence in countries like Mexico and Columbia. Latin men are indoctrinated from an early age about the need to be virile and take care of their families. As Ardesi (2011) noted, it is difficult to “grasp machismo’s full potential to drive Latin American men to extraordinary feats of heroism or to save face at any cost” (p.3). This makes Latin men, particularly susceptible targets for drug cartels. In Mexico in particular, where men under 25-years-of-age represent nearly half the nation’s population of over 100 million, then combine that with Mexico’s high unemployment rates (Ardesi, 2011), MDTOs represent a lucrative enticement. Statistically, these numbers suggest upwards of 2.5 million young, unemployed men are potential candidates for MDTOs to recruit. The ability to earn substantial income with little concern for legal consequences is significant, and the bravado born of a machismo culture helps negate fears of a violent death which many of these young men view as heroic (Aredsi, 2011). A culture that already ignores machismo behaviors and acts of violence against women, offers even greater impunity within the confines of Latin DTOs.
Impunity Immunity
Latin American nations and Mexico in particular, have a massive impunity problem, which in effect grants broad-scale immunity to criminal actors for their illegal activities and the violence connected to their crimes (Whelan, 2019). According to the Center of Studies on Impunity and Justice (CESIJ), the problem is a complex mix of a nation’s ability to protect its citizenry and human rights while also administering justice through criminal apprehension, prosecution, and incarceration (2016). To that end, Mexico has failed on almost every level. Only the Philippines has a worse Impunity Index of the 59 countries included (CESIJ, 2016). In Mexico, only about 7% of crimes are reported to authorities, primarily due to law enforcement indifference and distrust of the legal system. This includes concerns for personal safety due to the corruption and lassitude within Mexico’s legal system (CESIJ, 2016). Of that paltry percentage, for those charged with a crime, only 4.4% are ever convicted. Impunity is the ability of criminal actors to violate the laws without legal consequence. In Mexico, less than 1% of all crimes committed end in any form of legal punishment, meaning over 99% are immune to consequences of the law (CESIJ, 2016) thus reinforcing citizens’ lack of reporting on criminal activities. Impunity is the failure of governance at all levels, Federal, State, and Local, and across all branches; judiciary, executive, and congress (CESIJ, 2016). Impunity is a primary factor in the destabilization of a nation or states’ ability to govern or protect its citizenry. It impacts the legitimacy of a nation’s government and law enforcement bodies (Lengel, 2011). This further opens the door for criminal enterprise and its associated violence.
Destabilization
If a nation loses its legitimacy it becomes a failed state. There is no faith in government to enact national security and protect its citizens (Lengel, 2011). This was an issue in Columbia in the 80s, and it is becoming a legitimate concern for Mexico over the last two decades (Beittel, 2011; Gootenberg, 2012; Lengel, 2011). Three Mexican presidents have failed to make significant progress in stemming the tide of violence perpetrated by ever-evolving DTOs. Wholesale corruption has been exposed at every level of the government, military, and law enforcement. This internal destabilization is not only an issue of national security for Mexico, but for the U.S. as well given the near 2000-mile border both nations share, and the constant state of trade, immigration, and tourism between both (Beittel, 2011). This destabilization has also now contributed to the specter of spillover violence into the U.S. (Curran, 2015; Osowski, 2014). As Lengel (2011) notes, when the government is viewed to have no legitimacy, DTOs become the face of governance, with the citizens viewing them as the “controlling authority” (p.1). Some, including former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, have referred to MDTOs in particular as insurgents (Beittel, 2011), while most recently President Trump has called them terrorists (Donati & de Cordoba, 2019).
Despite destabilizing the government through violence and criminal incursions, DTOs are not insurgents or terrorists, at least by the standard definitions. Insurgency is about the overthrow of a governing body, but DTOs goals are not about deposing a president or conquering the existing government, but rather to halt the government’s interventions into their criminal activities (Lengel, 2011). Similarly, terrorism is based on ideological motivations of a political or religious nature, and while DTOs often engage in terrorist-like violence, their motivation is financial. These violent tactics are a strategy to dissuade other DTOs encroaching on their markets, and government suppression of the means by which they make their money (Lengel, 2011).
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