During the early hours of the 31st of January in 1968, the northern Vietnamese forces planned and executed simultaneous attacks across the south of Vietnam, following a series of warnings proposed to the US forces through radio signals. The offensive was intended to completely destroy the Saigon regime and government, to present the sheer force that the Viet Cong had had to the Americans so that the communist forces could push for victory and end the war. Despite these initial militaristic aims that the north had, the offensive failed them in this way but presented them with success in other ways. The US and southern forces came out of the offensive as the victorious side, in terms of the militaristic aspect of the offensive, however, the aftermath and consequences were not in favor of the victorious, yet reaped the reward for the aggressors. Whether it was overrated can be decided based on multiple factors with three of them being: in terms of the military, its social impact, and also the psychological impact that it had. In terms of the military, it can be said to be overrated due to how the US was victorious in that aspect, however, the psychological and social impacts that the offensive of 1968 had on America were devastating. The social impact could be evidently seen through the American public's view and the position in which they stood on the war in Vietnam. Following the offensive, many were beginning to become less supportive of the war and were even beginning to oppose it. Many also believed that the offensive was a defeat for the Allied forces despite it being a victory so socially it cannot be overrated. Psychologically, the offensive damaged both the American public but also those involved in the war. Generals and officers became distressed and shaken up by the attack, while soldiers also suffered in similar ways with the sheer size of the support that the north had exercised and shown to the south, and it showed the Americans that there were no signs of the war coming to a halt any time soon. Westmoreland is a prime example of an American official being distressed by the events as following it, he resigned from his position declaring he had experienced a nervous breakdown. Although the actual events and battles of the Tet offensive could be argued to be overrated, the social and psychological impact that it had suggests otherwise and demonstrate the destruction and rot that the offensive had set into American society's attitude and outlook on the war in Vietnam.
In terms of its militaristic importance, the Tet offensive could be argued to be overrated. The aim, of the Viet Cong before the launch of the Tet offensive, was to break the deadlock in the war and cause the Saigon regime to crumble. This aim was not fulfilled and the US did not suffer defeat from the offensive. This success in terms of winning the offensive is demonstrated through the statistic that the US suffered almost thirteen thousand casualties and the Viet Cong suffered a recognized fifty thousand deaths. This is clear evidence that the side that suffered the most was the communist forces and in reality, the offensive wasn't as devastating for the US as the communists intended it to be but was the complete opposite in terms of the militaristic side of the offensive. ‘Allied forces quickly won the battle’. This view is valid given that the US comfortably put down the communist aggressors in the battle of Hue, which was one of the main battles from the offensive. Robbins's interpretation supports the idea that the battle was a comfortable victory for the Allied forces. Further statistics from this battle support this interpretation even more as around 6,000 communist forces were killed compared to the significantly smaller 600 allied troops, and this led to the US openly declaring the battle as a victory. This was further supported by the way the allied forces were able to take back full control of all attacked cities in a matter of weeks. Based on the fact that the US and allied forces were able to take control of the attacked cities and suffered fewer casualties than their aggressors, it can be argued that, in terms of its militaristic importance, the Tet offensive was overrated. Joseph Califino supports this argument well when he says, ‘Tet was a major military defeat for the Vet Cong and North Vietnamese...Nevertheless, the Tet attacks succeeded in forcing the American government to retreat from an expansion and even continuation of the war as it had been fought.’ Here he clearly identifies and supports the popular belief that the US began to withdraw from the Vietnamese war because of the impact that Tet had on America, but it is made clear by Califino that it was not because of the effect that the north`s attacks militarily had, due to how clearly states that the Communists suffered militarily. This defeat on the battlefield is highlighted even more by the number of losses on either side; between 33,000 and 58,000 deaths for the communists compared to the minor 1,100 to 4,000 deaths for the US forces.
As well as this, it can also be said that the offensive was militarily overrated due to how the consequences and events that took place on the battlefield were not the biggest issue or concern that the allied forces faced. Schmitz supports this interpretation and shows this when he says ‘for the first time in modern history the outcome of a war was determined not on the battlefield but on the printed page and above all on the television screen.' The fact that the immediate aftermath and consequences of this series of battles were not the most important outcome, furtherly emphasizes that the militaristic side of the battle was overrated, as the side that came out victorious were the ones who ended up worse off from the sequence of events because of other factors such as the psychological and social impacts. On top of this view about the Tet offensive being overrated can be furtherly supported by a primary source that comes from a top North Vietnamese General, Tran Do: ‘we didn’t achieve our main objective which was to spur uprisings throughout the south.’ This quote shows that the aims and goals, the communists had for the offensive, were to cause damage and install into the south through destruction and violence by the Viet Cong. However this was not achieved and the consequences in which the US suffered the most were not in the south but back home in the states and not because of the effectiveness of the northern forces` military but because of how it became apparent how large the communist cause was and America was interfering and trying to prevent in politics that ultimately had nothing to do with them, but they involved themselves in it because of a made up ‘greater soviet conspiracy’ theory. The idea that in terms of its military significance, Tet was overrated because of how the communists failed to achieve their main goals can be seen further by the Viet Cong declaring that they wanted to take control of as many cities in the south as possible. ‘Documents subsequently seized by the US troops showed that the orders from Hanoi were to seize and hold as many centers as possible before a general uprising in the south’ when Christene Bragg says this, it not only emphasizes that the Viet Cong and communists north failed to use their military strength to seize and take control of major parts in the south but they also failed to use their military to gain support during the campaign from the people in the south and start an uprising against the US and southern government, as they intended, so the direct and initial impact of the military was minimal and unimportant despite the argument that the military offensive was the first domino to fall in the later chain of events that would cause major issues for America and south Vietnam.
However, in contrast to this, the Tet offensive could be argued to be not overrated militarily due to the effects and immediate consequences that it had on the US military. The simultaneous sequence of events was planned to stretch US and allied forces through its range of attacks across the south. Attacking a diverse selection of locations, meant the US forces would have to split, to deal with all the attacks, and therefore would be made a lot weaker. Hasting says 'The communists were deemed to have secured a triumph merely by displaying the power to engulf South Vietnam in destruction and death'. This portrays the idea that the northern forces were successful to an extent because they were able to prove to the Americans that their forces and support were huge and that they were not going away any time soon. Not only was this a psychological blow to the US but it was also a militaristic blow as it showed the US the sheer size of the communist forces and would therefore have made them fear the communist military. The fact that the northern forces were comfortably able to enter the south and let chaos run loose in the south, just showed how capable the communist forces were as they were able to infiltrate the south and strike a major blow to the allies. Due to their impressive ability and skill to do this, alone, it makes it hard to call the offensive overrated militarily because storming the south undetected should not have been a simple and easy task.
Arnold also makes it clear that the offensive has an argument that it wasn't overrated to an extent, in terms of its militaristic significance. 'It was one of the few battles of history that can be called decisive.' This shows that despite its success militarily for the communists, Arnold still believes that the actual battle, and therefore militaristic side of the simultaneous attacks, wasn't entirely unimportant as if it wasn't for the events started by the Viet Cong forces then the chaos that erupted as a result of Tet, psychological and social chaos, wouldn't have come about back home in America.
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Due to the damaging psychological effects that the Tet offensive had on the US, it is hard to say that the offensive of 1968 was overrated in regards to this. The psychological damage that it caused could be seen not only through the soldiers and generals that were based in Vietnam but also in those back home in America; the public and government. The psychological damages caused were arguably down to the media`s reports on the events and a strong argument that the media created mass panic in America could be made. This interpretation can be supported by Westmorland saying ‘television reporters, who did not understand the true nature of the war, served the purpose of the enemy by portraying the Tet as a crisis and a defeat'. Not only does this support the argument that the media caused this psychological blow to US society but it also shows that a panic and sense of emergency was beginning to be installed in America based on the way in which the war was being reported. Furtherly it shows that the psychological damages that the US was served because of Tet were made even worse by the belief that even those who were involved at the time knew that the enemy had been put at an advantage due to the psychological mess that Tet was causing America. This view seems credible as many would also argue that the Tet also gave America a massive reality check as the 80,000 men's strong invasion of the south clearly showed America that support for the communist’s cause was strong and there was no sign of them giving in anytime soon. 'We must decide whether it is futile to destroy Vietnam to save it'. This was the response that an NBC television reporter, Frank McGee, gave when asked whether it would viable to increase troops in Vietnam. His response makes it clear that the US had realized that if they wanted to win the war then they would have to destroy the whole of Vietnam. If they did go on to do this then their initial aims of making Vietnam communist free would have been successful however they would also destroy all morality that they had but also any support at home as a public lack of support for the war was also beginning to be shown through mass protests.
As well as this, the sheer size of the communist forces that were used in the Tet offensive`s attacks demonstrated to the Americans just how big the communist cause was and how the battle seemed as if it would never end due to what could be seen as ‘never ending' support and soldiers. Although the number of soldiers lost for the north was massive, it was barely a loss for the north due to how many more men they could carry on supplying for the cause. A North Vietnamese officer acknowledged this loss of soldiers, however, is quoted to have said, ’We had hundreds of thousands killed in this war. We would have sacrificed one or two million more if necessary.' The general clearly supports this argument as he says if required, the Viet Cong could have had millions of soldiers to fight and it is, therefore, fair to argue that the support for the northern cause was a lot bigger than the Americans anticipated and therefore it's justifiable that the Americans were star struck and psychologically damaged by the size of their forces that the communists demonstrated.
Despite this, the argument that the offensive was overrated psychologically still stands due to how it could be said that the chain of attacks didn't have a significant enough impact on the US, particularly the American public. This argument is evident in many historians' writing and works, and Schmitz actively poses this belief as proved when he says, ‘Tet did not cause a dramatic shift in public opinion’. This shows that there was no instant shift in public opinion following Tet, despite the negative and damaging reports that the US public received from the media. Furthermore, this is highlighted again by the fact that Johnsons' public rating was at its lowest in August 1967 when it stood at 27%. This shows that Johnson was already losing public backing and support, and because of this, it can't be said the events of late January and the months following were the reason for Johnson's downfall.
Socially, the Tet offensive as a turning point cannot be overrated due to the significant impact that it had on the US public and how it was able to fully grasp the attention of US society and caused a major sway in the public's attitude towards the war in Vietnam. This social impact that came from the Tet offensive was hugely down to the media and how the events were reported back home to the American public. Mass panic was installed into US society as it was reported that the majority of the southern population supported the communist forces and therefore it could be argued that the US was fighting an unjust war against a country that completely wanted communism but also that the US was fighting a battle that they couldn't win, due to how much support there was made out to be for the communists. James Arnold supports this when he states in his ‘assessment', ’The American press played a decisive role in the Tet offensive press reporting of the Tet offensive was highly misleading they reported it must be because of a sympathetic civilian population who helped conceal communist movements'. Reports such as these were highly damaging for the US cause in Vietnam as they began to cause a public uprising at home for the anti-Vietnam movement. Furthermore, the Tet offensive evidently left major damage upon US society as it led to a lack of trust in the government as both the US public, soldiers and arguably even the government did not know why the US was fighting an ongoing war that looked almost impossible to win, due to the sheer size of the communist's support and forces that appeared to be endless. The support and trust in the government, which continued to push for the continuing of the war, was evident through the public's trust. Arnold supports the argument for a lack of support for the Vietnamese war from the US public when he says 'the test offensive of1968. Reversed the support of the people back home. The social impacts that came from Tet were evident in the sharp decline in the public's confidence in Johnson and whether winning the war was even worth fighting let alone was even winnable. 'Tet contradicted the official optimism about the course of the war and public confidence in Johnson fell sharply'. The impact socially upon US society can be seen even further with stats showing, that in opinion polls, that after the Tet, in 1971, 61% of people said that sending troops to Vietnam was a mistake compared to 24%, before the offensive, in 1965.
In contrast to this, the significance of the Tet offensive as a turning point could be overrated socially due to how following the Tet offensive. Opposition at home could be argued to have been a loud minority and in real opposition to the war in Vietnam didn't drastically increase as a result of the offensive. ‘Tet produced a ’rally' effect, with 70 percent of Americans-up from 63 percent in December-saying they wanted the US to continue the bombing of North Vietnam'. This quote from historian Califano supports this argument as following the Tet offensive, there was a significant increase in support for the bombing and further destruction of Vietnam. If the offensive was such a major turning point, then the support for the war would have decreased throughout America's public which it didn't and because of this, it could be argued that through its social impacts, the Tet offensive was overrated. There is also a perfectly acceptable argument, held in high regard by many, that the social impact of Tet was very little however the media exaggerated it and attempted to make it worse. It could be said that not only was it responsible for reporting falsely and exaggerating the negatives of the offensive for the US but it also reported back a lack of trust in the government and huge panic within the public, that in reality, didn't actually completely.
In conclusion, it is hard to judge whether the Tet offensive was either overrated or underrated or neither based on the impacts that it had. Based on the three ways that I have assessed it, the offensive could be argued either way with its militaristic importance being unimportant but undoubtedly, the psychological and social impacts were extremely significant. The fact that the offensive and series of events is known as a turning point makes it hard to argue against the point that the offensive was overrated. The title of Arnold's book on the offensive, ‘Tet offensive, a turning point’ is evidence that many historians see the event as a turning point, and through being a turning point it means that it was a decisive stage of the Vietnamese war and therefore cannot be overrated. Militarily the fact that the communist forces were unable to cause any a major drop in y was summarised when Arnold says in his assessment on the Tet offensive as a turning point, ‘The Tet offensive of 1968 failed to defeat the American foot soldier on the battlefield, but it had defeated his general's strategy, his political leaders, and reversed the support of the people back home.’
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