Essay about Revolutionary War

Many people would say the American colonists were bargaining with the British for their freedom in the leadup to the Declaration of Independence, but through an international affairs lens, is this actually the case? Was either party actually acting within the bargaining model, or where they both just determined to get exactly what they wanted? Ultimately, is the bargaining model a satisfactory and comprehensive model to view the American Revolutionary War under, or must one look elsewhere? This paper will argue that while components of the bargaining model, including its assumptions and conclusion that war results from failure to strike a bargain, are very useful in explaining the causes of the Revolutionary War, it also has some oversights, making other theories, such as the “democratic norms and culture” argument, the fundamental attribution error, and prospect theory, necessary to get a more complete picture of why the war played out the way it did.

Before going into the main analysis, it is relevant to highlight some assumptions being made here. Firstly, at this moment in history, the world could be described as an unbalanced multipolarity, perhaps moving towards what would become unipolarity—in Britain—by the end of the eighteenth century. As far as the colonies, they will be treated as an actor or states. This is because, in all the major theories, relations between two or more states are the focal point, and the colonies must act as one to utilize these theories.

The concept of war as a mode of bargaining was first introduced by Carl von Clausewitz, who is famously quoted as saying, “[w]ar is the continuation of politics by other means” (Downes 9/19). In the time since then, however, a solidified theory known as the bargaining model has taken hold, which “describes interactions in which actors try to resolve disputes over the allocation of a good” (Frieden 2019: 96). Of course, states will only reach an agreement, however, if doing so would give them at least as much as their “expected value” from fighting, creating what is known as the bargaining range, or “the set of deals that both sides prefer over war” (Downes 9/24; Frieden 2019: 99). In “Rationalist Explanations for War,” James Fearon surmises that “war is costly and risky, so rational states should have incentives to locate negotiated settlements that all would prefer to the gamble of war” (Fearon 1995: 380). He is interested in pinning down the reasons why any rational state would arrive at the answer of war when it seems there are always less costly and deadly alternatives. Before reaching his conclusions, however, one must acknowledge the assumptions the bargaining model makes.

Starting with the assumption that states are unitary actors and exist in anarchy, this appears to be true (Downes 9/24). Though not yet an actual state and instead the purveyors of an internal revolution, the colonists’ link was strong enough to unify thirteen unique colonies. Additionally, the framework for the revolution was not based on class, race, or ethnicity but rather on an ideological national identity, thus fulfilling the requirement of the assumption. The other half of this assumption, that states exist in anarchy, also seems to be true. Though England would attempt to subdue the colonies with military forces, the conflict can ultimately be considered a domestic, or internal, affair. The key here is that there is no external force to police the situation, and both sides are free to act in their own direct interests.

The second assumption, that states pay the cost of war themselves, is mostly true (Downes 9/24). The onus of funding the war definitely fell to each respective side; however, France helping the colonies monetarily and logistically does add a wrinkle to the situation. When you involve another actor’s resources, they are also added to the math of the bargaining model. With France’s assistance, the colonies were certainly unburdened. So, while the logic about the lower the cost of war, the more willing to fight, holds, where the money is coming from in the case of the colonies is not solely themselves.

The third assumption, that states do not prefer war for its own sake, also seems to be the case here (Downes 9/24). From their perspective, the colonists had exhausted all other means of negotiation before resorting to violence. The Declaration of Independence lays out clearly each of these attempts made by the colonists to no avail. In addition, England would have had no clear and obvious reason for waging a war on their most prosperous colonies. Therefore, neither actor had the motive to provoke war for the sake of it. Rather, it seemed to be a matter of necessity.

The fourth assumption, that states only care about getting the best deal, might provoke some objections from the colonists and their defenders, who would argue they were fighting not for typical, materially self-interested reasons but simply for what they were owed as human beings: unalienable rights (Downes 9/24). As humble as these wishes might have been, however, it could still be argued that achieving them would look enough like “getting the best deal” that this particular objection can be ignored.

The fifth and final assumption, that states are rational, could raise some eyebrows when considering the state of the British monarch at the time (Downes 9/24). King George III is infamously characterized in history as a mad figure and therefore not the most “rational.” That being said, when weighing the costs and benefits of the colonies’ independence, it would not exactly be irrational for the British elite, as a whole, to want to hold on to one of the main stimulators of their economy.

Now having considered each of the bargaining model’s assumptions, it is plausible to say that the Revolutionary War fulfills them well enough to make it a valid framework for initial analysis, but whether the model itself is as foolproof is another question entirely. To answer it, one must look into two more general ways one could apply this model to the Revolutionary War, as well as bring in some explanations by Fearon to explain why it nonetheless occurred.

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The first bargaining model interpretation of the war is that as England’s premiere colonies and irreplaceable sources of revenue, the colonies felt they had an upper hand and therefore a bigger expected outcome in what they were after. This confidence was exhibited with aggressive tactics like the Boston Tea Party but only amounted to slaps in the face of their home country. When England not only failed to redress their grievances, and instead imposed harsher terms, the colonists saw no choice but to cease the bargaining and continue politics through other means, the very idea Clausewitz propagated.

The alternative theory still following the logic of the bargaining model assumes a much larger initial bargaining range. This could be the case if the colonists took into account the likely costs of waging war with the world’s preeminent superpower. It is also just as likely because it is known that the colonists did attempt to bargain many times before they drafted the Declaration of Independence. How, then, with such a large bargaining range, did the colonies ultimately find themselves engaging in direct combat with their country of origin? For that, one must examine the shortcomings of the bargaining model and the associated writings.

In his journal, Fearon assumes the accuracy of the bargaining model and searches for plausible exceptions within it. He concludes that there are only three reasons why a rational state might go to war in spite of the bargaining model (Fearon 1995: 381). The first explanation, which he deems the weakest, is in cases where states are fighting over an indivisible good, in which the issue becomes all-or-nothing (Fearon 1995: 381-2). This would definitely apply to the nature of the colonies’ demand for unalienable rights. In fact, an argument could be made that what Fearon considers to be the weakest rationalist explanation could actually be the strongest when applied to the Revolutionary War because the other two, commitment problems and private information, misrepresent the state of affairs at that time. The colonists would have been quite aware of the sheer power they were up against. Furthermore, no amount of strategic planning around the time of attack or misrepresenting their capabilities would have changed this, and the colonists would not have been so naïve to think otherwise (Fearon 1995: 381-2). So, while the indivisibility option proposed by Fearon seems to best explain how a bargain might fail to be struck under the bargaining model, the weakness of the other two is representative of bigger pitfalls surrounding the theory.

For some reason, Fearon’s take on the bargaining model also assumes that states would never want to take on the costs of war under any circumstances—even if the expected benefits would outweigh the costs (Fearon 1995: 381). Fearon’s judgment is correct that this does not explain why a state would not try to bargain just to avoid the costs outright, but he does not provide a resolution in the case of the colonists, who had already tried bargaining many times. After that, it makes perfect sense that the colonists would pursue war if the costs were worth the overall gain. And what could be more essential and worth fighting for if not for your own rights as a person (as they saw it)?

Given these shortcomings of the bargaining model, it seems necessary, then, to provide alternative or additional theories to explain under what pretenses the Revolutionary War occurred. Perhaps the most compelling of these supplementary theories is Bruce Russett’s “democratic norms and culture” argument, in which he argues “if people in a democracy perceive themselves as autonomous, self-governing people who share norms of live-and-let-live, they will respect the rights of others to self-determination if those others are also perceived as self-governing and hence not easily led into aggressive foreign policies by a self-serving elite” (Russett 1993: 92). Essentially, democratic states will expect other democratic states to act within the peaceful norms present in their own systems when interacting with one another.

In the case of the colonies, though hard to call it a norm considering they had not been around very long, the founders were highly influenced by Enlightenment thinking and had already internalized the ideas of liberty and freedom. That being said, these men would also have realized they were up against an authoritarian monarch rather than a democracy. Russett says that “authoritarian states are expected to aggress against others if given the power and the opportunity. By this reasoning, democracies must be eternally vigilant and may even need to engage in defensively motivated war or preemptive action anticipating an immediate attack” (Russett 1993: 93). So, though the colonists might have hoped for reciprocated peaceful conflict resolution and had given England the benefit of the doubt in the beginning, they eventually had to let go of this and treat England as the autocratic regime it was.

Another useful concept to append to the bargaining model in explaining the Revolutionary War is the fundamental attribution error. According to Causes of War, this theory says that “[i]ndividuals have a tendency to interpret others’ behavior, particularly behavior that they regard as undesirable, as reflecting dispositional factors rather than situational factors” (Levy 2010: 143). In other words, people interpret actions and decisions based on what fits their narrative, often resulting in cognitive biases. “Moreover, since we believe that our own actions are defensively motivated, and since we assume that the adversary understands that, we interpret the adversary’s hostile behavior as evidence that it must be hostile” (Levy 2010: 143). The colonists characterized England as levying taxes just to keep them under control and restrict their freedom, but, situationally, it made sense for England to tax the colonies to recoup losses caused by the French and Indian War. By this theory, however, the colonists would not have been able to see past this, only seeing that England was unnaturally greedy and disrespectful of the rights God had endowed them with, and took England to the task.

A final additional framework to explain the Revolutionary War is prospect theory. The theories discussed up to this point have been very colonial-centric, but viewing England through this lens yields another quite compelling explanation. Per this theory, people have a tendency to overweight losses relative to gains, and therefore, “[t]hey are more likely to fight in order to avoid losses than to make gains” (Levy 2010: 151-152). Furthermore, “[i]f faced with possible losses from the status quo … individuals will prefer to gamble on risky strategies that might eliminate the loss and maintain the status quo rather than adopt a strategy that is certain to lead to that negative outcome” (Levy 2010: 151). By this token, it makes sense why England risked war over the colonies they had held ownership over for so long. The economic loss would have been massive and disruptive to the economic system they were accustomed to. It also explains why the bargaining model is unsatisfactory in explaining the situation: England was not willing to bargain at all if it meant losing the incredibly valuable status quo.

Perhaps that sentiment says it best. Though some aspects of the bargaining model are compelling, it comes short of fully explaining the Revolutionary War because, in some ways, neither side viewed it as a bargaining situation, to begin with. The colonists were determined to receive their full autonomy and independence from England, and the British were determined to make sure they did not let go of a sliver. Again, though the bargaining model’s assumptions and conclusion that war results from failure to strike a bargain are not off base, it is not a sufficient theory alone. Fearon’s rationalist explanations attempt to close the gap somewhat, but it is other theories, namely Russett’s “democratic norms and culture” argument, the fundamental attribution error, and prospect theory, that are necessary to actually wrap one’s head around this momentous war in American history. Relying on multiple, logical theories through which to view the past makes sure these events are not oversimplified and brings us closer to the proper conclusions.